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Abstract 
 
Establishing how cognitive abnormalities result in the signs and symptoms that define 
schizophrenia and anxiety disorders (and their co-morbidity) has become a prominent question 
in clinically, and sub-clinically, applied research. Abnormal performance in schizophrenia, 
schizotypy and anxiety has been observed in comparison to healthy individuals on a range of 
cognitive and behavioural tasks. For example, abnormal attention to irrelevant information has 
long been recognised by clinicians, which has since encouraged researchers to elucidate the 
nature of the relationship between schizophrenia, and anxiety more recently, with allocation of 
attention to stimuli in laboratory studies providing empirical evidence for an attentional view 
of these disorders.  
 
The pre-exposure effect (slower learning to a stimulus that has been rendered familiar 
by preexposure, relative to a novel cue), hereafter refered to as latent inhibition, has been shown 
to be inversely correlated with schizotypy, and abnormal in people with schizophrenia, but 
findings are inconsistent. One potential contributing factor to this inconsistency is that many 
tasks that purport to measure latent inhibition are confounded by alternative effects that also 
retard learning and co-vary with schizotypy, such as learned irrelevance (experience of a cue 
as irrelevant to the occurrence of an outcome due to inconsistent/uncorrelated presentations of 
a cue and a target). The general aim of this thesis is to address, or begin to address, some of the 
key questions and limitations with existing research that evaluate latent inhibition and learned 
irrelevance as potentially useful cognitive endophenotypes for schizophrenia and anxiety 
disorders. The current experiments separate out the effects of latent inhibition and learned 
irrelevance to assess the independent effects of these phenomena on schizotypy (and by 
extension schizophrenia) and anxiety. By teasing apart, the effects of latent inhibition and 
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learned irrelevance the attempt is to disentangle, and improve understanding of attentional 
abnormalities observed in these sub-clinical traits and by extension, their related pathologies.  
  
 Across Experiments 1-4, the purpose was two-fold. The first was to address the 
limitations of existing latent inhibition tasks by designing a paradigm that examines a purer 
effect of latent inhibition, by minimising the contribution of learned irrelevance, and assessing 
how this latent inhibition task co-varies with schizotypy and anxiety (Chapter 2: Experiments 
1 and 2). The second was to examine the alternative, potentially less equivocal, learned 
attentional paradigm (learned irrelevance) and assess the relationship between this task with 
both schizotypy and anxiety (Chapter 3: Experiments 3 and 4). Based on the assumption that 
latent inhibition and learned irrelevance share similar psychological underpinnings (in this 
case, attentional), we anticipated the effect of schizotypy and anxiety to be comparable in the 
two types of attention tasks here. The results however indicate a double dissociation; an 
abnormally persistent latent inhibition effect in high positive schizotypy individuals 
(Experiments 1 and 2) and a reduced learned irrelevance effect in high state anxious individuals 
(Experiments 3 and 4). The possibility that latent inhibition is non-attentional and the 
implications of these findings for associative models of attention and learning are explored. 
 
The aim of Experiments 5 and 6 were to explore the causal relationship between 
induced variations in anxiety (stress, relaxation or neutral mood) and learned variations in 
attention, using a less ambiguous measure of attention (compared to latent inhibition): learned 
irrelevance. Based on the findings from Experiments 3 and 4, a reduced attentional bias towards 
previously established predictive cues was expected in individuals induced with an acute state 
of anxiousness, relative to individuals induced with either a relaxed or neutral mood state. This 
pattern of results was observed but to a weaker extent than the previous experiments, 
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suggesting that induced variations in anxiety do not have the same relationship with learning 
as naturally occurring variations in anxiety, as observed in Experiments 3 and 4. Further 
analyses revealed that the relationship between reduced learned irrelevance and anxiety was 
mediated by individuals who were also characterised by high levels of schizotypy, and by 
extension vulnerability to schizophrenia. Given the potential common underlying cognitive 
processes to both anxiety and schizophrenia, it seems likely that therapies which target the 
symptoms of anxiety (e.g., Attentional Bias Modification Treatment; ABMT) would be 
beneficial to individuals who have also been diagnosed with a psychotic disorder. 
 
This work represents the first attempt to investigate the independent effects of latent 
inhibition and learned irrelevance on schizotypy and anxiety, using refined tasks that 
minimised the contribution of either learning phenomenon on each other. How these learning 
tasks co-vary in patients with schizophrenia and clinically diagnosed anxiety however remains 
for future research to determine1. At this juncture, the current findings lend support to the 
potential cognitive endophenotype status of learned irrelevance (considering its status as a less 
ambiguous measure of attention) and its continued use to provide a base for the development 
of relevant attentional bias modification treatments.  
 
 
 
 
 
   
                                                             
1 This work in clinically diagnosed populations (including preparation for publication: Granger et al.) is 
currently on-going in our lab. 
-5- 
 
Publications 
 
The data contained in this thesis have been published as follows: 
 
Chapter 2 
Granger, K. T., Moran, P., Buckley, M. G., Haselogrove, M. (2015). Enhanced latent inhibition 
in high schizotypy individuals. Personality and Individual Differences, 91, 31-39. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-6- 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
First and foremost, I owe my biggest thanks to my primary supervisor, Mark Haselgrove. It has 
been an honour to be his PhD student and without his endless support, my PhD would not have 
been possible. I am so grateful for his time, ideas and expertise that not only guided my PhD 
research but also helped to shape me into the scientist I am today. The enthusiasm he has for 
his research is incredibly motivational and he has provided an excellent example of a very 
successful scientist and academic. If my career is half as successful as Marks’ I shall be very 
content. From allowing me pop my head round his office door (a lot!), whether it be to tell him 
about an exciting finding, to ask a question or sometimes just because I needed to talk, I truly 
thank him. A big thank you also goes to the whole of ‘Team Haselgrove’. 
 
I also owe a huge thank you to my second supervisor, Paula Moran – thank you for always 
making me smile and for helping me to see the bigger picture. I am truly grateful for all your 
support, guidance and exceptional expertise. 
 
Thank you very much to Helen Cassaday for the suggestions you have made as my internal 
examiner, and also to Robin Murphy for the effort you have spent in examining my thesis – I 
hope you enjoyed it. 
 
A special thank you to my excellent research interns Hannah Radley, Zaynab Ali and Amy 
Williams for help with running Experiments 4 and 5! 
 
My office mate Emma – Where to begin! We really have shared the rollercoaster ride of a PhD 
together. Our ‘Team’ approach to life both professionally and personally has made the last 4 
years so much more productive (and fun!). Some memories created (which can be found written 
on the office whiteboard!), never to be forgotten.   
 
My from the bottom of my heart thank you, goes to my Mum and Dad who have stood by me 
from the very beginning of this journey. They have supported me through the hard times, and 
celebrated with me during the good times. Words cannot describe what it means to have parents 
that have been there for me no matter what; not only as my parents but also as my friends. I am 
forever grateful to you both and I love you with all my heart.  
My brother Aaron, if it wasn’t for him I wouldn’t be where I am now. He has always believed 
in me, ever since I was a little girl. Before (and after!) every exam, every results day, through 
to my PhD progression vivas, I knew to expect a phone call of encouragement from my brother. 
He encouraged me to succeed and never let me quit. I thank him, not only for seeing my 
potential, but for helping me to see it too. 
My Gran; her intelligence amazes me and I thank her for all she has taught me. In a different 
generation she could have achieved what I have today. 
Lastly but by far no means least: a very important thank you I want to make to Ian, for being 
there when it mattered most. Thank you for standing by me, supporting me and for always 
helping me to see the positive in every situation. You have changed my life and I couldn’t have 
made it to the end without your love and support. 
So, to all my family and friends, who dares to read it? ;)  
-7- 
 
Contents 
 
Abstract ...................................................................................................................................... 2 
Publications ................................................................................................................................ 5 
Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................... 6 
Contents ..................................................................................................................................... 7 
List of Tables ........................................................................................................................... 13 
List of Figures .......................................................................................................................... 15 
Chapter 1: ............................................................................................................................. 17 
General Introduction .......................................................................................................... 17 
1. Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 17 
A. Overview of Schizophrenia, Schizotypy and Anxiety ............................................ 18 
1.1 Schizophrenia: Symptoms, Classification & Causes ................................................................. 18 
1.1.1 Schizophrenia at the symptom level ................................................................................... 18 
1.1.2 Classification of symptoms ................................................................................................ 19 
1.1.3 Causes of schizophrenia ..................................................................................................... 20 
1.1.3.1 Key Neurological factors............................................................................................. 20 
(1) Dopamine hypothesis of schizophrenia.......................................................................... 20 
(2) Glutamate hypothesis of schizophrenia ......................................................................... 23 
1.1.3.2 Genetic and environmental factors .............................................................................. 24 
1.1.4 Psychiatric Co-morbidities and Schizophrenia ................................................................... 25 
1.1.4.1 Co-morbid anxiety in schizophrenia ............................................................................ 25 
1.2 Schizotypy .......................................................................................................................... 26 
1.2.1 Overview of schizotypy ..................................................................................................... 26 
1.2.2 Measures of schizotypy ...................................................................................................... 27 
1.3 Clinical Anxiety: Symptoms, Classification & Causes ....................................................... 32 
1.3.1 Clinical Anxiety at the symptom level ............................................................................... 32 
1.3.2 Classification of symptoms ................................................................................................ 33 
1.3.3 Causes of anxiety ........................................................................................................ 34 
1.4 Sub-clinical Anxiety ................................................................................................................. 36 
1.4.1 Overview of sub-clinical anxiety........................................................................................ 36 
1.4.2 Measures of sub-clinical anxiety ........................................................................................ 37 
B. Cognitive dysfunction in Schizophrenia, Schizotypy and Anxiety .................... 39 
1.5 Schizophrenia, Schizotypy and Attention Dysfunction ............................................................. 40 
-8- 
 
1.5.1 Latent inhibition ................................................................................................................. 42 
1.5.1.1 Latent inhibition and schizophrenia............................................................................. 43 
1.5.1.1.1 Attenuated latent inhibition in schizophrenia: Mixed findings ............................. 43 
1.5.1.1.2 Enhanced latent inhibition in schizophrenia ......................................................... 44 
1.5.1.2 Latent inhibition and schizotypy ................................................................................. 45 
1.5.1.2.1 Attenuated latent inhibition in schizotypy: Mixed findings .................................. 46 
1.5.1.2.2 Limitations of existing latent inhibition designs ................................................... 47 
1.5.2 Learned irrelevance ............................................................................................................ 49 
1.5.2.1 Learned irrelevance, schizophrenia & schizotypy ....................................................... 54 
1.5.2.1.1 Attenuated learned irrelevance in schizophrenia and schizotypy .......................... 54 
1.6 Attention Dysfunction in Anxiety ............................................................................................. 57 
1.6.1 Latent inhibition and anxiety .............................................................................................. 60 
1.6.1.1 Attenuated latent inhibition and anxiety ...................................................................... 60 
1.6.1.2 Latent inhibition: The Anxiety components of schizotypy .......................................... 61 
1.6.2 Learned irrelevance and anxiety ..................................................................................... 63 
C. Learning Theory Background ..................................................................................... 63 
1.9 Associative Learning Theory .................................................................................................... 63 
1.9.1 Attention in associative learning ........................................................................................ 64 
1.9.1.1 Mackintosh (1975): The predictiveness principle ........................................................ 66 
1.9.1.2 The uncertainty principle (Pearce & Hall, 1980) ......................................................... 68 
1.9.2 Overview of applications to latent inhibition and learned irrelevance ......................... 71 
D. Aims of Thesis ................................................................................................................. 72 
(a) Experiments 1-4 .................................................................................................................. 73 
(b) Experiments 5 & 6 .............................................................................................................. 75 
Chapter 2: ............................................................................................................................. 76 
Latent inhibition: The relationship with schizotypy and anxiety ............................. 76 
2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 76 
2.1.1 Latent inhibition: Recapitulation ............................................................................................ 76 
2.1.2 Latent inhibition and schizophrenia ....................................................................................... 77 
2.1.3 Latent inhibition and schizotypy ............................................................................................ 80 
2.1.4 Latent inhibition, schizotypy and anxiety............................................................................... 83 
2.1.5 Experimental paradigms of latent inhibition: conceptual and methodological limitations. .... 85 
2.1.6 Aims and research questions .................................................................................................. 87 
2.2 Experiment 1 .................................................................................................................... 88 
2.2.1 Method ................................................................................................................................... 89 
-9- 
 
2.2.1.1 Participants ..................................................................................................................... 89 
2.2.1.2 Apparatus & Stimuli ........................................................................................................ 90 
2.2.1.3 Procedure ........................................................................................................................ 90 
2.2.1.3.1 Replicated-task Condition ........................................................................................ 90 
2.2.1.3.2 Modified -task Condition ......................................................................................... 91 
2.2.1.4 Scoring ............................................................................................................................ 94 
2.2.2 Results and Discussion ........................................................................................................... 94 
2.2.2.1 Latent inhibition .............................................................................................................. 94 
2.2.2.2 Latent inhibition and schizotypy ...................................................................................... 95 
2.3 Experiment 2 .................................................................................................................... 98 
2.3.1 Method ................................................................................................................................... 99 
2.3.1.1 Participants ..................................................................................................................... 99 
2.3.1.2 Apparatus ........................................................................................................................ 99 
2.3.1.3 Procedure ........................................................................................................................ 99 
2.3.2 Results and Discussion ......................................................................................................... 100 
2.3.2.1 Latent inhibition ............................................................................................................ 101 
2.3.2.2 Latent inhibition and schizotypy .................................................................................... 102 
2.3.2.3 Latent inhibition, schizotypy and anxiety ...................................................................... 104 
2.3.2.3.1 Experiment 1 .......................................................................................................... 106 
2.3.2.3.2 Experiment 2 .......................................................................................................... 108 
2.3.2.3.3 Summary of findings ................................................................................................... 112 
2.4 General Discussion .......................................................................................................... 112 
Chapter 3: ........................................................................................................................... 119 
Learned irrelevance: The relationship with schizotypy and anxiety ..................... 119 
3.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 119 
3.1.1 Latent inhibition: Overview & limitations ........................................................................... 119 
3.1.2 Latent inhibition vs learned irrelevance ............................................................................... 120 
3.1.4 Learned irrelevance and schizophrenia ................................................................................ 124 
3.1.5. Learned irrelevance and schizotypy .................................................................................... 126 
3.1.6 Learned irrelevance and anxiety........................................................................................... 127 
3.1.7 Aims and research questions ................................................................................................ 128 
3.2 Experiment 3 .................................................................................................................. 130 
3.2.1 Method ................................................................................................................................. 131 
3.2.1.1 Participants ................................................................................................................... 131 
3.2.1.2 Apparatus ...................................................................................................................... 131 
-10- 
 
3.2.1.3 Procedure ...................................................................................................................... 132 
3.2.1.4 Scoring .......................................................................................................................... 134 
3.2.2 Results and Discussion ......................................................................................................... 134 
3.2.2.1 Learned irrelevance ...................................................................................................... 136 
3.2.2.2 Learned irrelevance, Schizotypy and Anxiety ................................................................ 138 
3.2.2.2.1 Preliminary analyses .............................................................................................. 138 
3.2.2.3 Learned irrelevance and Anxiety ................................................................................... 140 
3.2.2.4 Summary of findings ...................................................................................................... 143 
3.3 Experiment 4 .................................................................................................................. 144 
3.3.1 Method ................................................................................................................................. 146 
3.3.1.1 Participants ....................................................................................................................... 146 
3.3.1.2 Apparatus ...................................................................................................................... 146 
3.3.1.3 Procedure.......................................................................................................................... 147 
3.3.1.4 Scoring .......................................................................................................................... 149 
3.3.2 Results and Discussion ......................................................................................................... 150 
3.3.2.1 Learned irrelevance ...................................................................................................... 151 
3.3.2.2 Learned irrelevance, Schizotypy and Anxiety ................................................................ 154 
3.3.2.2.1 Preliminary Analyses ............................................................................................. 154 
3.3.2.3 Learned irrelevance and Anxiety ................................................................................... 157 
3.3.2.4 Summary of findings ...................................................................................................... 160 
3.4 General Discussion .......................................................................................................... 160 
Chapter 4: ........................................................................................................................... 167 
Learned irrelevance: The relationship with induced anxiety and schizotypy ..... 167 
4.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 167 
4.1.1 Attentional bias and vulnerability to anxiety ........................................................................ 167 
4.1.2 Experimentally induced anxiety and latent inhibition .......................................................... 170 
4.1.3 Aims and research questions ................................................................................................ 172 
Part 1: Mood Manipulation .............................................................................................. 173 
4.2 Experiment 5 .................................................................................................................. 173 
4.2.1 Method ................................................................................................................................. 173 
4.2.1.1 Participants ................................................................................................................... 173 
4.2.1.2 Materials ....................................................................................................................... 174 
4.2.1.2.1 Speech Stressor Task .............................................................................................. 174 
4.2.1.2.2 Relaxation Response Task ...................................................................................... 174 
4.2.1.2.3 Mood Assessment Scale ......................................................................................... 174 
-11- 
 
4.2.1.3 Procedure ...................................................................................................................... 175 
4.2.1.3.1 Speech Stressor Task .............................................................................................. 175 
4.2.1.3.2 Relaxation Response Task ...................................................................................... 176 
4.2.1.3.3 Neutral Reading Task ............................................................................................. 177 
4.2.2 Results and Discussion ......................................................................................................... 178 
4.3 Experiment 6 .................................................................................................................. 180 
4.3.1 Method ................................................................................................................................. 180 
4.3.1.1 Participants ................................................................................................................... 180 
4.3.1.2 Materials & Apparatus.................................................................................................. 181 
4.3.1.2.1 Mood induction tasks ............................................................................................. 181 
4.3.1.2.2 Mood Assessment Scale ......................................................................................... 181 
4.3.1.2.3 Learned irrelevance task ......................................................................................... 181 
4.3.1.3 Procedure ...................................................................................................................... 181 
4.3.1.3.1 Mood induction tasks ............................................................................................. 181 
4.3.1.3.2 Learned irrelevance task ......................................................................................... 182 
4.3.1.3.2.1 Scoring ............................................................................................................ 182 
4.3.2 Results and Discussion ......................................................................................................... 182 
4.3.2.1 Learned irrelevance ...................................................................................................... 186 
4.3.2.2 Learned irrelevance and anxiety – high vs low state anxiety groups............................. 189 
4.3.2.3 Learned irrelevance and anxiety – Speech, Relaxation and Neutral conditions ............ 191 
Part 2: Learned irrelevance - Experiments 3, 4 and 6 combined ............................... 198 
4.4 Experiments 3, 4 & 6 combined .................................................................................... 198 
4.4.1 Scoring ............................................................................................................................. 199 
4.4.2 Preliminary analysis ........................................................................................................ 199 
4.4.3 Mediation analysis ........................................................................................................... 201 
4.5 General Discussion .......................................................................................................... 205 
Chapter 5: ........................................................................................................................... 210 
General Discussion ............................................................................................................ 210 
5.1 Discussion ........................................................................................................................ 210 
5.1.1 Overview.............................................................................................................................. 210 
5.1.2 Summary of findings ............................................................................................................ 212 
5.1.2.1 Experiments 1 and 2 ...................................................................................................... 212 
5.1.2.2 Experiments 3 and 4 ...................................................................................................... 215 
5.1.2.3 Experiments 5 and 6 ...................................................................................................... 217 
5.1.3 Implications of findings ....................................................................................................... 221 
-12- 
 
5.1.4 Clinical applications and future directions for research........................................................ 227 
5.1.5 Conclusions .......................................................................................................................... 231 
References ............................................................................................................................. 233 
Appendices ............................................................................................................................ 256 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-13- 
 
List of Tables 
 
Chapter 1: General Introduction 
 
Table 1.1 Experimental design: learned irrelevance with single cues (Schmidt-Hansen et al., 
2009) 
 
Table 1.2 Experimental design: learned irrelevance with compound cues (Le Pelley & 
McLaren, 2003). 
 
 
Chapter 2: Latent inhibition: The relationship with schizotypy and anxiety 
 
Table 2.1 Beta-coefficients from the multiple regression analyses of schizotypy subtypes 
(predictor variables), with reaction times to preexposed and non-preexposed stimuli as 
dependent variables for Experiment 1. 
 
Table 2.2 Summary information for O-LIFE scores for the participants in the replicated-task 
and modified-task conditions of Experiment 1, and all participants from Experiment 2. 
 
Table 2.3 Beta-coefficients from the multiple regression analyses of schizotypy subtypes 
(predictor variables), with reaction times to preexposed and non-preexposed stimuli as 
dependent variables for Experiment 2. 
 
Table 2.4. Summary information for STICSA-scores; Experiment 1 (pooled data from the 
replicated and modified task condition) and Experiment 2. 
 
Table 2.5. Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients for anxiety and schizotypy 
variables: Experiments 1 (pooled data from the replicated and modified task conditions) and 2. 
 
Table 2.6. Beta-coefficients from the hierarchical multiple regression analyses of schizotypy 
subtypes and anxiety subtypes (predictor variables), with reaction time to the preexposed and 
non-preexposed stimuli as dependent variables.  
 
 
Chapter 3: Learned irrelevance: The relationship with schizotypy and anxiety 
 
Table 3.1. Experimental Design of Experiment 3. 
 
Table 3.2.  Summary information for O-LIFE scores; Experiment 3. 
 
Table 3.3. Summary information for STICSA-scores; Experiment 3. 
 
Table 3.4. Correlation matrices among study variables; Experiment 3. 
 
Table 3.5. Experimental Design of Experiment 4. 
 
Table 3.6. Summary information for O-LIFE scores; Experiment 4. 
 
-14- 
 
Table 3.7. Summary information for STICSA-scores; Experiment 4.  
 
Table 3.8. Correlation matrices among study variables for stage 1; Experiment 4. 
 
Table 3.9. Correlation matrices among study variables for stage 2; Experiment 4. 
 
 
Chapter 4: Learned irrelevance: The relationship with induced anxiety and 
schizotypy 
 
Table 4.1. Pairwise comparisons for state anxiety scores between the different mood condition 
at pre-test, post-test and follow-up; experiment 6. 
 
Table 4.2. Pairwise comparisons for the pre, post and follow-up anxiety scores for each of the 
mood conditions; experiment 6. 
 
Table 4.3. Correlation matrices among study variables for stage 1; experiment 6. 
 
Table 4.4. Correlation matrices among study variables for stage 2; experiment 6. 
 
Table 4.5. Correlation matrices among study variables for stage 2; experiment 6, part 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-15- 
 
List of Figures 
 
Chapter 2: Latent inhibition: The relationship with schizotypy and anxiety 
 
Figure 2.1. Experimental design for Experiment 1 
 
Figure 2.2. Mean reaction time to the target cued by preexposed stimuli and non-preexposed 
stimuli in the latent inhibition task for Experiment 1. 
 
Figure 2.3. Mean reaction time to the target cued by preexposed stimuli and non-preexposed 
stimuli in the latent inhibition task for Experiment 2. 
 
 
Chapter 3: Learned irrelevance: The relationship with schizotypy and anxiety 
 
Figure 3.1. Reaction times to target cued by relevant and irrelevant cues for stage 1 in the 
learned irrelevance task; Experiment 3. 
 
Figure 3.2. Reaction times to target cued by relevant and irrelevant cues for stage 2 in the 
learned irrelevance task; Experiment 3. 
 
Figure 3.3. Reaction times to target cued by relevant and irrelevant cues for stage 1, separately 
for high and low state anxiety groups; Experiment 3. 
 
Figure 3.4.  Reaction times to target cued by relevant and irrelevant cues for stage 2, separately 
for high and low state anxiety groups; Experiment 3. 
 
Figure 3.5. Screenshot examples from a typical stage 1 trial in Experiment 4. 
 
Figure 3.6. Screenshot examples from a typical stage 2 trial in Experiment 4. 
 
Figure 3.7. Percentages of correct responses to target cued by relevant and irrelevant cues for 
stage 1 in the learned irrelevance task; Experiment 4. 
 
Figure 3.8. Mean discrimination scores for stage 2, average separately for the relevant and 
irrelevant cues; Experiment 4. 
 
Figure 3.9. Percentage of correct responses to target cued by relevant and irrelevant cues for 
stage 1, averaged separately for high and low state anxiety groups; Experiment 4. 
 
Figure 3.10.  Mean discrimination scores for stage 2, averaged separately for separately for 
high and low state anxiety groups; Experiment 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-16- 
 
Chapter 4: Learned irrelevance: The relationship with induced anxiety and 
schizotypy 
 
Figure 4.1. Mean state anxiety scores at pre-test and post-test for each mood condition; speech, 
relaxation and neutral; Experiment 5. 
 
Figure 4.2. A flow diagram to illustrate the order of task completion; Experiment 6. 
 
Figure 4.3. Mean state anxiety scores at pre-test and post-test for each mood condition; speech, 
relaxation and neutral; Experiment 6. 
 
Figure 4.4. Percentages of correct responses to target cued by relevant and irrelevant cues for 
stage 1 in the learned irrelevance task; Experiment 6. 
 
Figure 4.5. Mean discrimination scores for stage 2, average separately for the relevant and 
irrelevant cues; Experiment 6. 
 
Figure 4.6. Percentage of correct responses to target cued by relevant and irrelevant cues for 
stage 1, averaged separately for high and low sate anxiety. 
 
Figure 4.7. Mean discrimination scores for stage 2, averaged separately for relevant and 
irrelevant cues for the low and high anxious groups. 
 
Figure 4.8. Percentage of correct responses to target cued by relevant and irrelevant cues for 
stage 1, averaged separately for relaxation, neutral and control conditions. 
 
Figure 4.9. Mean discrimination scores for stage 2, averaged separately for relaxation, neutral 
and control conditions. 
 
Figure 4.10. Model of state anxiety as a predictor of learned predictiveness, mediated by 
unusual experiences and trait anxiety. 
 
Figure 4.11. Model of trait anxiety as a predictor of learned predictiveness, mediated by 
unusual experiences and state anxiety. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-17- 
 
Chapter 1: 
General Introduction 
 
1. Introduction  
It has been proposed that schizophrenia is associated with a breakdown of an attentional 
filter; reflecting an inability to reduce attention to (or ignore) irrelevant stimuli (McGhie & 
Chapman, 1961; Hemsley, 1987), and such conclusions have prompted studies to elucidate the 
nature of this relationship in the laboratory. Many of these studies have translated designs from 
animal conditioning experiments (i.e., latent inhibition, learned irrelevance and blocking), in 
an attempt to understand the interaction of attention and associative learning, and how this 
might relate to schizophrenia and its associated pathologies, such as anxiety. 
 
Psychotic disorders such as schizophrenia exist on a continuum, ranging from typical 
imaginative states (low schizotypy), to features related to schizophrenic symptoms (high 
schizotypy), suggesting that natural variations in these schizotypal characteristics can serve as 
a proxy for the full blown condition (Claridge, 1997). This has been supported by studies 
indicating that attentional mechanisms are similarly disrupted in high psychometrically-
defined schizotypal individuals and people with schizophrenia (e.g. Baruch, Hemsley & Gray, 
1988a,b; Gray et al., 2002; Evans, Gray & Snowden, 2007; Schmidt-Hansen, Killcross & 
Honey, 2009; Le Pelley, Schmidt-Hansen, Harris, Lunter & Morris, 2010a; Granger, Prados & 
Young, 2012). However, within a ‘fully dimensional’ framework, this continuum is extended 
to represent the highest point ending, not only in clinical diagnoses of schizophrenia but also 
in pathological spectra comorbid with schizophrenia, such as anxiety (Rossi et al., 2000; Rossi 
& Daneluzzo, 2002). In line with this proposition, measures of anxiety have been shown to co-
vary with schizotypal traits that also appear to modulate attentional effects that have been 
translated from animal conditioning studies (Braunstein-Bercovitz, 2002).  
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The experiments reported in this thesis investigate the attentional mechanisms 
underlying the sub-dimensions of schizotypy (and by extension schizophrenia) to assess 
whether attentional abnormalities are specific to the symptoms of schizophrenia, or whether 
they are non-specific effects, related to the high levels of anxiety that accompany these states.  
 
A. Overview of Schizophrenia, Schizotypy and Anxiety 
 
1.1 Schizophrenia: Symptoms, Classification & Causes 
1.1.1 Schizophrenia at the symptom level 
Schizophrenia is a severe form of mental illness affecting around 1% of the global 
population with direct costs of treating the disorder estimated to be around £2.6 billion per year 
in the UK alone (Tajima-Pozo et al., 2015). The general incidence of schizophrenia is reported 
to be slightly lower in females with a later age of onset in the late-20’s, relative to the early- to 
mid-20’s for males. Earlier age of onset in males has been linked to worse premorbid 
adjustment, lower educational achievement and a worse overall prognosis (Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders [DSM-V], American Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
Lifetime prevalence also varies by race/ethnicity, across countries and by geographic origin for 
immigrants and children of immigrants (DSM-V). Schizophrenia is defined by 3 groups of 
symptoms. Positive symptoms reflect marked departures from ordinary cognition, which 
include; delusions; hallucinations; disorganized speech (e.g. frequent derailment or 
incoherence); grossly disorganized or catatonic behaviours. Negative symptoms reflect the 
absence or diminution of normal daily functions, which is characterized by affective flattening, 
alogia (poverty of speech), or avolition (lack of motivation). Cognitive symptoms are subtle 
and may only be recognised when tests are performed; cognitive symptoms include: poor 
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executive functioning, trouble focusing or paying attention, and problems with working 
memory (DSM-V, 2013).  
 
1.1.2 Classification of symptoms 
The DSM is the handbook used by mental health care professionals worldwide to guide 
diagnosis of mental disorders. In line with the development of new research and knowledge, 
the DSM has been periodically reviewed since it was first published in 1952. The latest revision 
is DSM-V and the classification for schizophrenia based on this revision can be found in 
Appendix 1. The DSM-V states that in order for schizophrenia to be diagnosed, symptoms 
must have been present for six months and include at least one month of active symptoms (i.e., 
delusions, hallucination or disorganised speech). The diagnostic criteria no longer identify sub-
types of schizophrenia (previously identified as Paranoid; Disorganised; Catatonic; 
Undifferentiated and Residual sub-types in the DSM-IV, 1994), due to overlapping sub-type 
symptoms and symptoms changing from one sub-type to another. The sub-types are now used 
to provide further detail in diagnosis. For example, paranoid schizophrenia (marked by 
delusions and auditory hallucinations) is now used to specify schizophrenia and other psychotic 
conditions such as schizoaffective disorder (see also section 1.2.1). This specifier can also be 
used to diagnose other disorder areas such as bipolar disorder and major depressive disorder 
(DSM-V, 2013). 
 
This latest revision of the DSM-V, whilst not changing significantly from DSM-IV, has 
made an important shift towards a dimensional approach rather than a categorical approach to 
diagnosis. Previous classification systems based on a categorical approach, defined the 
presence or absence of a disorder to be clear cut; for instance in DSM-III and DSM-IV, a 
schizophrenia diagnosis could only be given if present symptoms were clearly not due to 
another Axis I disorder, such as an anxiety, mood or substance abuse disorder. However, the 
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newly-adopted dimensional approach characterises the relationship between schizophrenia, 
and other disorders such as schizoaffective disorder, bipolar disorder and major depression 
(See also section 1.1.4). This current consensus also supports schizophrenia forming a 
continuum with normal behaviour. For example several epidemiologic and clinical studies have 
demonstrated a symptomatic continuum of psychotic like experiences ranging from self-
reported infrequent psychotic symptoms in the general population to schizotypal traits, to 
schizotypal personality disorder, and finally to full-blown psychosis resulting in a diagnosable 
primary psychotic disorder (for a review see Esterberg & Compton, 2009). 
 
1.1.3 Causes of schizophrenia 
The degree of heterogeneity regarding the symptomatology of schizophrenia is one 
reason for the difficulty in its classification and the confusion surrounding its aetiology. Despite 
the vast amount of research dedicated to the topic, the exact causes of schizophrenia remain 
unclear. It has been proposed there are multiple causes of schizophrenia and it is the result of 
a complex interplay between a number of different environmental (e.g., stress and major 
trauma; Morgan & Fisher, 2007), neurological (neurotransmitter abnormalities; Vallone, 
Picetti & Borrelli, 2000) and genetic factors (see Sanders et al., 2008 for the reviewed role of 
14 candidate genes). 
 
1.1.3.1 Key Neurological factors 
   (1) Dopamine hypothesis of schizophrenia 
 The hypothesis that dopamine (DA) and dopaminergic mechanisms are central to 
schizophrenia has been one of the most enduring theories in psychiatric research. Dopamine 
(as well as adrenaline and noradrenaline) is an abundant neurotransmitter that is part of the 
catecholamine group. Dopaminergic projections predominantly give rise to nigrostriatal, 
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mesolimbic and mesocortical pathways and impairments in the dopamine system result from 
dopamine dysfunctions in these brain areas (Birsch, 2014). The first formulation of the 
hypothesis (version I) emphasised the role of hyperactive dopamine transmission in the 
etiology of schizophrenia. This emerged from the discovery of anti-psychotic drugs and the 
influential research by Carlsson and Lindqvit (1963) who demonstrated that these drugs 
augmented the metabolism of dopamine in animals. Additionally, resperine, an effective drug 
for treating psychosis, was found to block the reuptake of dopamine and other monoamines, 
leading to their dissipation; whilst amphetamine, which increases synaptic monoamine levels, 
was found to induce psychotic symptoms (Carlsson, Lindqvist & Magnusson, 1957). These 
observations provided further evidence for the dopamine hypothesis of schizophrenia and much 
emphasis in research then focused on excess transmission at dopamine receptors and blockade 
of these receptors to treat psychosis (Matthysse, 1973; Snyder, 1976). However, whilst this 
original version of the hypothesis could explain hyperactivity of dopamine in schizophrenia, 
little consideration was given to how it might relate to the co-existence of positive and negative 
symptoms.  
 
The dopamine hypothesis was later reformulated (version II) due to increasing 
awareness of the chronicity of negative and cognitive symptoms and their resistance to 
dopamine D2 receptor antagonism (the main receptor for antipsychotic drugs). The 
advancement of imaging data suggested that these symptoms were possibly the result of 
reduced dopamine D1 receptor activation in the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and subsequent 
findings emerged suggesting the importance of prefrontal dopamine transmission at D1 
receptors (the main DA receptor in the neocortex) for optimal PFC performance (see Knable 
& Weinberger, 1997). Such observations led to the hypothesis that the effects of abnormalities 
in dopamine function could vary by brain region, and that whilst hyperactive dopamine 
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transmission in the mesolimbic areas was found to be implicated in the positive symptoms; 
hypoactive dopamine transmission in the prefrontal cortex was found to be implicated in the 
cognitive and negative symptoms of schizophrenia (Howes & Kapur, 2009).  
 
However, a major shortcoming of both the original hypothesis (version I) and the 
revised hypothesis (version II) was in their lack of explanation detailing how dopaminergic 
abnormalities actually led to the clinical expression of the disease. This omission gave way to 
a third conceptualisation of the theory which suggested that multiple ‘hits’ act together to cause 
a dysregulation of dopamine, drawing upon evidence from environmental, animal, genetic, 
family and imaging studies schizophrenia (Howes & Kapur, 2009). Version III of the theory 
implicates the development in the neuroscience literature of increasing evidence for the role of 
dopamine in motivational salience and reward prediction (e.g., Robbins & Everitt, 1982, 1996; 
Schultz, Dayan & Montague, 1997), which provided a framework to link dopamine 
dysregulation to the symptoms of schizophrenia using salience and reward. Such developments 
of the hypothesis (see: Kapur, 2003; Kapur, Mizrahi & Li, 2005) have suggested that 
dysregulated dopamine transmission disrupts the normal process of contextually driven 
salience attribution and leads to an aberrant assignment of salience to stimuli, independent of 
and out of synchrony with the context. Such inappropriately distributed salience represents an 
‘altered experience of the world’ and it is argued that psychotic (positive) symptoms, such as 
hallucinations and delusion, emerge over time as the individual’s own experience of aberrant 
salience. Hallucinations and delusions are thus constructed by the individual and represent the 
individual’s existing cognitive and cultural background; allowing the same dopaminergic 
abnormality to have different clinical expressions across different individuals. Negative 
symptoms are proposed to be downstream from this: dopamine dysregulation leading to 
aberrant salience in turn causes a ‘drowning out’ of stimuli indicating reward (i.e., stimuli in 
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synchrony with the context); the result being social withdrawal and neglect of interests. In 
support of this explanation, schizophrenia has been associated with reduced ventral striatal 
activation to reward, and greater reduction correlates with increased negative symptoms 
(Juckel, Schlagenhauf & Koslowski, 2006). 
 
   (2) Glutamate hypothesis of schizophrenia 
Whilst the dopamine hypothesis of schizophrenia has been the most influential in terms 
of explanatory power for symptoms of the illness, theories involving other neurotransmitters 
have also been proposed. Glutamatergic hypofunction has also been implicated in the 
pathophysiology of schizophrenia, since the observation that phencyclidine, ketamine and 
other N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA) receptor blockers induced positive symptoms in healthy 
volunteers or exacerbated the positive, negative and cognitive dysfunction in patients with 
schizophrenia (Javit & Zukin, 1991; Krystal et al., 1994; Lahti et al., 1995). NMDA receptors 
are a major subtype of glutamate receptors which are important for complex behaviours such 
as associative learning, attention and, executive function, each of which are dysfunctional in 
schizophrenia (e.g., Robbins & Murphy, 2006). 
 
Imaging studies also support the role of glutamate in schizophrenia by demonstrating 
reduced NMDA receptor binding in the hippocampus for patients free from anti-psychotic 
medication (Pilowsky et al., 2006). Additionally, post-mortem studies indicate increased 
expression of glutamate receptors in frontal and parieto-temporal brain areas in patients with 
schizophrenia. It has been suggested that this increase in glutamate receptors is likely to reflect 
post-synaptic up-regulation in response to lowered glutamatergic neuronal activity (Law & 
Deakin, 2001). These clinical observations suggest that symptoms of schizophrenia might be 
improved by increasing glutamatergic neural transmission and have provided a salient driving 
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force behind the glutamatergic hypothesis regarding the pathophysiology and treatment of 
schizophrenia. As such, clinical trial evidence has shown that four weeks of treatment with an 
agonist for the metabotropic glutamate 2/3 receptor (mGlu2/3R) has similar efficacy to 
olanzapine (D2 antagonist) in ameliorating both positive and negative symptoms of 
schizophrenia (Patil et al., 2007). On this basis of such evidence, the NMDA model is now 
considered to be one of the most useful models for both etiological conceptualisation of 
schizophrenia and novel treatment development (Tamminga, 1998; see Javiit., 2010 for a 
review). 
 
1.1.3.2 Genetic and environmental factors  
It is well-established that schizophrenia (and schizophrenia spectrum disorders) has a 
hereditary component and the risk of developing schizophrenia for relatives of schizophrenic 
probands correlates with the degree of shared genes (Brown, 2011). For example, compared to 
the general population lifetime prevalence of 1%; the risk of developing schizophrenia 
increases to 10-15% for dizygotic twins who share 50% of their genes and, to 48% for 
monozygotic twins who share 100% of their genes (see Tsuang, 2000; Riley et al., 2005; 
Brown, 2011). However, if the development of schizophrenia was based on genetic equivalence 
alone then concordance rates of 100% would be expected; the most plausible explanation is for 
a role of environmental factors which act on a complex set of susceptibility genes (Brown, 
2011; see also DSM-V, 2013). Numerous environmental influences have been proposed to 
interact with genetic liability in the development of schizophrenia that may act right from the 
period of conception, through to the onset of the illness (e.g., Dean & Murray, 2005). For 
example, risk factors during early life include: prenatal/postnatal exposure to infection (e.g., 
rubella, influenza), maternal malnutrition (e.g., famine, folic acid, iron, and vitamin D), 
fetal/neonatal hypoxic and other obstetric complications, and maternal stress. Other 
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developmental determinants include socioeconomic status; child abuse and cannabis/drug 
abuse (see Brown, 2011 for a comprehensive review).  
 
1.1.4 Psychiatric Co-morbidities and Schizophrenia 
Psychiatric co-morbidities are common among individuals diagnosed with 
schizophrenia. Co-morbidity with anxiety and depressive symptoms in particular are high, with 
an estimated prevalence of 15% for panic disorder, 29% for posttraumatic stress disorder, and 
23% for obsessive-compulsive disorder (Buckley, Miller, Lehrer & Castle, 2009). 
Approximately 50% of patients with schizophrenia have a co-morbid diagnosis with depression 
(Buckley et al.). Psychiatric co-morbidities complicate the clinical picture of schizophrenia, 
causing an increase in schizophrenic symptoms. For example, negative symptoms are worsened 
by depression, panic attacks can drive paranoia and cannabis abuse can worsen positive and 
disorganisation symptoms (Green, Canuso, Brenner & Wijcik, 2003; Harrison et al., 2008). In 
order to deal with complex sets of symptoms, diagnostic symptoms have previously embraced 
a hierarchy, where the management of psychotic symptoms have been considered more 
important than the management of depression, anxiety or substance abuse (Hausmann & 
Fleischhacker, 2002). However, the evolution of the diagnostic criteria in the different editions 
of DSM is contributing to an increased awareness of these co-morbidities (Achim et al., 2011). 
The following section focuses on the co-morbidity of anxiety in schizophrenia in particular. 
 
1.1.4.1 Co-morbid anxiety in schizophrenia 
The presence of anxiety disorders in individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia is 
gaining increased attention. Approximately, 38.3% of individuals with schizophrenia spectrum 
disorders present at least one anxiety disorder (compared to around 18.2% of the general 
population with a diagnosed anxiety disorder), with a large amount of data suggesting this co-
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morbidity is associated with more severe clinical characteristics and a profound effect on 
prognosis (Buckley et al., 2009; Hausmann & Fleischakker, 2002). One study has shown that 
in a group of 128 individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia, higher scores on psychometric 
measures of anxiety were positively correlated with more ostensible symptoms of psychosis, 
such as, hallucinations, and also with more prominent symptoms of depression, withdrawal and 
poorer functioning (Lysaker & Salvers, 2007). Moreover, a group of individuals with a high 
risk of developing schizophrenia showed that increased levels of social anxiety were associated 
with later progression to schizophrenia (Johnstone et al., 2005). These data clearly emphasise 
the importance of understanding the relationship between schizophrenia and anxiety. 
 
1.2 Schizotypy 
1.2.1 Overview of schizotypy   
Meehl (1962) introduced the term ‘schizotaxia’ to describe the genetic predisposition 
to schizophrenia that could be manifested, even without full manifestations of schizophrenia. 
The schizophrenia spectrum disorders include schizotypal personality disorder, delusional 
disorder, brief psychotic disorder, schizophreniform disorder, schizoaffective disorder, 
substance/medication-induced psychotic disorder and psychotic disorder due to another 
medical condition, as defined in the diagnostic schema (DSM-V, 2013). These personality 
disorders reflect the phenotypic expression of a liability for schizophrenia, as evidenced from 
familial studies but are not associated with the profound psychosocial disturbance characteristic 
of schizophrenia (Battaglia et al., 1995). Advocates of this quasi-dimensional approach 
consider ‘schizotypy’ to derive from the term ‘schizophrenic genotype’ which states 
personality traits exist on a dimension but their presence is indicative of a greater disposition 
towards (future) schizophrenia (EckBlad & Chapman, 1983; Claridge, 1997). However, within 
a fully dimensional approach to schizophrenia (McCreery & Claridge, 1995), schizotypy is 
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viewed as a personality continuum upon which all people vary, and may never reach a level 
where diagnosis of a mental health condition is necessary. From this view, schizotypy is neutral 
in terms of mental health but interacts with environmental risk (e.g., stress) and protective 
factors (e.g., supportive social networks), leading to healthy outcomes such as creativity, or 
unhealthy outcomes such as psychosis (Nettle, 2006).  
 
That schizotypal traits may exist on a continuum with schizophrenia has, in many ways, 
revolutionised schizophrenia research. As there is capacity to study individuals without clinical 
diagnosis of schizophrenia but who should have similar cognitive and behavioural profiles as 
patient groups. Psychometrically identified schizotypy is adopted in order to avoid confounds 
that can often accompany research in patients with schizophrenia, such as medication state, 
disease chronicity, and symptom nature and severity (Fonseca-Pedero et al., 2008). Also, as 
those with higher levels of schizotypy are at a greater risk of later development of schizophrenia 
spectrum disorders, there is opportunity to study what leads to manifestation of the illness 
(Tyrka et al., 1995). The reliability and validity of schizotypy scales are discussed in the 
following section. 
  
1.2.2 Measures of schizotypy 
The dimensions of schizotypy are most commonly measured using self-report scales 
that can be broadly split into two categories based on their theoretical origin (Bentall, 1989; 
Mason, Claridge & Williams, 1997): symptom-oriented or personality-oriented. The 
assumption held by these different approaches however, remains the same; that symptoms of 
schizophrenia and schizotypal traits exist on a continuum.  
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Symptom-oriented scales for schizotypy are based on the relationship between 
psychosis proneness and DSM-IV specified conditions for schizotypal personality disorder; the 
focus of items in these scales is based on psychotic perceptual-deviations and traits reflective 
of schizophrenic symptomology. A group of scales that belong to this category are those 
developed by Chapman and his colleagues (Chapman et al., 1978; Eckblad et al., 1982; Eckblad 
& Chapman, 1983). Included in the Chapman scales are: The Physical Anhedonia Scale 
(Chapman et al., 1976) and the Revised Social Anhedonia Scale (Mishlove & Chapman, 1985), 
assessing anhedonic tendencies, particularly indexing social withdrawal due to a lack of interest 
in intimacy and interaction. The Perceptual Aberration Scale (Chapman et al., 1978) assesses 
perceptual distortions, especially those related to body image; and the Magical Ideation Scale 
(Eckblad & Chapman, 1983) which measures magical beliefs and ideas of reference. Such 
clinical scales are advantageous as they use diagnostic criteria as reference points in the 
development of these dimensional scales, providing a clear link between schizophrenia and 
schizotypy. 
 
 The second category of self-report measures, personality-oriented scales; aim to 
address the key issue that many schizotypy scales (such as those outlined above), are not 
acceptable to the non-patients that typically complete them. For example, many healthy 
individuals feel uncomfortable recording positive responses to questions that clearly relate to 
psychiatric illness, due to the stigma surrounding mental health illnesses. As an alternative 
approach, other scales were constructed in order to be more applicable to the normal 
population. The Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale (LSHS; Launay and Slade, 1981) was 
developed to assess predisposition to hallucinations in healthy individuals, and was developed 
under the premise that experience of hallucinations occurs on a continuum with normal mental 
states. The Rust Inventory for Schizotypal Cognitions (RISC; Rust, 1987) was developed to 
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measure schizotypical cognitions in relation to positive schizophrenic symptoms; which could 
not be considered extreme, but once responses are collated can indicate those with high levels 
of schizotypal traits. Other personality-oriented scales include; the Schizotypal Personality 
Scale (STA; Claridge & Broks, 1984) and the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ; 
Raine, 1991), designed to reflect the DSM-III descriptions of schizotypal traits. Eysenck and 
Eysenck (1975) developed the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ) with one factor 
relating to a general dimension of psychoticism; developed on the assumption of a continuum 
of normal personality differences. Eysenck’s P scale is aimed at assessing psychotic tendencies 
and thus a predisposition towards psychosis. This scale however has been criticised in terms of 
its validity in relation to reflecting psychosis, and it has instead been suggested that P more 
accurately reflects traits of hostility and impulsivity, as opposed to the most prominent 
psychotic like factors, such as unusual experiences and magical thinking (Zuckerman, 
Kuhlman & Camac et al., 1988).  
 
A major criticism of the scales described in the previous paragraphs is based on their 
psychometric properties predominantly measuring positive symptom-like traits, categorizing 
schizotypy as a single dimension. This weakens their applicability to non-clinical populations, 
and furthermore fails to represent the heterogeneity of schizotypy as negative symptomology 
is not accounted for in the majority of the scales. Newer scales have attempted to overcome 
this shortcoming, whilst at the same time encapsulate elements of both symptom-oriented and 
personality-oriented scales. They have aimed for increased reliability and a clear distinction of 
subcomponents of schizotypy via large-scale factor analysis studies. The consensus emerging 
from such factor analysis studies suggest that schizotypy is a multi-dimensional construct 
which has three main components: ‘positive schizotypy’, ‘negative schizotypy’ and ‘cognitive 
disorganisation’ (see Bentall et al., 1989; Vollema & van den Bosch, 1995; Mason et al., 1997). 
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These are consistent with the three-factor model of schizophrenia symptoms (Vollema & 
Hoijtinkm, 2000), which suggests a close similarity between traits and symptoms, providing 
evidence for an uninterrupted continuum between normality and clinically diagnoses 
schizophrenia (Bentall et al., 1989). On the basis of these findings Mason, Claridge and Jackson 
(1995) developed the Oxford-Liverpool inventory of feelings and experiences (O-LIFE) to 
measure these schizotypy factors in a single questionnaire. The development of this 
questionnaire was based on a factor analysis of fifteen existing psychosis-proneness 
questionnaires in over 1000 subjects (Bentall et al), which was later replicated to reveal the 
same factor structure (Claridge et al., 1996). In addition to the three schizotypy factors, these 
studies identified a fourth component which has more generally been labelled ‘anti-social 
behaviour,’ loading on to the Eysenck P-scale (Eysenck and Eysenck, 1975), the Hypomania 
scale (Eckblad and Chapman, 1986), and the Borderline Personality scale (STB; Claridge and 
Broks (1984). On the basis of these findings, which to date, includes the most extensive study 
of schizotypy carried out; the 159 item O-LIFE questionnaire was developed to include four 
scales, comprising; unusual experiences (positive schizotypy), introvertive anhedonia 
(negative schizotypy), cognitive disorganization and impulsive nonconformity (anti-social 
behaviour).  
 
The unusual experiences subscale contains hallucinatory, magical thinking and 
perceptual aberration items which reflect positive schizotypy, consistent with positive 
symptoms of schizophrenia and include items such as ‘Are your thoughts sometimes so strong 
that you can almost hear them?’ The cognitive-disorganisation subscale assesses disruptions in 
attention, concentration and decision making, along with feelings of purposelessness, 
moodiness and social anxiety. This subscale reflects the disorganised aspects of psychosis 
(such as disorganised speech and inappropriate affect), and includes items such as ‘Do you ever 
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feel that your speech is difficult to understand because the words are all mixed up and don’t 
make sense?’ The introvertive anhedonia subscale reflects anhedonia (inability to experience 
pleasure) and describes a dislike for emotional and physical intimacy. It also places emphasis 
on independence and solitude and is consistent with negative symptoms of schizophrenia, 
termed negative schizotypy. This subscale includes items such as ‘Are people usually better 
off if they stay aloof from emotional involvements with other people?’ Impulsive 
nonconformity measures recklessness, impulsive, self-abusive and antisocial behaviours and 
includes items such as ‘Do you ever have the urge to break or smash things?’ However, this 
subscale has not been found in any of the schizophrenic symptom validation studies; it has been 
suggested that this scale is more likely to represent a measure of psychopathy and criminality 
than symptoms observed in schizophrenia (Zuckerman et al., 1988)2. 
 
The reliability and consistency of the O-LIFE is well-established with all four scales 
demonstrating high test-retest reliability of greater than 0.70 (Burch et al., 1988), and high 
internal consistency: Unusual Experiences α = 0.89; Cognitive Disorganisation α = 0.87; 
Introvertive Anhedonia α = 0.82; and Impulsive Nonconformity α = 0.77 (Mason et al., 1995; 
see also Haselgrove et al., 2015). These results have since been replicated to a similar degree 
by Rawlings and Freeman (1997: 0.77, 0.81, 0.85 and 0.72). Extensive laboratory 
investigations have also established the construct validity of the O-LIFE as a measure of 
schizotypal traits by demonstrating predictable effects in relation to neuropsychological 
function; particularly on measures of latent inhibition (see Lubow & Weiner, 2010 for a review) 
                                                             
2 The adequacy of Impulsive Nonconformity as a valid schizophrenia-like construct has been challenged. It has 
instead been suggested that this scale is likely to represent a measure of psychopathy and criminality than 
symptoms observed in schizophrenia. It has also been argued that IntrovAv and the CogDis dimensions are not 
analogous to the Scale for the Assessment of Negative Symptoms (SANS) in patients with schizophrenia. The 
UnEx dimension as a measure of positive schizotypy has however been reported to significantly correlate with 
the Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms (SAPS) in patients with schizophrenia (Cochrane, Petch & 
Pickering, 2010).  
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and on several other attentional, perceptual and reasoning paradigms (Jolley et al., 1999; Steel 
et al., 2002; Tsakanikos and Reed, 2003; Mason et al., 2004; Sellen et al., 2005). Based on the 
psychometric properties of the O-LIFE questionnaire and its ability to reflect the heterogeneity 
of schizotypy, it is increasingly being utilised in current schizotypy/schizophrenia research, 
and furthermore in relation to attention and associative learning (see section 1.5). 
 
1.3 Clinical Anxiety: Symptoms, Classification & Causes  
1.3.1 Clinical Anxiety at the symptom level    
Both ‘anxiety’ and ‘fear’ are constructs that underlie the symptoms of anxiety disorders. 
Anxiety is defined as a future-oriented mood state associated with preparation for possible, 
upcoming negative events, and fear is an alarm response to real/perceived present or imminent 
threat (Barlow, 2002). Whilst these two states overlap, they also differ as anxiety is more often 
associated with worry, muscle tension and cautious or avoidant behaviours in preparation for 
future danger. Whereas fear is more often associated with thoughts of imminent threat, escape 
behaviours and increased autonomic arousal ready for fight or flight, including sweating, 
trembling, heart palpitations, and nausea (Lang, 1968; see Craske et al., 2009 for a review). 
Panic attacks are a particular type of fear response which feature prominently as an anxiety 
disorder, but also in other mental disorders as well (DSM-V, 2013), discussed more in the 
following section (1.3.2). 
 
Clinical anxiety disorders can be separated from normative levels of transient fear or 
anxiety (often stress-induced) by being excessive and persistent (e.g., at least 6 months), 
however, the duration is more flexible for children and often shorter (typically for separation 
anxiety disorder and selective mutism). Cultural and contextual factors are taken into account 
by the clinician to decide whether the symptoms of fear and anxiety are excessive or out of 
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proportion to the situation. An anxiety disorder will only be diagnosed when the symptoms are 
not the consequential physiological effects of medication or a substance, or to another mental 
disorder/condition (DSM-V, 2013).  
 
1.3.2 Classification of symptoms 
The DSM-V includes 9 anxiety disorders, sequenced according to the typical age of 
onset. Separation anxiety disorder (excessive fear and anxiety about being separated from 
attachment figures to the degree that it is inappropriate) and selective mutism (consistent 
reluctance to speak in social situations where speech is expected, e.g., at school) are now 
classified as anxiety disorders; rather than disorders of early onset as classified in DSM-IV. 
The remaining disorders include; specific phobia (fearful or anxious of certain objects or 
situations which can relate to animals; natural environment; blood-injection-injury; 
situational); panic disorder (recurrent, unexpected panic attacks in response to a typically 
feared object or situation); agoraphobia (fearful or anxious about certain situations e.g., being 
in open/enclosed spaces, using public transportation). Substance/medication-induced anxiety 
disorder involves anxiety due to substance intoxication or withdrawal. The last anxiety 
disorder, generalised anxiety disorder (GAD), is the most common amongst adults and is 
characterised by persistent and excessive anxiety and worry about various situations which the 
individual finds difficult to control, such as performance at work or school. GAD also includes 
physical symptoms such as restlessness, fatigue, difficulty with concentration or mind going 
blank, irritability, muscle tension and sleep disturbance. The diagnostic criteria for anxiety 
disorders no longer include obsessive-compulsive disorder (characterised by the presence of 
repetitive behaviours that the individual feels driven to perform in response to unwanted 
obsessive thoughts and urges) or trauma- and stressor-related disorders (e.g., posttraumatic 
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stress disorder; anxiety, nightmares and flashbacks caused by traumatic events). These 
disorders now have their own respective chapters in the DSM-V.   
 
The following sections focus on the causes of anxiety disorders, in general (GAD) as 
the focus of the experiments reported in this thesis focus on subclinical levels of general, 
everyday anxiety. The DSM-V classification for GAD can be found in Appendix 2. 
 
1.3.3 Causes of anxiety 
Comparable to other forms of mental illness (see section 1.1.3 for a discussion on 
schizophrenia), the exact cause of anxiety disorders is unknown, but are proposed to be the 
result of a combination of factors, including a constellation of brain regions, neurochemical 
mechanisms (Rauch, Shin & Phelps, 2006) and environmental stress (see Craske et al., 2009).  
 
1.3.3.1 Functional neuroanatomy and neurochemical correlates  
Autonomic activation, such as tachycardia (heart rate which exceeds the normal resting 
rate) and increased arousal are among the most immediate psychophysiological responses 
observed when experiencing a state of anxiety. As such, the ascending noradrenergic system, 
which originates from the locus coeruleus (LC), has been proposed as the core system around 
which feelings of anxiety are organised. The LC is highly responsive to alerting/stressful 
stimuli and contains a large portion of noradrenaline (NA) cell bodies found in the brain. Some 
LC neurons project to the paraventricular nucleus (PVN) in the hypothalamus and activate the 
hypothalamopituitary-adrenocortical (HPA) axis, which triggers/facilitates the stress response 
associated with increased anxiety. Noradrenergic LC neurons also project to other brain areas 
involved in the fear/anxiety response, i.e., the amygdala, prefrontal cortex, hippocampus, 
hypothalamus and the thalamus. The LC is also innervated by brain areas such as the amygdala 
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which is involved in the assessment of threat and in forming associations with danger in the 
environment. The LC is considered a key brain stem region involved in anxiety and is in a key 
position to influence anxiety-related neuroanatomical structures, including cortical areas 
(Sullivan, Coplan, Kent & Gorman, 1999).  
 
It has been suggested that observed limbic abnormalities in patients with anxiety may 
result from the dysregulation of neurotransmitters, including increased release of noradrenaline 
(see Tanaka et al., 1982, 1983; Limori et al., 1982), serotonin (see Bagdy, 1998; Murphy et al., 
2001) and dopamine (Nutt et al., 1998), particulatly in the hypothalamus and amygdala regions. 
Gamma-Aminobutyric acid (GABA) is the main inhibitory neurotransmitter in the brain and 
the GABAA benzodiazepine receptor is also thought to play an important role in anxiety-related 
disorders and is an important target for several anxiolytic drugs, i.e., diazepam and lithium. For 
example, the diazepam-sensitive α2-GABAA subtype appears to be specifically involved in 
reducing anxiety (Mohler, Crestani & Rudolf, 2002) and is largely expressed in the 
hippocampus, the amygdala, and the striatum. 
 
1.3.3.2. Familial, genetic and environmental causes 
The importance of the role of genetic factors in the familial clustering of anxiety has 
been demonstrated by numerous twin studies of anxiety symptoms and disorders (Kendler, 
Eaves & Walters, 1996). The evidence for GAD specifically however comes from a limited 
amount of studies. The familial odds ratio for developing GAD has been reported to be 
approximately 5 (Noyes, Clarkson & Crowe, 1987) and heritability is reported to be 0.32 
among female pair twins (Kendler, Neale & Kessler, 1992). There is also a 3.5% increased risk 
of anxiety symptoms and disorders among offspring of parents with anxiety disorders, 
compared to controls. Children at risk for developing an anxiety disorder have been 
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characterised by behavioural inhibition (behavioural withdrawal in the face of novel and 
challenging situations), increased autonomic reactivity (Biedel, 1988), somatic symptom 
(Reichler, Sylvester & Hyde, 1988), social fears (Turner, Beidel & Costello, 1987), enhanced 
startle reflex (Merikangas, Avenevoli, Dierker, 1999) and respiratory sensitivity (Pine, Klein 
& Coplan, 2000), relative to controls (for a review see; Merikangas & Pine, 2002). 
 
Anxiety sensitivity is another potential trait marker for the development of anxiety 
disorders, which is characterised by beliefs that feelings of anxiety are predictive of harmful 
physiological or psychological consequences such as fainting or having a heart attack. 
Therefore, the fear alone of benign arousal/anxiety sensations and feelings produces an active 
state of anxiety which can in turn increase the amount and intensity of the anxiousness/arousal 
experienced. Anxiety sensitivity is thus considered a risk factor for the development of anxiety 
disorders and is also reported to be a potential premorbid marker for the development of anxiety 
disorders in high-risk but not low-risk youth (Pollock, Carter, & Dierker et al., 2002). Other 
environmental risk factors include family disruption, poor parental monitoring/low social class 
of rearing, stressful life events in childhood and adulthood and mental health problems (see 
Gandy et al., 2012; Moreno-Peral, 2014; Newman et al., 2016). Thus the role of environmental 
influences in the etiology of anxiety is well established and the relatively moderate magnitude 
of heritability strongly implicates an important role for environmental influences in the 
development of anxiety symptoms and disorder onset. 
  
1.4 Sub-clinical Anxiety  
1.4.1 Overview of sub-clinical anxiety  
Catell (1966) first introduced the distinction between state and trait anxiety, which was 
later elaborated by Speilberger (1966, 1972, 1976). Much research has since suggested that 
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anxiety is best understood by conceptually and empirically distinguishing between these state 
and trait facets (e.g. Endler and Kocovski, 2001; Kocovski, Endler, Cox, and Swinson, 2004; 
Rapee and Medro, 1994; Reiss, 1997; Spielberger, 1985a, b). Speilberger (1983) defines state 
anxiety as a transient emotion that consists of subjective feelings of tension, apprehension, 
nervousness and worry in response to stress that varies in intensity and which fluctuates over 
time. Trait anxiety, on the other hand, is not transient and reflects a stable tendency to 
experience anxiety on a daily basis. This disposition to experience anxiety has been 
conceptualized as a personality trait, and the validity of the state-trait anxiety distinction, as 
investigated through psychometric evaluation, has received extensive support in the literature 
(Spielberger, 1989; Spielberger, Vagg, Barker, Donham, & Westberry, 1980), see also section 
1.4.2. 
 
Even at a sub-clinical level, everyday feelings of stress and worry constitute a burden, 
and the impact of sub-clinical anxiety is becoming recognized as a major contributor to 
psychological, social and economic costs. Anxiety can make concentration difficult 
(Beddington et al., 2008), leading to problems in work environments (work-related anxiety 
resulted in 15 million working days lost in 2013; Office for National Statistics, 2014) and social 
environments (including distress, withdrawal; NHS Choices, 2015).  
 
1.4.2 Measures of sub-clinical anxiety 
The distinction between state and trait anxiety is embodied in the State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (STAI: Spielberger, 1983), consisting of two 20-item self-report scales. The STAI 
state scale assesses how respondents feel at the moment of completing the questionnaire and 
the STAI trait scale assesses how frequently respondents generally experience symptoms of 
anxiety. Since the development of the STAI, the measure continues to be extremely popular in 
psychological research, cited in over 400 peer reviewed journal articles. However, despite its 
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extensive use, the state and trait scales of the STAI have been criticized for their inability to 
discriminate between symptoms of anxiety and depression (see Gros et al., 2007). Even with a 
revision of the scales in response to these concerns, critiques of the STAI persist; factor analytic 
investigation support that the STAI does not provide a pure measure of anxiety, as distinct from 
depression (Caci et al., 2003).  
 
Ree, MacLeod, French & Locke (2008) developed the State-Trait Inventory for 
Cognitive and Somatic Anxiety (STICSA) to address the limitations of the STAI. The STICSA 
was designed to provide a more accurate measure of pure anxiety, by better discriminating 
between the symptoms of anxiety and depression. Symptoms relatively unique to anxiety were 
favoured (i.e., physiological arousal and anxious thoughts), whereas symptoms that were non-
specific and unique to depression were not favoured. The STICSA replicates the format of the 
state and trait scales in the STAI; each scale consists of 21 self-report items. The STICSA state 
scale assess how respondents “feel right now, at this very moment, even if this is not how you 
usually feel,” whereas, the trait scale assesses “how often, in general, the statement is true of 
you.” Each item is rated on a 4-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (not at all) to 4 (very much 
so).  
 
In contrast to the STAI, the STICSA separates anxiety into cognitive and somatic 
symptoms- existing research suggests anxiety may comprise these distinct symptom 
dimensions and therefore their inclusion in anxiety assessment is important (e.g., Clark and 
Watson, 1991; Himadi, Boice, and Barlow, 1985; Koksal and Power, 1990; Koksal, Power and 
Sharp, 1991). The somatic scale includes self-report symptoms such as sweating, trembling, 
palpitations and muscle tension. Whereas the cognitive scale includes symptoms that are 
associated with thought processes, including worry, intrusive thoughts, and lack of 
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concentration. Other self-report scales have been developed to measure the somatic and 
cognitive dimensions of anxiety, but unlike the STICSA questionnaire (Ree et al., 2008) none 
have been designed to distinguish these dimensions within both state and trait anxiety. Some 
of these scales include: The Cognitive Somatic Anxiety Questionnaire (Schwartz et al., 1978); 
the Endler Multidimensional Anxiety Scales (EMAS: Endler, Parker, Bagby and Cox, 1991) 
and the Lehrer and Woolfolk Anxiety Questionnaire (Lehrer & Woolfolk, 1982; for a review 
see Ree et al., 2008). In contrast, the STICSA questionnaire distinguishes state and trait 
dimensions of both cognitive and somatic anxiety; with research suggesting the questionnaire 
is a reliable and valid measure of anxiety in both sub-clinical and clinical populations (Ree et 
al., 2008). Based on the psychometric properties of the STICSA questionnaire and its ability to 
reflect a purer measure of anxiety, distinct from depression, it is increasingly being utilised in 
current anxiety research, and furthermore in relation to attention and associative learning (see 
section 1.6).  
 
B. Cognitive dysfunction in Schizophrenia, Schizotypy and Anxiety 
 
A prominent question in schizophrenia and anxiety research, concerns how a range of 
neurological abnormalities result in the signs and symptoms that define these disorders. One 
way to address this question is the study of cognitive endophenotypes. An endophenotype can 
be described as a link between the genotype (the genetic makeup of an organism) and 
phenotype (the organism’s observable traits and characteristics) of a disorder. A ‘cognitive’ 
endophenotype then is defined as a quantifiable trait linking overt clinical symptoms, to the 
genetic and biological predisposition to the illness (Braff, Greenwood, Swerdlow, Light & 
Schork, 2008). In relation to schizophrenia, the overt symptom might be psychosis, but an 
underlying phenotype, for example, may be aberrant salience attribution to environmental 
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stimuli (as discussed in section 1.1.3.1). For a cognitive deficit to be considered a viable 
endophenotype for schizophrenia, it must be present when the individual is not suffering from 
the illness, and there must be evidence to establish it as genetic (i.e., via studies involving first 
degree relatives, where the deficit is also demonstrated in these individuals). Deficits in 
selective attention (e.g., latent inhibition: slower learning to a previously-exposed cue, relative 
to a novel cue) have been reported in first-degree relatives in individuals with schizophrenia 
(Serra, Joene, Toone & Gray, 2001) and also in healthy ‘schizotypal’ individuals that display 
symptoms similar to those observed in schizophrenia individuals (Lubow & Weiner, 2010, for 
a review). These findings suggest latent inhibition deficits are a possible endophenotype for 
schizophrenia. Similarly, disruptions in selective attention are also observed in individuals with 
a diagnosis of anxiety and in individuals scoring highly on sub-clinical measures of anxiety 
(Braunstein-Bercovitz, 2000, 2002); suggesting a deficit in attention that is also a possible 
endophenotype for anxiety patients. How attentional dysfunction is associated with 
schizophrenia, schizotypy and anxiety, is reviewed next, before moving on to discuss, in more 
detail, how these conditions interact in relation to such variations in selective attention. 
    
1.5 Schizophrenia, Schizotypy and Attention Dysfunction 
Disturbances in attention are considered to be a fundamental cognitive deficit in 
patients with schizophrenia (e.g. McGhie & Chapman, 1961; Hemsley, 1987). Various forms 
of attentional impairment have been reported in schizophrenia, including deficits in sensory-
motor gating (Braff, Geyer & Swerdlow, 2001), attentional set shifting (Jazbec et al., 2007), 
response inhibition (Barch, Carter, Hachten, Usher & Cohen, 1999), spatial cuing (Posner, 
Early, Reiman, Pardo & Dhawan, 1988; Strauss, Alphs & Boekamp, 1992), and signal 
detection (Servan-Schreiber, Cohen & Steingard, 1996). These examples represent deficits in 
how attention determines performance, typically under conditions of instruction where 
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participants are told which cue is the target or where to attend. However, attention can also 
determine how much is learned, and vice versa; for example, tests of latent inhibition (Lubow 
& Moore, 1959) and learned irrelevance (Le Pelley & McLaren, 2003) indicate individuals can 
learn to ignore irrelevant stimuli (i.e., stimuli which are poor predictors of the events that follow 
them). However, in contrast to healthy individuals, it has been proposed that schizophrenia is 
associated with a deficit in the ability to reduce attention to irrelevant stimuli (e.g. McGhie & 
Chapman; Hemsley). Support for an attentional view of schizophrenia has since been provided 
by studies investigating the relationship between latent inhibition (for a review see Lubow & 
Moore, 2010; see section 1.5.1) and learned irrelevance (Le Pelley, Schmidt-Hansen, Harris, 
Lunter & Morris, 2010a; see section 1.5.2) and schizophrenia. Whilst this thesis explores latent 
inhibition and learned irrelevance designs, it should be noted that a similar literature exists for 
blocking; reduced learning about the relationship between stimulus (Y) and an outcome when 
presented in a compound (stimulus X and stimulus Y) because the outcome has previously 
been predicted by stimulus X (Shanks, 1985). Critically, studies have found reduced blocking 
in schizophrenia (Bender, Muller, Oades, & Sartory, 2001; Jones, Hemsley, Ball, & Serra, 
1997; Moran, Owen, Crookes, Al-Uzri, & Reveley, 2008) and high schizotypal individuals 
relative to low schizotypal individuals (Haselgrove & Evans, 2010; Moran, Al-Uzri, Watson, 
& Reveley, 2003). Thus, in comparison to healthy participants, individuals with schizophrenia 
and high schizotypy individuals essentially learn as much about the redundant cue (stimulus 
Y) as they do about the initially trained cue (stimulus X) which has been taken as evidence for 
an inability to to ignore irrelevant stimuli in these individuals (see Morris et al., 2012 for a 
review). Therefore, there are conditioning procedures: latent inhibition, learned irrelevance and 
blocking which have been interpreted as the consequence of learning to ignore irrelevant 
stimuli, and evidence of impairments in each, in patients with schizophrenia and high 
schizotypal individuals.  
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1.5.1 Latent inhibition  
In a typical latent inhibition task, a stimulus is rendered familiar by mere exposure, 
before being established as a cue for another stimulus. Latent inhibition is seen where 
organisms learn more slowly about the preexposed stimulus, relative to a novel stimulus during 
a subsequent test of learning (Lubow & Moore, 1959). The effect is extremely reliable having 
been demonstrated across a wide variety of species and learning preparations (for a review see: 
Hall, 1991; Lubow & Weiner, 2010). There are two explanations for latent inhibition. One 
class of explanation emphasizes the acquisition of a stimulus- ‘nothing of consequence’ or 
stimulus- ‘context’ association during pre-exposure which interferes with the expression of the 
stimulus–outcome association during subsequent conditioning (e.g. Bouton, 1993; Weiner, 
2003). Of more influence however, is the class of explanation which suggests that attention 
decreases to the cue during preexposure, retarding its ability to enter into an association with 
the outcome during subsequent training (e.g. Lubow, 1989; Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce & Hall, 
1980; Wagner, 1978). 
  
The most common procedure used to demonstrate latent inhibition in humans has been 
a between-participant task that comprises two-phases: preexposure and test (e.g., Baruch, 
Hemsley & Gray, 1988a; Gray, Fernandez, Williams, Ruddle & Snowden, 2002). During 
preexposure, participants are allocated to either a preexposed group or a non-preexposed group. 
The preexposed group are exposed to an irrelevant stimulus which is followed by no further 
consequence at this time, whereas, the non-prexposed group are not exposed to this stimulus. 
Throughout the preexposure stage participants are typically engaged in a masking-task. Both 
preexposed and non-preexposed groups then complete the test phase in which the preexposed 
stimulus (a novel stimulus for the non-preexposed group) is paired with a target outcome. 
Latent inhibition is demonstrated when the preexposed group is slower to learn the stimulus-
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target association than the non-preexposed group. Attentional analyses of latent inhibition 
propose that, during preexposure, attention diminishes to the preexposed stimulus so that, 
subsequently, participants in the preexposed-group take longer to learn the association between 
the stimulus and the target (Lubow & Gerwitz, 1995; Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce & Hall, 1980). 
 
1.5.1.1 Latent inhibition and schizophrenia  
1.5.1.1.1 Attenuated latent inhibition in schizophrenia: Mixed findings 
 
Consistent with the idea that individuals with schizophrenia have a deficit in attention 
is the observation of an attenuation of latent inhibition in these individuals, which is reflected 
as the absence of slower learning to the preexposed cue, compared to the non-preexposed cue 
in a between-participants design. During the test-phase, clinical participants with schizophrenia 
preexposed to the stimulus, show faster learning of the association between the stimulus and 
the target relative to healthy participants.  
 
Attenuation of latent inhibition is typically seen in individuals with acute schizophrenia, 
rather than individuals with chronic schizophrenia (e.g. Baruch et al; Gray, Hemsley & Gray, 
1992; Rascle et al.,2001; Gray et al., 2002, Vaitl et al., 2002, but see also; Swerdlow et al., 
1996, Williams et al., 1998; Cohen et al., 2004). In line with the DA hypothesis of 
schizophrenia (see section 1.1.3.1), this relationship has been attributed to augmented DA 
activity in acute patients as administration of the indirect dopamine agonist; amphetamine both 
attenuates latent inhibition and induces positive symptoms (Abi-Dargham et al., 1998; Breier 
& Berg, 1999). This relationship has been expanded to account for schizophrenia patients’ 
impaired ability to allocate attention to stimuli - an impairment that can lead to spurious 
associations being formed between stimuli in the environment from which unusual thought 
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patterns and positive symptoms (i.e., hallucinations, delusions) are formed (Kapur, 2005; 
Cassaday & Moran, 2010, Moran et al., 2008). This observed attentional disruption has been 
proposed to represent the core cognitive deficit underlying the positive symptoms of acute 
schizophrenia (Gray et al., 1991; Rascle et al., 2001). However, the relationship between 
attenuated latent inhibition and positive symptomatology has been challenged. Gray et al. 
(1992) suggested that a reduction of latent inhibition is associated with the acute stage of 
schizophrenia rather than the positive symptoms per se. When acute and chronic patients with 
schizophrenia were matched for their level of positive symptoms, an attenuation of latent 
inhibition was only observed in acute, not chronic patients. Later studies have provided mixed 
findings: normal latent inhibition has been observed in both acute medicated (Swerdlow et al., 
1996) and un-medicated (Williams et al., 1998) patients. More recent studies have shown that 
acute patients with schizophrenia do show attenuated latent inhibition, but that this was 
correlated with their negative rather than positive symptoms (Rascle et al., 2001), whereas 
Cohen et al. (2004) found latent inhibition in schizophrenia patients with high levels of positive 
symptoms did not differ from that of healthy controls (for a review see: Schmidt-Hansen & Le 
Pelley, 2012). 
 
1.5.1.1.2 Enhanced latent inhibition in schizophrenia  
One possible explanation for the inconsistencies may be because the effect has an 
additional pole of expression – an enhanced, or abnormally persistent, latent inhibition effect 
with the chronic stage of schizophrenia (Weiner, 2003). Under certain experimental conditions, 
abnormally persistent latent inhibition has been attributed to the effects of glutamate 
antagonists at the N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA) receptor, as opposed to attenuated latent 
inhibition - which has been attributed to over-activity of the DAergic system. In addition to 
DAergic models of schizophrenia, which predominantly account for the positive symptoms of 
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the illness, an association between schizophrenia and the glutamatergic system has been related 
much more to the prevalence of negative and cognitive symptoms (which are typically 
observed in the chronic phase of the illness; for a review see; Javitt, 2007, 2010). To the best 
of our knowledge, only three studies have shown that latent inhibition is abnormally persistent 
in chronic patients. Rascle et al. (2001), Cohen et al. (2004) and Gal et al. (2009) all report 
enhanced latent inhibition in patients in a chronic stage of their illness. Although enhanced 
latent inhibition has been tentatively associated with negative symptoms, this effect appears 
more specific to illness chronicity (Gal et al., 2009). It thus seems accurate to suggest that 
schizophrenia is associated with an abnormal expression of latent inhibition. Whether an 
attenuation or enhancement of the effect is observed, depends on the stage of the illness and 
possibly the patient’s medication status. 
 
1.5.1.2 Latent inhibition and schizotypy  
As previously stated in section 1.2, comparisons of the cognitive abilities of 
schizophrenic patients with controls can introduce a number of confounds, notably the 
medication state of the different groups. To overcome this issue, a dimensional approach can 
be adopted in which variations in schizotypal personality characteristics are measured in a 
normal population and correlated with performance on cognitive tasks. A number of studies 
have now indicated that attentional mechanisms are similarly disrupted in high 
psychometrically defined schizotypal individuals and people with schizophrenia schizophrenia 
(e.g., Baruch, Hemsley & Gray, 1988b; Gray et al., 2002; Evans, Gray & Snowden, 2007; 
Schmidt-Hansen, Killcross & Honey, 2009; Le Pelley, Schmidt-Hansen, Harris, Lunter & 
Morris, 2010; Granger, Prados & Young, 2012). However, like the schizophrenia literature 
(e.g., Baruch et al., 1988a; Gray et al., 1992 Rascle et al., 2001), previous studies that have 
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investigated the relationship between schizotypy and latent inhibition have revealed mixed 
results.  
  
1.5.1.2.1 Attenuated latent inhibition in schizotypy: Mixed findings   
Baruch, Hemsley and Gray (1988b) were the first to report a relationship between latent 
inhibition and schizotypy in the normal population, reporting reduced latent inhibition in 
participants who scored high, but not low (as determined by a median split) on the Psychoticism 
dimension of the Eysenck personality questionnaire (EPQ; Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975 see also; 
Lubow et al., 1992; Allan et al., 1995). Similarly, Gray et al. (2003) reported measures of 
schizotypy to be correlated with reduced latent inhibition, but only when using a between-
participant latent inhibition task (see also: Braunstein-Bercovitz & Lubow, 1998a; Burch, 
Hemsley & Joseph, 2004). However, another between-participant latent inhibition task used by 
Lipp, Siddle & Arnold (1994) reported no significant association of the effect with the EPQ 
(Eysenck & Eysenck), and an association between latent inhibition and the schizotypal 
personality questionnaire (Claridge & Broks, 1984) that only approached statistical 
significance (see also: Lipp & Vaitl, 1992). Furthermore, this trend was due to differences in 
the non-preexposed control group, with high scorers tending to learn faster than low scorers, 
rather than the theoretically more interesting, preexposed group. The between-participant tasks 
used by Baruch et al (1988b) also revealed no association between latent inhibition and scores 
on the Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale (Launay & Slade, 1981). Other studies have shown 
that, given sufficient preexposure, individuals high in schizotypy can in fact demonstrate a 
latent facilitation effect3 (De la Casa, Ruiz & Lubow, 1993), but see Burch et al. (2004). 
Therefore, where some authors report a reduction in latent inhibition with higher levels of 
                                                             
3 An increase in the rate of learning to the preexposed stimulus relative to the non-preexposed stimulus 
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schizotypy, others do not, and with some authors suggesting a reversal of latent inhibition with 
higher schizotypy (see also: Lubow & Weiner, 2010; Lubow, Kaplan & De la Casa, 2001; De 
la Casa & Lubow, 2002; Shira & Kaplan, 2009; Kaplan & Lubow, 2001; Lubow & Kaplan 
1997).   
 
More recent studies have tended to employ a within-participant procedure for detecting 
latent inhibition in which learning about a novel and familiar stimulus is measured in the same 
participant. Evans et al. (2007), Schmidt-Hansen et al. (2009) and Granger et al. (2012) all 
showed a deficit in latent inhibition that was related to the positive dimension of the O-LIFE 
(Mason et al., 1995). However, the attenuated latent inhibition effect with unusual experiences 
reported by Evans et al and Schmidt-Hansen et al, did not reach the conventional cut-off point 
for statistical significance. A significant reduction in latent inhibition was attained by Granger 
et al., but this was a result of an association between the difference between the preexposed 
and non-preexposed stimuli and unusual experiences. This latter observation is problematic, 
because any correlation between schizotypy and a composite constructed from these two scores 
does not reveal which of its components is, or is not, contributing to the overall effect. As such 
it is entirely possible that it is a difference in performance to the non-preexposed stimulus, not 
the preexposed stimulus that contributes to the co-variation of the composite measure with 
schizotypy. In support of this possibility, Granger et al did not see any significant relationship 
between the unusual experiences dimension and learning about the preexposed stimulus alone. 
 
1.5.1.2.2 Limitations of existing latent inhibition designs  
A number of studies of latent inhibition in humans have modified its basic procedure 
in order to ensure that participants engage with the experiment during pre-exposure. First, the 
outcome from the second stage of the experiment might be also included in the first stage of 
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the experiment - unpaired with the cue (e.g. Swerdlow et al., 1996; Cohen et al., 2004; Gal et 
al., 2009; Lubow & Kaplan, 1997; De la Casa & Lubow, 2001; Lubow & De la Casa, 2002). 
Second, a secondary, masking, task may be presented concurrently with the pre-exposed cue. 
For example, a list of nonsense syllables may be presented and participants required to count 
the number of times one syllable appears during preexposure (e.g. Baruch et al., 1988a; Gray, 
Hemsley & Gray, 1992). The use of either of these modifications contrains translation between 
human studies and animal models that do not require such procedures to observe latent 
inhibition (Lubow, 2005). But, more importantly, they also generate procedures that align 
themselves with other learning phenomena, rather than latent inhibition. For example, by 
exposing the target outcome during the pre-exposure stage of the experiment in an uncorrelated 
(or unpaired) fashion with the pre-exposed cue may result in the establishment of learned 
irrelevance or conditioned inhibition to the pre-exposed cue; which is known to retard the 
acquisition of later learning (e.g.: Baker & Mackintosh, 1977; Rescorla, 1969) and known to 
co-vary with schizotypy (Schmidt-Hansen et al., 2009; Le Pelley et al., 2010; Migo et al., 
2006). Evans et al. (2007) have described a within-participant latent inhibition procedure that, 
they suggest, circumvents the inclusion of a masking task during preexposure. However, this 
task sets up an expectation of the target stimulus, prior to the preexposure phase through 
instruction; casting doubt on whether the retardation in learning reflects a genuine latent 
inhibition effect rather than some other effect whose origin might be quite different (e.g., 
conditioned inhibition; see Rescorla, 1969). Existing latent inhibition designs are described in 
more detail in Chapter 2, and the limitations of these designs are described and addressed. 
 
In addition, whilst in the schizophrenia/schizotypy literature it has been explicitly 
assumed that latent inhibition designs provide a measure of the influence of attentional 
processes on associative learning (e.g., Bender et al., 2001; Rascle et al., 2001; Moran et al., 
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2003), there are other accounts of latent inhibition that make no reference to attention. For 
example, it has been arugued that latent inhibition can result from participants computing 
conditional probabilities, where the conditional probability of a particular outcome given the 
presence of a cue will be lower for a cue that has had extensive nonreinforced preexposure than 
for a cue that has not (Lubow & Weiner, 2010). On this approach, the abnormal expression of 
latent inhibition in individuals with high schizotypy/schizophrenia might reflect an abnormality 
in inferential reasoning (cf, Garety et al., 1991; Sellen et al., 2005), rather than attention. 
However, this does not mean that the attentional view of schizophrenia is incorrect, merely that 
the currently-available evidence provides equivocal support for it (see Le Pelley et al., 2010a). 
A paradigm that can provide a less ambiguous measure of the impact of attention on learning 
is thus desirable to provide support for the attentional dysfunction view of schizophrenia; one 
potential candidate is the learned irrelevance paradigm which is discussed in the following 
section. 
 
1.5.2 Learned irrelevance 
 A related approach to the examination of the abnormalities of attentional control 
displayed by individuals with schizophrenia makes use of a phenomenon inhibition known as 
learned irrelevance (Mackintosh, 1973). Learned irrelevance refers to the finding that the 
experience of a cue as irrelevant to the occurrence of an outcome (i.e., due to 
inconsistent/uncorrelated presentations of a cue and a target), retards later new learning about 
that cue. For example, Mackintosh (1973) demonstrated that rats given uncorrelated exposure 
between a tone and water, showed slower subsequent learning about a contingent tone-water 
relationship, compared to rats given no preexposure to the tone or water (see also Baker & 
Mackintosh, 1977; Allen et al., 2002; Linden et al., 1997; Baker et al., 2003; Bonardi & Ong, 
2003; Baker, Murphy & Mehta, 2003). A commonly accepted view of learned irrelevance 
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states that it reflects a reduction in learning rate to a cue as a result of prior experience of that 
cues irrelevance with respect to an outcome. This reduction in learning is taken to reflect a 
decrease in attention to the cue (on the assumption that attention is determined by relevance; 
see Mackintosh, 1975; Kruschke, 2001) and there is experimental evidence to support this view 
(see: Livesey, Harris & Harris, 2009).  
 
The fact that learned irrelevance involves slower learning about a cue following non-
reinforced preexposure makes it similar to latent inhibition. However, the procedure used for 
generating the two effects is different. The literature reports two different paradigms to 
generate an effect of learned irrelevance. The first involves exposure to inconsistent/ 
uncorrelated presentations of a cue and a target (rather than the cue presented without a target 
in tasks of latent inhibition). In the learned irrelevance task reported by Schmidt-Hansen, 
Killcross & Honey (2009), participants are presented with a series of letters, presented one after 
the other in the centre of the screen and are instructed to press the spacebar as quickly as 
possible when the letter X is presented. Amidst filler letters, the letter X is either preceded by 
either a novel letter (e.g., H) or by a letter that has been preexposed (e.g., S) in conjunction 
with uncorrelated presentations of X. Therefore, the preexposed letter (e.g., S) is presented 
without consequence on some trials, and precedes the occurrence of X on the others, see Table 
1.1. Here, a learned irrelevance effect is shown when participants are slower to respond to 
presentations of X when it was cued by the preexposed letter than the novel letter. 
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Table 1.1 
Experimental design: learned irrelevance with single cues (Schmidt-Hansen et al., 2009) 
 
Preexposed Stage Test Stage          
 Preexposed stimulus 
S → X (4)        S (16)        
Training 
S → X (16) 
 H → X (16) 
Filler trials Filler trials 
D → X (4)        D (16) D → X  (4)         D (50) 
M → X (4)        M (16) M → X (4)         M (50) 
T → X (4)        T (16) T →X  (4)          T  (50) 
V → X (4)        V (16) V → X  (4)         V (50) 
 
The second paradigm used to generate learned irrelevance arranges for cue(s) to always 
be followed by an outcome, but the predictive validity of these cues differs – thus one cue will 
reliably predict a specific outcome whilst another cue will not. A particularly clear 
demonstration of this learned irrelevance paradigm is illustrated in an experiment by Le Pelley 
and McLaren (2003) that used an allergist task (see Larkin, Aitken & Dickinson, 1998), in 
which participants are required to learn about the effects of different foods on ‘Mr X’. During 
stage 1, compound-cues (pictures of two different fruits) were followed by a given outcome - 
an allergic reaction experienced by the patient as a consequence of consuming these fruits. 
There were eight pairs of cues, and two possible outcomes (outcome 1 and 2). Table 1.2 shows 
that some food types (A-D) were established as being relevant predictors of an allergic reaction 
to the food (e.g. nausea): they consistently predicted an outcome on each trial. Whereas cues 
V-Y were irrelevant: being inconsistently followed by an outcome. In the second stage of 
training, new compounds of foods were created which each consisted of one previously 
relevant-cue and one previously irrelevant cue (i.e., AX, BY, DV, and DW), these were paired 
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with different allergic reactions to stage 1 (outcomes 3 and 4). Importantly, in this stage, the 
objective statistical relationship all the stimuli and the outcome were equal. In the absence of 
any learned bias, therefore, participants should learn as much about A, B, C and D as W, X, Y 
and Z. In a final test stage, participants had to rate the likelihood that new compounds (AC, 
BD, VX, and WY) would result in outcomes 3 and 4. Participants rated compounds AC and 
BD as significantly more predictive of outcomes 3 and 4 respectively, than compounds VX and 
WY. As the cues and compounds were all equally predictive of outcomes 3 and 4 during stage 
2 the results at test are taken as evidence for the acquisition of differences in attention to these 
cues during the initial stage of training (see also: Le Pelley, Oakeshott, Wills & McLaren, 2005; 
Le Pelley, Turnbull, Reimers & Knipe, 2010b). Furthermore, stage 1 training cannot directly 
influence stage 2 learning, as the outcomes in stage 2 are (i) different and (ii) statistically 
independent as cues paired with outcome 1 during stage 1 were equally likely to be paired with 
outcome 3 or outcome 4 in stage 2. Thus, learning that a particular cue predicts outcome 1 
during stage 1 does not inform the participant in any way about the effect of that cue in stage 
2. That the objective contingency between previously relevant and previously irrelevant cues 
is identical during stage 2 makes it difficult to account for these findings in terms of a bias in 
learning favouring previously relevant over previously irrelevant cues. As such, compared to 
explanations of latent inhibition (cf, Garety et al., 1991; Sellen et al., 2005), this variant of 
learned irrelevance (compared to the variant which instead involves exposure to inconsistent/ 
uncorrelated presentations of a cue and a target; see Schmidt-Hansen et al., 2009) is less 
amenable to non-attentional accounts of its occurrence as it cannot readily be explained by 
conditional probabilities or statistical inference. 
 
Le Pelley and McLaren’s (2003) finding suggests attention is determined by stimulus 
relevance and in turn supports the role of attention in learning. In further support of this 
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contention, eye-tracking studies have demonstrated that overt attention (attending to a stimulus 
or location by moving our eyes to look at it; Deubel & Schneider, 1996) is influenced by 
learning about stimulus relevance. Using the compound cue learned irrelevance procedure 
described above, Beesley, Le Pelley & Griffiths (2011) revealed that healthy adults reduced 
overt attention, measured using eye-tracking, to the previously non-predictive cues during stage 
2 of the procedure (see also; Beesley & Le Pelley, 2011; Kruschke, Kappenman, & Hetrick, 
2005; Wills, Lavric, Croft, & Hodgson, 2007). Therefore, studies of learned irrelevance 
provide support for an attentional bias toward predictive cues and away from irrelevant cues in 
healthy adults, which is consistent with theories of learned attention (Kruschke, 2001; Le 
Pelley, 2004; Mackintosh, 1975). The following sections explore the relationship between 
learned irrelevance task performance in individuals with schizophrenia and high schizotypal 
individuals (section 1.5.2.1).  
 
Table 1.2 
Experimental design: learned irrelevance with compound cues (Le Pelly & McLaren, 2003) 
 
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 
 
AV – 1 AX – 3  AC 3? 4? 
 
AW – 1 BY – 4  BD 3? 4?  
 
BV – 2  CV – 3  VX 3? 4? 
 
BW – 2  DW – 4  WY 3? 4? 
 
CX – 2    
 
CY – 2    
 
DX – 1   
 
DY – 1    
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1.5.2.1 Learned irrelevance, schizophrenia & schizotypy 
  1.5.2.1.1 Attenuated learned irrelevance in schizophrenia and schizotypy 
Similar to some of the existing schizophrenia and schizotypy literature that proposes a 
reduction in latent inhibition is associated with positive symptomatology; variations of the 
single-cue learned irrelevance task (see Table 1.1) have been reported to show an attenuation 
of learned irrelevance in participants with acute schizophrenia (see Gal et al., 2005; Young et 
al., 2005). However, in contrast to the latent inhibition literature that states latent inhibition 
attenuation is predominantly associated with the acute stages of schizophrenia, the studies 
carried out by Gal et al and Young et al also demonstrate some degree of learned irrelevance 
impairment in chronic schizophrenia patients. This impairment was however, ascribed to an 
effect of a more general deficit in associative learning as opposed to a specific failure to ignore 
the pre-exposed irrelevant cue. However, the experimental and control conditions in those 
studies differed in level of preexposure to the to-be-conditioned cue, making it possible that 
the effects observed, relative to acute schizophrenia individuals, reflect latent inhibition rather 
than learned irrelevance. Interpretation of these effects is made more complicated by the fact 
that the stimuli used to represent the preexposed and non-preexposed cues were not 
counterbalanced. Similar experimental limitations can be found in the schizotypy-learned 
irrelevance literature (e.g., Schmidt-Hansen et al., 2009) 
 
Using the single-cue learned irrelevance task described in Table 1.1, Schmidt-Hansen 
et al. (2009) reported reduced ‘learned irrelevance’ in individuals scoring highly on the unusual 
experiences dimension of the O-LIFE (Mason et al., 1995). However, similar to the single-cue 
learned irrelevance paradigms utilised by see Gal et al. (2005) and Young et al. (2005), the 
learned irrelevance task described by Schmidt-Hansen et al. also presents the preexposed cue 
an unequal number of times with the target. Thus there were more presentations of the 
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preexposed cue without consequence (not followed by the target), than there were pairings of 
the preexposed cue followed by the target during the preexposure stage, resulting in the 
paradigm being potentially confounded by latent inhibition and/or conditioned inhibition. 
 
The compound-cue learned irrelevance task described by Le Pelley and McLaren 
(2003); see Table 1.2 however equates latent inhibition by presenting all cues an equal number 
of times. Using a variant of Le Pelley and Mclaren’s learned irrelevance task; Morris, Griffiths, 
Le Pelley & Weickert (2012) assessed whether an inability to discriminate between relevant 
and irrelevant cues, as measured by the amount of learning in a novel test of attention, is related 
to the positive symptoms of schizophrenia. Across two experiments, results were consistent 
with models of attention which suggest that cues predictive of an outcome attract more 
attention that cues non-predictive of an outcome in healthy individuals (Kruschke, 2001; Le 
Pelley, 2004; Mackintosh, 1975). However, in individuals with schizophrenia, this normal 
attentional bias was impaired as patients were unable to distinguish between previously 
relevant and irrelevant cues and there was a positive correlation between learning about the 
previously irrelevant cue and high-positive symptom severity, measured using the Positive and 
Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS) for schizophrenia (Kay, Fiszbein & Opler, 1987). These 
results provide evidence consistent with a failure of selective attention in schizophrenia and 
that this deficit may be critical in the formation and experience of psychotic symptoms (Corlett, 
Honey & Fletcher, 2007; Corlett, Murray & Honey, 2007). In an extension of these findings 
Le Pelley et al (2010a) assessed whether an observed attentional bias towards previously 
established relevant cues is reduced in high schizotypy individuals, again using a variant of the 
compound-cue learned irrelevance task described by Le Pelley and McLaren (2003; see section 
1.5.2). 
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 Le Pelley et al. (2010a) demonstrated an effect of learned irrelevance when participants 
were taken as a whole; participants learnt faster in stage 2 about previously relevant cues, 
relative to previously irrelevant cues. Importantly, however, individuals scoring highly on the 
unusual experiences dimension of schizotypy measured using the O-LIFE questionnaire 
(Mason et al., 1995) showed no effect of learned irrelevance: high schizotypal individuals 
showed no significant difference in learning about previously relevant or irrelevant cues in 
stage 2, relative to low schizotypal individuals who demonstrated increase learning towards 
previously relevant cues. This finding supports the suggestion that schizotypy is associated 
with a deficit in the appropriate allocation of attention to stimuli based on their previously 
experienced relevance; with a specific inability to reduce attention to irrelevant information 
(see Lubow &Weiner, 2010; Haselgrove et al., 2015). This finding is consistent with attentional 
interpretations of latent inhibition, consistent with some of the existing schizotypy and 
schizophrenia literature (see Lubow & Weiner, 2010) that proposes a reduction in learned 
variations in attention is associated with positive symptomatology. This finding does however 
encourage the parsimonious suggestion that masked latent inhibition tasks (which generate a 
procedure that align themselves with learned irrelevance, rather than latent inhibition, see 
section 1.5.1.2.2) show sensitivity to schizotypy because it is actually generated by learned 
irrelevance. This casts doubt on the assumption that masked latent inhibition in humans is 
comparable to simple latent inhibition in animals, which could undermine the use of animal 
latent inhibition preparations as models of schizophrenia; and other pathologies that are 
associated with reduced masked latent inhibition (see section 1.6.1 for a discussion with 
anxiety). These arguments are further explored in Chapter 3. 
 
An additional line of research that might explain some of the controversies in the latent 
inhibition literature (i.e., whether latent inhibition is attenuated or enhanced in individuals with 
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schizophrenia/high in schizotypality) is that proposed by Braunstein-Bercovitz (2000). 
Suggesting, selective attention dysfunction may not be specific to schizophrenia and may 
instead be related to the anxiety components of schizotypality and its related pathologies. The 
most commonly reported attentional biases observed in individuals experiencing anxiety, are 
briefly reviewed next; before moving on to discuss the research (albeit limited) with latent 
inhibition and anxiety, and crucially, with latent inhibition and the anxiety components of 
schizotypy. To date, there are no studies that have directly investigated the relationship between 
learned irrelevance and anxiety (see section 1.6.2). 
 
1.6 Attention Dysfunction in Anxiety 
Anxiety disorders constitute a major worldwide health burden with sizeable 
psychological, social and economic costs (Beddington et al., 2008). The impact of anxiety on 
cognitive function is a major contributing factor to these costs; anxiety disorders can augment 
focus upon negative life events and make concentration difficult, leading to problems in both 
social and work environments. In such situations the state of anxiety can be seen as 
maladaptive. Anxiety can, however, also improve the ability to detect and avoid danger, which 
under the right circumstances- such as walking home alone in the dark- can be adaptive. The 
precise impact of anxiety on cognition is, however, unclear (Robinson et al., 2013).  
 
Recent psychological models suggest that core deficits in attention control are involved 
in the etiology and maintenance of mood and anxiety disorders (e.g. de Raedt & Koster, 2010; 
Sylvester et al., 2012). According to cognitive theories (e.g. Williams, Watts, MacLeod & 
Mathews, 1988; Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg & Van, 2007) anxiety is 
associated with biased allocation of attention towards threat-related stimuli because one 
function of anxiety is the detection of threat, enabling the individual to react quickly.  
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To understand cognitive biases of attention, psychological theories and clinical research 
have increasingly turned to information-processing paradigms derived from experimental 
cognitive psychology. A modified version of the Stroop (1935) colour-naming task is one of 
the most frequently adapted paradigms to show attentional biases in high anxiety individuals. 
In this task, participants are asked to name the ink colour of words, whilst ignoring their 
semantic content. Consistent with the hypothesis that people with heightened vulnerability to 
anxiety are less able to ignore negative information, the general finding is that, anxious 
individuals display disproportionately longer colour-naming latencies with threatening words 
such as ‘tragedy’ compared to neutral words such as ‘corner.’ This effect has been reported in 
individuals clinically diagnosed with having a generalised anxiety disorder (e.g., Eysenck et 
al., 1987; Mathews & MacLeod, 1985; Mogg et al., 1989, 1995), post-traumatic stress disorder 
(Cassiday et al., 1992; Thrasher & Yule, 1994) and also non-clinical, healthy individuals 
scoring highly on self-report measures of anxiety (e.g., Dalgleish, 1995; Fox, 1993, 1994; 
MacLeod & Hagan, 1992; Van-Den-Hout et al., 1995; Edwards, Burt & Lipp, 2006).  
 
More direct measures of selective attention have served to confirm that individuals with 
high levels of anxiety-vulnerability do indeed orient attention towards negatively-valenced 
stimuli. For example, the ‘dot probe’ procedure described by MacLeod, Mathews, and Tata 
(1986) assessed attentional responses to emotional information. In this task, participants were 
presented, briefly, with two words simultaneously, one negative threat-related word and one 
neutral word. Following the termination of this display, a small dot probe appears in the prior 
location of one of these two words and participants were required to press a response button, 
corresponding to target identity, as quickly as possible whenever the probe is detected. 
Consistent with existing attentional bias related research, generalised anxiety disorder patients 
were quicker to detect probes that appeared in the spatial vicinity of the more negative words. 
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Non-anxious controls tended to detect probes more slowly when they appeared in the vicinity 
of the negative words as opposed to the more neutral words, suggesting that low levels of 
anxiety vulnerability may be associated with a disposition to selectively orient attention away 
from negative information. This pattern of findings with the dot probe task has been replicated 
in patients with generalised anxiety disorder (e.g. Mogg, Mathews & Eysenck, 1992) and also 
non-clinical, healthy individuals scoring highly on self-report measures of anxiety (Broadbent 
& Broadbent, 1988; MacLeod & Mathews, 1988; See also: MacLeod et al., 2007; Koster et al., 
2006; for a review see Cisler & Koster, 2010).  
 
In addition to an attentional bias towards threat-related stimuli, data also point to a 
general attentional bias toward irrelevant stimuli, in the absence of threat. For example, in a 
modified version of the Stroop task, participants were required to name the colour of a centrally 
located colour-patch, which was flanked top and bottom by either a neutral-, colour- or threat- 
related distractor word. As we might expect, high anxious individuals produced slower colour-
patch naming times when the patch was flanked by threat-related distractor words, relative to 
neutral distractor words. However, in addition to this finding, high anxious individuals also 
show distraction by the colour-related distractor words (when the colour word was separate 
from the colour patch) relative to the neutral-related distractor words). By contrast, low anxious 
individuals did not show any Stroop interference, when the colour words were conflicting with 
the colour-patch (Fox et al., 1993). In general, high anxious individuals produced slower 
colour-patch naming latencies than the low anxious individuals regardless of whether the 
distracting words were conflicting colour words, neutral or threat-related words.  
 
These findings have been taken as evidence for a general inability to maintain 
attentional focus in high anxious individuals, rather than an automatic attentional bias that is 
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specific towards threat-related information. In further support of this contention, Derryberry 
and Reed (2002) have previously reported a high negative correlation between individual’s trait 
anxiety scores and self-report of attentional control (see also; Enright and Beech, 1993; Fox, 
1993, 1994; Mathews et al., 1990; Poy et al., 2004; Bishop, 2009; Pacheo-Unguetti, Acosta, 
Callejas & Lupiáñez, 2010). 
 
To date, many existing selective attention paradigms have been influential for 
determining attentional biases in anxious individuals: indicating a bias in attentional processing 
for irrelevant information (either in the presence or in the absence of threat; for a review see: 
Eysenck et al., 2007). At this juncture, the selective attention tasks used in existing research 
(highlighted above) are able to advocate a well-established difference in attentional capture for 
individuals high and low in anxiety. What is less clear is how this difference in attention to 
relevant/irrelevant stimuli affects how well these stimuli are attended to, and learnt about in 
subsequent, novel situations. Based on associative theories of learning for example, the prior 
predictive history of a stimulus will affect how well that stimulus is attended to, and thus learnt 
about in the future (e.g., Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce & Hall, 1980). Similar to the schizophrenia 
literature, one prominent example of a learned attention task that has been used to investigate 
impaired attentional processes in anxiety is the latent inhibition paradigm (Lubow, 1989). 
 
 1.6.1 Latent inhibition and anxiety 
  1.6.1.1 Attenuated latent inhibition and anxiety  
As previously stated, the latent inhibition procedure (Lubow, 1989) has been used to 
investigate attentional biases, for both schizophrenia and schizotypy (for a review see: 
Braunstein-Bercovitz, Dimentman-Ashkenazi & Lubow, 2001, and section 1.5.1). Latent 
inhibition has typically been used for this task because it has been proposed to provide an index 
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of the degree of distraction by irrelevant stimuli (for a review see: Braunstein-Bercovitz et al., 
2002), and it has a well-established pharmacological basis (Moser, Hitchcock, Lister & Moran, 
2000). Indeed, a variety of animal and human studies support a disruption of selective attention 
with increased anxiety and stress levels, as reflected in studies of latent inhibition (see Weiner, 
1990; Weiner & Feldon, 1997; Braunstein-Bercovitz, 2000, 2002). More specifically, 
Braunstein-Bercovitz (2002) report that anxiety modulates latent inhibition, as individuals high 
in trait anxiety (Braunstein-Bercovitz, 2000) and state anxiety (Braunstein-Bercovitz, 2001) 
show an attenuation of latent inhibition. These data have been taken as further evidence for an 
attentional bias in anxious individuals. Furthermore, this relationship between anxiety and 
latent inhibition has been proposed to effectively account for the attenuation of latent inhibition 
in high-schizotypal individuals and schizophrenia patients that is often reported in some of the 
existing literature (for a review see Braunstein-Bercovitz, 2002). Evidence for this suggestion 
is discussed in the following section.  
 
  1.6.1.2 Latent inhibition: The Anxiety components of schizotypy 
Similar to schizophrenia, and as noted earlier, several lines of existing research suggest 
anxiety is associated with a reduced ability to ignore irrelevant stimuli/information, reflecting 
a general inability to maintain attentional focus (Eysenck et al., 1987; Mathews & MacLeod, 
1985; Mogg et al., 1989). As such, the disruption of latent inhibition reported in schizophrenia, 
high-schizotypals (for a review see Lubow & Weiner, 2010) and anxious individuals (for a 
review see Braunstein-Bercovitz, 2002) is most commonly attributed to the relatively high 
distractibility in these groups. Few studies, however, have attempted to bridge the gap between 
schizotypy and anxiety in relation to learned attentional functioning to assess whether the 
anxiety that characterises schizophrenia and schizotypy accounts for the difficulties individuals 
with schizophrenia and schizotypal individuals have in ignoring irrelevant information. This is 
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surprising given the high co-morbidity rate between schizophrenia and anxiety (Buckley et al., 
2009; see section 1.1.4) and the overlap between psychometrically identified schizotypy and 
anxiety symptoms (Braunstein-Bercovitz, 2000). Both at clinical and sub-clinical levels, the 
SPQ and State Trait Anxiety Inventory are highly correlated (Braunstein-Bercovitz, 2000) and 
several studies report a positive correlation between symptom type in patients with 
schizophrenia and level of anxiety (Huppert et al., 2001; Lyons et al., 2001; Norman & Malla, 
1993a, b). 
 
In addition, as previously highlighted (see section 1.5.1.1.1), latent inhibition is 
mediated by dopaminergic activity (for reviews see: Gray, 1998; Moser et al., 2000; Weiner & 
Feldon, 1997), and both schizotypy (Caplan & Guthrie, 1994; Silver, 1994, 1995) and anxiety 
(McIvor et al., 1996; Nutt et al., 1998; Peroutka et al., 1998) are also characterized by increased 
dopaminergic activity. The high correlations of schizotypal scale scores with anxiety scale 
scores suggest that schizotypal scales may contain an anxiety factor (or vice versa). This, 
together with data that anxious individuals are distracted by irrelevant stimuli as measured by 
latent inhibition (as well as other tasks which show slower learning/distraction towards 
previously non-reinforced irrelevant stimuli, such as negative priming; Fox, 1993, 1994; and 
Stroop tasks; Mathews et al., 1990), reinforces the possibility that an anxiety component of the 
disorder may account for selective attention deficits in high schizotypals and individuals with 
schizophrenia. Furthermore, that disrupted latent inhibition in high schizotypals may be a result 
of the high levels of anxiety which accompanies this state.  
   
One attempt to cross the boundary between schizotypy and anxiety, and investigate 
cognitive performance was in a study conducted by Braunstein-Bercovitz (2000). This study 
carried out a factor analysis to assess whether schizotypy is accompanied by sub-clinical levels 
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of anxiety. This analysis produced two factors; one factor that was correlated with trait-anxiety 
scores, and labeled ‘anxiety- loaded;’ the second factor represented thought and perception 
disorders, and was labeled ‘perceptual-disorganisation.’ Consistent with some of the existing 
research, disrupted latent inhibition was observed in high as compared to low schizotypy 
individuals. However, latent inhibition was also disrupted in patients with high trait anxiety 
scores and on the anxiety-loaded factor. Latent inhibition deficits, then, appear not to represent 
a specific marker for schizotypy, nor, by extension, for schizophrenia. Instead, such latent 
inhibition deficits may be a contribution of the heightened anxieties that accompany many 
different types of pathology. 
 
1.6.2 Learned irrelevance and anxiety  
Whilst there are studies that have looked at latent inhibition with anxiety, there are no 
studies that have directly investigated the relationship between anxiety and learned irrelevance. 
It is important to bear in mind however that, as previously highlighted, existing latent inhibition 
preparations including a masking task, generate a procedure that align themselves with learned 
irrelevance, rather than latent inhibition (see section 1.5.1.2.2). Therefore, the conclusions of 
these findings reported in the preceding sections, relating to disrupted latent inhibition with 
schizophrenia schizotypy and anxiety remain open to debate. 
C. Learning Theory Background 
 
1.9 Associative Learning Theory 
Abnormalities of association formation have been considered to have a role in the 
pathogenesis of schizophrenia since Bleuler described ‘loosening of associations’ as 
‘contradictory, competing, and more or less irrelevant responses [that] can no longer be 
excluded’ to epitomise the core deficits observed in schizophrenia (Bleuler, Dementia Praecox, 
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or the Group of Schizophrenias, p. 511). As discussed previously, considerable evidence of 
impairments in associative learning has accumulated; leading to the development of the idea 
that a disruption in learning might be of relevance to understanding the fragmented thinking 
and delusions that characterise schizophrenia. As such, associative learning theory provides a 
framework that can aid understanding of the disrupted psychological processes that give rise 
to impaired behaviour observed in neuropsychiatric disorders, which in turn, may help to 
clarify the nature of these deficits. Considered here, are some fundamental features of attention 
in associative learning that are of relevance to the attentional view of schizophrenia and 
anxiety, focusing on the Mackintosh (1975) and Pearce and Hall (1980) theories, in particular.  
 
 1.9.1 Attention in associative learning 
Decades of research have been spent discovering how animals, including humans, are 
able to learn relationships between cues and events in the environment surrounding them. For 
it is the ability to learn about and use these cues to predict events of motivational significance 
(reinforcers) that enables organisms to adapt and survive in a changing environment. Exactly 
how both animals and humans come to attend to the appropriate cues has been of long standing 
debate amongst learning theorists (see Le Pelley, 2004, for a review). Some theories postulate 
that attention is a crucial mediating variable allowing the use of prior experience to determine 
which cues are, and which cues are not, processed for learning. Other theories focus on the 
nature of the association that is formed (see: Le Pelley, 2004; Mitchell & Le Pelley, 2010).  
 
One of the major goals of associative learning theory is to determine the factors that 
influence learning; why under some conditions we learn more about one stimulus than another. 
Research from animal conditioning studies suggests that one factor which determines learning 
about the consequences of stimuli is the prior predictive history of a stimulus.  For example, 
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previous experience with a cue (e.g., a light) as being predictive or nonpredictive of 
reinforcement (e.g., food) will affect how well that stimulus is learnt about in subsequent 
conditioning (see Le Pelley, 2004; Le Pelley et al. 2016, for a review). Research with human 
learning also provides support for this suggestion (see Le Pelley & Mclaren, 2003; Le Pelley, 
Schmidt-Hansen, Harris, Lunter & Morris, 2010a). The rate of learning about the cue is 
commonly referred to as the cue’s associability (α) which is related to the amount of attention 
paid to the cue (Le Pelley, 2004)4.  
 
However, exactly how the prior predictiveness of a cue determines α is inconsistent 
across the literature, with findings supporting opposing theories of associative learning. 
According to Mackintosh’s (1975) theory cues that have reliably predicted an outcome in the 
past, acquire attention (α) whilst poorer predictors lose attention and thus come to be ignored 
– facilitating or attenuating subsequent learning, respectively. In contrast, Pearce and Hall 
(1980) posit that attention should decrease to cues that reliably predict the outcome with which 
they are paired. Instead, the Pearce-Hall model assumes attention is allocated to cues that are 
inaccurate or uncertain predictors of reinforcement, so as to facilitate learning about the exact 
significance of those cues. In accordance with these theories, there are certain studies which 
are in line with the Mackintosh model; suggesting that stimuli previously established as reliable 
predictors of reinforcement, attain a higher α and are subsequently learnt about faster, than 
stimuli established as non-predictive (see Le Pelley, 2004). In opposition, other studies 
demonstrate faster learning about stimuli previously established as being uncertain/unreliable 
predictors of reinforcement, compared to those experienced as being continuously predictive 
(see Haselgrove, Esber, Pearce & Jones, 2010); thus fitting well with the Pearce-Hall model. 
                                                             
4 Associability and attention are often used (perhaps incorrectly) interchangeably to describe alpha (α).  
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The following sections provide a brief history and overview of these theories and their ability 
to explain latent inhibition and learned irrelevance, in particular. 
 
1.9.1.1 Mackintosh (1975): The predictiveness principle 
According to the Mackintosh model, attention to a stimulus is increased when it is the 
best predictor of an outcome, and decreases otherwise. The change in associative strength 
between the stimulus (CS A) and the outcome (US B) is formalised by Equation 1. 
           ΔVA= α ·Ɵ · (λ - VA)                                    (1) 
 In this equation, the error term (λ - VA) is the discrepancy between the magnitude of the 
US (λ) and the associative strength of the CS A (VA). Ɵ is determined by the properties of the 
US and is a learning rate parameter. The most crucial aspect of this equation is that α is not a 
fixed parameter of CS-processing (c.f. Rescorla & Wagner, 1972), but a variable parameter 
that changes as a result of experience with the CS; it increases when the CS is a good predictor 
of the US (participants attend to relevant stimuli that predict trial outcomes) and decreases 
when it is a poor predictor of the US (participants ignore irrelevant stimuli that do not predict 
trial outcomes). The rules for determining these increases and decreases in α are formalised in 
Equation 2a and 2b. 
ΔαA > 0 if | λ – VA| < | λ – Vx|   (2a) 
 
ΔαA < 0 if | λ – VA| > | λ – Vx|   (2b)  
 Here, Vx is the summed associative strength of all CS’s, besides VA, present on that trial. 
If (λ – VA) is smaller than (λ – Vx), then CS A is a better predictor of the outcome on that trial 
than any other available stimuli; if it is bigger, then CS is a poorer predictor.  
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Much research from animal studies provides evidence for a mechanism operating on 
this predictiveness principle offered by the Mackintosh model, which provides an explanation 
for many standard conditioning effects including the intra- and extradimensional-shift effect, 
blocking and overshadowing, overtraining-reversal effects, learned irrelevance and latent 
inhibition (for reviews, see Le Pelley, 2004; Pearce, 2008; Pearce & Mackintosh, 2010; Le 
Pelley et al., 2016). These conditioning effects are also well documented in human associative 
learning, commonly being observed in serial-reaction-time tasks (Beesley & Le Pelley, 2010) 
and eye-gaze fixations (Beesley & Le Pelley, 2011; Le Pelley, Beesley & Griffiths, 2011). The 
results of these studies support the suggestion that attention to a stimulus is governed by 
learning about its predictive-validity i.e., its ability to predict the occurrence of significant 
outcomes. A particularly clear demonstration of the importance of learned predictiveness 
/irrelevance is illustrated in the experiment reported by Le Pelley and McLaren (2003); this 
experiment was discussed at length in section 1.5.2, see also Table 1.2. 
 
According to the Mackintosh (1975) model, attention to a stimulus is increased when it 
is the best predictor of an outcome, and decreases otherwise. In this way, Mackintosh describes 
learned irrelevance as a decrease in attention (more specifically ‘decreased associability) to the 
previously uncertain/inconsistent cues, because the participant learns these cues are irrelevant 
(i.e., as it is an uncertain predictor of a given outcome), in contrast to the previously predictive 
cues. By the same token, Mackintosh describes latent inhibition as a decrease in 
attention/associability to the preexposed cue, as both the pre-exposed cue and the context are 
established as (at best) equally good predictors of non-reinforcement. Equation 2b will 
therefore ensure that the associability of the preexposed cue will reduce during stage 1. 
Therefore, at the outset of conditioning, the associability of the pre-exposed cue will be lower 
than the associability of the novel (non-pre-exposed cue), hence reduced learning to the pre-
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exposed familiar cue relative, to the novel cue. Therefore, learning that a cue is ‘irrelevant’ to 
the occurrence of an outcome will result in reduced learning about this cue when these events 
are eventually paired; a unitary mechanism underlying both latent inhibition and learned 
irrelevance.  
 
1.9.1.2 The uncertainty principle (Pearce & Hall, 1980) 
Despite the success of the Mackintosh model, Pearce and Hall (1980) argued that, rather 
than devoting attentional resources to stimuli that are accurate predictors of reinforcement, 
attention should be directed towards stimuli which are inaccurate predictors of their outcomes. 
According to the Pearce and Hall model, when a stimulus is initially presented for conditioning, 
the stimulus is a poor predictor of its consequence and thus attention to the stimulus should be 
increased to facilitate learning on subsequent trials. Throughout conditioning, attention to the 
stimulus may then decrease as it becomes a better predictor of its outcome, and ultimately cease 
once the outcome is fully predicted by the stimulus. This change in associative strength 
between the stimulus (CS A) and the outcome (US) is formalised by Equation 3.  
ΔVA= S. αA. λ     (3) 
 
In this equation S is determined by the intensity of the CS and is a fixed learning-rate 
parameter and λ represents the asymptote of conditioning, determined by the intensity of the 
US. The parameter α again represents the associability of the CS (assumed to be high for a 
novel CS) and is modified by experience according to Equation 4. 
    α n+1 =|λ−ΣV n |        (4) 
Where ΣV represents the sum of the associative strengths of all stimuli present on trial 
n; the value of α on trial n is determined by the absolute discrepancy between the asymptote of 
conditioning and the summed associative strength experienced on the preceding trial n. In 
simple conditioning, Equation 4 predicts that a CS which is reliably paired with a US will lose 
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associability and approach zero as asymptote is reached. Studies that are consistent with these 
predictions are, for example the Hall and Pearce (1979) negative-transfer effect, in which 
acquisition of conditioning between a CS and a strong US is attenuated as a consequence of 
previous continuous reinforcement with the same CS and a weaker US. Another implication of 
Equation 4 refers to the effect of a partial reinforcement schedule and how this determines the 
degree of attention paid to a stimulus. By intermittently presenting a US after a CS, the 
parameter |λ−ΣV | will always be positive no matter how many trials are given. Therefore, 
where associability (and thus attention) to a continuously reinforced CS will ultimately reach 
zero, the associability of a partially reinforced CS will remain at a relatively high level.  
 
Direct support has since been provided for this prediction by using the associability of 
a stimulus as a measure of degree of attention paid to it. For example, Haselgrove et al., (2010) 
conducted an appetitive conditioning experiment using rats and four auditory stimuli, A, B, X 
and Y. The training stage was designed to modify attention to stimuli in accordance with the 
central tenets of the Pearce-Hall model; with A and B consistently paired with a food reward 
an X and Y intermittently paired with food. From this treatment it was expected, on the basis 
of the Pearce-Hall model that the associability of A and B would be lower than that of X and 
Y. In a subsequent test discrimination stage, rats were presented with an AY+, AX-, BY- 
discrimination. The results support that more attention was paid to X and Y during test, as the 
discrimination between the compounds that differed in terms of partially reinforced CSs (AY 
and AX) was acquired more readily than the discrimination between the compounds that 
differed in terms of the continuously reinforced CSs (AY and BY). Thus, suggesting that 
attention in rats is modulated in the way the Pearce-Hall model anticipates. Other studies (see 
Kaye & Pearce, 1984) have used the orienting response that the stimulus elicits to provide an 
index of attention paid to the stimulus; when a cue for the occurrence of food was only partially 
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reinforced, orientation towards the predictor was maintained relative to a continuously 
reinforced cue (see also: Wilson, Boumphrey, & Pearce, 1992).   
 
There is only limited direct support for the Pearce-Hall model in studies of human 
learning; Hogarth, Dickinson, Austin, Brown and Duka (2008) used an eye-gaze measure as 
an index of attention to visual cues associated with an aversive noise outcome. The visual cue 
associated with an uncertain noise outcome, attracted a longer gaze-time, than cues which 
consistently predicted either the outcome (A), or its omission (C). These findings however fail 
to explore whether or not learning is facilitated for these cues predictive of uncertain outcomes 
(although see Le Pelley et al., 2010b; discussed at length in Chapter 3). More recent work by 
Beesley et al. (2015) also supports an increase in overt attention (as measured by eye-gaze) to 
cues trained in uncertain compounds (compounds that were paired with outcomes in a 
probabilistic manner: i.e., Outcome o1 occurred on 70% of trials, and o2 occurred on the 
remaining 30%). However, in a subsequent test of learning involving new cue-outcome 
relationships, there was no evidence of a carryover effect of participants’ previous experience 
of uncertainty on overt attention or learning about these uncertain cues. 
 
Applied to latent inhibition, the Pearce-Hall model suggests that the associability of a 
stimulus declines during preexposure because it is consistently followed by no consequence, 
therefore its outcome, nothing, is well predicted. Therefore, the model anticipates nominal 
learning on the first conditioning trial when the preexposed stimulus is paired with the US.  By 
a similar token, Pearce and Hall attempt to describe learned irrelevance as a decrease in 
associability to the preexposed cue due to the random presentations of the CS and US, resulting 
in the growth of a context-US association. Consequently, whenever the US is, by chance, paired 
with the CS, it will be accurately predicted by the contextual stimuli, and thus attention to the 
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CS will decline because it is followed by an accurately predicted event. However, as there are 
trials in which the CS is followed by no consequence, the US will always be surprising; 
presenting a problem for the Pearce-Hall model in being able to explain learned irrelevance as 
a decrease in associability to the preexposed cue. Nevertheless, the Pearce-Hall model suggests 
that learning a cue is ‘irrelevant’ to the occurrence of an outcome will result in reduced learning 
about this cue when these events are eventually paired; suggesting a unitary mechanism (in this 
case, attentional) underlying both latent inhibition and learned irrelevance. 
 
1.9.2 Overview of applications to latent inhibition and learned irrelevance 
Many researchers have adopted the view that latent inhibition and learned irrelevance 
are the result of reduced stimulus processing, and explain the effects in terms of mechanisms 
that deal with attention and/or association (Le Pelley, 2004; Lubow, Weiner & Schnur, 1981; 
Mackintosh, 1975; McLaren & Mackintosh, 2000; Pearce & Hall, 1980; Wagner, 1978, 1981). 
These models assume that latent inhibition is generated by an attention-like mechanism, 
resulting from a reduction in the processing of the stimulus during non-reinforced preexposure. 
And, learned irrelevance is viewed as reflecting a reduction in the processing (in terms of a 
change in attention or associability) as a result of unpaired correlations between a stimulus and 
target during irrelevance pre-training. Theories which adopt this approach are referred to as 
‘attentional models’ as they can explain latent inhibition and learned irrelevance as the result 
of a failure to encode the relationship between the preexposed stimulus and the US (Le Pelley, 
2004; Lubow et al., 1981; Mackintosh, 1975; McLaren & Mackintosh, 2000; Pearce & Hall, 
1980; Wagner, 1978, 1981). Therefore, despite the very different principles on which their 
theories are based, both Mackintosh (1975) and Pearce and Hall (1980) suggest the mechanism 
(in this case, attentional) underlying an effect of latent inhibition is the same mechanism 
underlying an effect of learned irrelevance. Whilst attentional accounts of latent inhibition and 
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learned irrelevance remain dominant, non-attentional accounts do exist (e.g. Hall, 1991; 
Bouton, 1993; 1997; Miller & Matzel, 1988; Oswald, 2001) and these are considered in the 
general discussion. 
D. Aims of Thesis 
 
The above sections have reviewed the symptomology of schizophrenia, schizotypy and 
anxiety (clinical and sub-clinical); with particular focus on the role attentional abnormalities 
may play in the causes of the disorders and by extension, their related personality sub-types in 
the normal population. Given the numerous factors likely to play a role in the manifestation of 
clinically diagnosed schizophrenia and anxiety, evidence has been reviewed that supports the 
study of attentional dysfunction as a possible cognitive endophenotype.  An endophenotype is 
a ‘halfway point’ between the genetic/biological abnormalities and the signs and symptoms 
that characterise the disorder and may further our understanding of schizophrenia and anxiety. 
Braff (2008) proposed for an endophenotype to be viable, it must have a genetic basis, 
confirming it is trait not state and therefore precedes disorder onset. One means of doing this 
is by testing for the hypothesised endophenotype in healthy individuals using scales to measure 
schizotypy and anxiety.  
 
Latent inhibition has already been identified as a potential cognitive endophenotype 
and there are plausible theories (Howes & Kapur, 2009; Kapur, 2003; Kapur et al., 2005) that 
link empirical findings to the clinical picture of schizophrenia. There is however, significant 
co-morbidity between schizophrenia and anxiety. As anxiety also shows abnormalities in 
dopaminergic functioning it maybe that latent inhibition dysfunction relates to symptom level. 
The similar relationship reported between both schizotypy and anxiety with latent inhibition 
(see Braunstein-Bercovitz, 2002) suggests that latent inhibition disruption is possibly 
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associated with general psychiatric illness or the anxiety components of schizotypy and by 
extension schizophrenia, rather than being a specific endophenotype for schizophrenia. 
However, there are number of limitations encompassed within existing research, specifically 
regarding the nature of latent inhibition paradigms, and whether they instead reflect the 
operation of learned irrelevance (see: Le Pelley et al., 2010a).  This questions the current status 
of latent inhibition as a viable endophenotype for both schizophrenia and anxiety disorders by 
constraining the comparison between human studies and animal models that instead produce 
latent inhibition using only simple preexposure (thus latent inhibition not confounded by 
alternative learning phenonmena). Further studies are required to ascertain whether this is the 
case. The possibility that the learned irrelevance paradigm might be more reliable, considering 
it is less ambiguous in terms of attention, is also worth exploring as a potential endophenotype 
for schizophrenia and anxiety. Existing research findings which indicate an attenuation of 
learned irrelevance in high schizotypy individuals provides support for this exploration (see Le 
Pelley et al., 2010a, section 1.5.2.1). Whether the distinction between latent inhibition and 
learned irrelevance is an important one, is a focus of the current work. 
 
The general aim of this thesis is to address, or begin to address, some of the key 
questions and limitations with existing research that evaluate latent inhibition and learned 
irrelevance as potentially useful cognitive endophenotypes for schizophrenia and anxiety 
disorders.  
 
(a) Experiments 1-4  
The purpose is twofold: first, to address the limitations of existing latent inhibition tasks by 
designing a paradigm that examines a purer effect of latent inhibition, by minimising the 
contribution of learned irrelevance, and assessing how this latent inhibition task co-varies with 
-74- 
 
schizotypy and anxiety (Chapter 2: Experiments 1 and 2). Secondly, latent inhibition has been 
argued, an equivocal measure of attentional processing (Weiner, 1990; Hall, 1991; Bouton, 
1993; Gray & Snowden, 2005) which renders it difficult to draw inferences that attenuations 
of latent inhibition infer a disruption of attention processes implicated in schizophrenia and 
anxiety. Thus, whilst an effect of latent inhibition has been viewed as a consequence of 
attention that influences learning; as already highlighted- alternative, and less equivocal, 
attentional paradigms exist. The learned irrelevance paradigm has been proposed a less 
ambiguous measure of the impact of attention on associative learning, in contrast to latent 
inhibition (as previously discussed; see also Le Pelley, 2010a,b). Therefore, the second aim 
was to design a learned irrelevance paradigm, and assess the relationship between this task and 
measures of schizotypy and anxiety (Chapter 3: Experiments 3 and 4). 
 
Examining the comparison between a true latent inhibition paradigm and a learned 
irrelevance paradigm, will allow an assessment of their independent effects on schizotypy and 
anxiety. By teasing apart the effects of latent inhibition and learned irrelevance we are 
attempting to disentangle, and constrain our understanding of attentional abnormalities 
observed in these sub-clinical traits and by extension, their related pathologies. We assess 
whether the learned irrelevance paradigm has the potential to produce converging and 
complimentary evidence to that of the latent inhibition work.  
 
Based on the assumption then, that latent inhibition and learned irrelevance share 
similar psychological underpinnings (in this case, attentional), we should expect the effect of 
schizotypy and anxiety to be comparable in the two types of attention tasks here. This 
proposition is supported by attentional theories of associative learning, such as Mackintosh 
(1975) which suggests the mechanism underlying an effect of latent inhibition is the same 
mechanism underlying an effect of learned irrelevance. Consequently, if we see an effect of 
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schizotypy and anxiety with latent inhibition, then we would expect to see the same with 
learned irrelevance. If this does not turn out to be the case, a revision of existing attentional-
associative models will be suggested.  
 
(b) Experiments 5 & 6 
To anticipate, the results from Experiments 3 and 4 demonstrated a reduced effect of 
learned irrelevance which was specific to individuals high in state anxiety. However, from 
these results it remains unclear whether high anxiety causes an inability to direct attention, or 
alternatively whether the inability to distinguish previously relevant from irrelevant cues 
induces a state of anxiousness. Therefore, the aim of chapter 4 (Experiments 5 and 6) was to 
explore the direction of causality between anxiety and learned irrelevance, using a mood 
manipulation procedure in which participants either received a negative mood inducing task (a 
speech stressor task) to elevate state-anxiety levels; a positive mood inducing task (relaxed 
breathing/meditation exercises) to reduce state-anxiety levels; or a neutral mood inducing task 
(passage from the National Geographic) to act as a control group. Experiment 5 sought to 
explore the effectiveness of these mood induction tasks in modulating state anxiety before 
assessing their ability to influence learned variations in attention using an established learned 
irrelevance procedure (Experiment 6). 
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Chapter 2:  
Latent inhibition: The relationship with schizotypy and anxiety 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 2.1.1 Latent inhibition: Recapitulation 
Theoretical analyses of latent inhibition have focused upon an attentional explanation - 
proposing that during preexposure, attention diminishes to the preexposed stimulus so that, 
subsequently, participants take longer to learn the association between this stimulus and the 
outcome (Lubow & Gerwitz, 1995; Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce & Hall, 1980) than the non-
preexposed cue. Despite over 50 years of research, there is still no generally accepted theory 
of latent inhibition (Wagner, 1978, 1981; Bouton, 1993; Weiner, 2003), but the absence of a 
theoretical consensus has not impeded the use of latent inhibition paradigms for practical 
applications (e.g., screening potentially therapeutic drugs for schizophrenia; see Lubow & 
Weiner, 2010). As such, the concept of latent inhibition and the notion that it might be reduced 
in patients with schizophrenia has been a powerful heuristic tool for cross-species studies (for 
a review see Swerdlow & Williams, 2010). However, what is less clear is the evidence that 
latent inhibition actually is reduced, as many latent inhibition tasks have failed to provide 
replicable modulation of latent inhibition in patients with schizophrenia (for a review see 
Swerdlow, 2010) and in high schizotypy individuals (for a review Lubow & Weiner, 2010). 
Crucially, what is even less clear is whether existing latent inhibition paradigms instead reflect 
alternative learning phenomena. Detailed description of these findings, as well as a discussion 
of possible conceptual and methodological ambiguities surrounding some of the existing latent 
inhibition procedures, are discussed in the following introductory sections; 2.12 to 2.1.5.  
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2.1.2 Latent inhibition and schizophrenia   
Baruch et al (1988a) were the first to report an anomaly in latent inhibition in patients 
with schizophrenia. This task was based on a ‘masked’ procedure devised by Ginton, Urca & 
Lubow (1975) in which participants had to listen to a recording of nonsense syllables and count 
the frequency of one of them. For the preexposure group only, short bursts of white noise were 
provided as a background to the masking task. The subsequent task during the test phase 
consisted of both preexposed and non-preexposed groups learning that a burst of white noise 
(the CS) signalled the increment of a counter on a scoreboard (the US). The learning of the 
noise-increment association was slowed for control participants and patients with chronic 
schizophrenia who were preexposed to presentations of the white noise, whilst those with acute 
schizophrenia showed an absence of slower learning to the preexposure stimulus. Some studies 
have replicated this experiment reporting acute, rather than chronic patients with schizophrenia 
exhibit attenuated latent inhibition (Baruch et al; Gray, Hemsley & Gray, 1992; Rascle et al., 
2001; Gray et al., 2002, Vaitl et al., 2002). This relationship has been suggested to account for 
the presence of spurious associations being formed between stimuli in the environment from 
which unusual thought patterns and positive symptoms may emerge (i.e., hallucinations and 
delusions; Kapur, 2005; Cassaday & Moran, 2010, Moran et al 2008).  
 
 However, a number of studies demonstrate controversy about the status of latent 
inhibition in schizophrenia. For example, there are some studies that suggest no disruption of 
latent inhibition in patients with schizophrenia (Lubow, Weiner, Schlossberg & Baruch, 1987; 
Swerdlow et al., 1996; Williams et al., 1998; Lubow, Kaplan, Abramovich et al., 2000; Serra, 
Jones, Toone & Gray, 2001), whilst others report an increased (or enhanced) effect of latent 
inhibition (Rascle et al., 2001; Cohen et al., 2004; Gal et al., 2009). Normal latent inhibition 
has even been reported in acute medicated patients with schizophrenia (Swerdlow et al., 1996; 
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but see Williams et al., 1996) which used the same auditory latent inhibition paradigm as 
discussed above (see Ginton et al., 1975). Authors using a slight variation of this task however 
reported an attenuation of latent inhibition but only in one or another subclinical subgroup or 
sex (Lubow et al., 1987; Lubow et al., 2000). Others have alternatively suggested that 
attenuated latent inhibition simply reflects generalised learning deficits observed in the non-
preexposed group (Serra et al., 2001). Disagreement also appears when the effects of disease 
chronicity are taken into account. Some have suggested latent inhibition deficits reflect the 
acute stage of schizophrenia rather than the positive symptoms per se (Gray et al., 1992), whilst 
others have suggested latent inhibition is attenuated in acute negatively symptomatic patients 
(Rascle et al., 2001) or levels of latent inhibition are normal in acute positively symptomatic 
patients (Cohen et al., 2004). Each of these studies that show discrepant results not only 
challenge the proposed relationship between attenuated latent inhibition and positive 
symptomology in schizophrenia (Kapur, 2005) but also highlight the number of reports that 
fail to detect attenuated latent inhibition. One possible explanation for the inconsistencies in 
the literature may be because the effect has an additional pole of expression – an enhanced, or 
abnormally persistent latent inhibition effect, with the chronic stage of schizophrenia (Weiner, 
2003). For the first time, Rascle et al. (2001) reported an enhanced latent inhibition effect with 
patients in a chronic stage of their illness, one that was positively correlated with the negative 
symptoms of schizophrenia using the between-participant latent inhibition task described by 
Ginton et al. (1975).  
 
However, the between-participant paradigms that have typically been used to measure 
latent inhibition in patients with schizophrenia have several limitations. Primarily, the 
preexposed and non-preexposed groups are composed of different participants, making it 
difficult to match patients with identical states across groups. To avoid these problems, more 
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recent studies have tended to employ a within-participant procedure for detecting latent 
inhibition in which learning about a novel and familiar stimulus is measured in the same 
participant. In a task reported by Cohen et al. (2004), participants were presented with displays 
on a computer monitor that comprised 20 shapes. One of the shapes (X) was different from the 
remaining nineteen (Y), and it was the participants’ task to respond, on a keyboard, whether 
the odd shape was on the left, or the right hand side of the screen. Following 96 trials in which 
the odd item, and the distracters, were presented to participants, participants received  four 
types of test trials in which: (1) the stimulus that had previously served as a distracter, Y, now 
served as the odd-item target stimulus amongst an array of nineteen Xs - the preexposed 
condition; (2) trials in which a novel cue, Z, served as the target stimulus amongst an array of 
nineteen Xs - the non-preexposed condition; (3) filler trials identical to pre-exposure; and (4) 
trials in which the target and the distracts were novel. The results of Cohen et al’s experiment 
demonstrated that reaction times during the preexposed condition were slower than during the 
non-preexposed condition. Furthermore, similar to Rascle et al. (2001) their results show that 
patients in a chronic stage of their illness, displaying high negative and low positive symptoms, 
show an enhanced latent inhibition effect. Gal et al. (2009) have also replicated this finding 
using a variation of this within-participant visual recognition latent inhibition procedure. 
Although Gal et al suggest enhanced latent inhibition is more specific to illness chronicity, 
rather than negative symptoms per se. To the best of current knowledge, reports by Rascle et 
al. (2001), Cohen et al. (2004) and Gal et al. (2009), are the first three studies to have shown 
that latent inhibition is abnormally persistent in chronic patients. On the basis of the studies 
reviewed thus far, it seems accurate to suggest that schizophrenia is associated with an 
abnormal expression of latent inhibition. Whether an attenuation or enhancement of the effect 
is observed, depends on the stage of the illness. 
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2.1.3 Latent inhibition and schizotypy  
Comparable to the schizophrenia literature (e.g., Baruch et al., 1988a; Gray et al., 1992 
Rascle et al., 2001), previous studies that have investigated the relationship between schizotypy 
and latent inhibition have revealed mixed results. Baruch et al (1988b) were the first to report 
a relationship between latent inhibition and schizotypy in the normal population using the 
masked between-participant procedure to measure latent inhibition described by Ginton et al. 
(1975). They report reduced latent inhibition in participants who scored high, but not low (as 
determined by a median split) on the Psychoticism dimension of the Eysenck psychoticism 
questionnaire (EPQ; Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975). Although there was no relationship between 
latent inhibition and the Launay and Slade (1981) hallucination scale and only a trend for a 
reduced latent inhibition effect in participants scoring high (again as determined by median 
split) on the STA; suggesting an apparent discrepancy in findings when alternative 
psychometric measurements are used. In addition, Lubow, Ingberg-Sachs, Zalstein-Orda and 
Gewirtz (1992) also found reduced latent inhibition in participants scoring high on the STA 
but this effect was driven by a difference in learning in the non-preexposed group, as opposed 
to the theoretically more interesting, preexposed group. Using Brauch et al’s procedure 
(originally described by Ginton et al.), Allan, Williams, Wellman et al. (1995) were able to 
demonstrate reduced latent inhibition in participants who scored high (as compared to low) on 
the STA questionnaire, and critically, with a difference in learning only observed in the 
preexposed group. Varying modulation of latent inhibition in schizotypy individuals is thus 
widely reported across the literature. 
 
Whilst the majority of existing studies have employed a ‘masked’ procedure to 
demonstrate latent inhibition (i.e., Baruch et al., 1988b; Allan et al., 1995), some studies have 
instead employed a differential conditioning procedure, in a between-participant comparison 
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to assess the generality of existing findings. For example, Lipp and Vaitl (1992) used a 
differential conditioning procedure in which two visual stimuli were presented; one of which 
served as the to-be-conditioned stimulus (CS+) and the other was the not-to-be-conditioned 
stimulus (CS-). The US that followed the CS+ was a tone that participants were required to 
make a rapid button press response to as soon as they heard it. One group received different 
stimuli during preexposure and conditioning (Group Different), serving as a control for the 
latent inhibition effect, whereas a second group received the same CS+ throughout both stages 
of the experiment (Group Same); and it is expected that latent inhibition would occur in this 
latter group. The measure of conditioning was differential skin conductance during the CS+ 
and CS- presentations to assess whether schizotypy measures co-vary with latent inhibition 
indexed by autonomic responses. Unlike Baruch et al’s findings, EPQ scores did not co-vary 
with latent inhibition but consistent with Baruch et al’s findings, Launay & Slade’s (1981) 
hallucination scale also did not co-vary with latent inhibition. Regarding STA (Claridge & 
Broks, 1984) scores; participants scoring high as compared to low on this questionnaire, 
determined by median split, did however show differences in the extent of latent inhibition 
displayed. Differential conditioning was significantly higher in Group Different than in Group 
Same only for participants who scored low on the STA. For participants who scored high, 
differential conditioning was equivalently high in Groups Same and Different. Using a slight 
variant of this procedure (an electric shock was instead used as the US); Lipp, Siddle & Arnold 
(1994) also show differences in the extent of latent inhibition displayed between groups who 
were divided by median split on the STA into low and high groups. However, it is unclear 
whether this experiment reveals an effect of schizotypy that is specific to stimulus preexposure 
as the high and low groups did not differ in the differential conditioning to the preexposed CS. 
Instead these groups only differed in relation to the non-preexposed CS. In contrast to an 
attenuation of latent inhibition however, other studies have shown that, given limited 
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preexposure, individuals high in schizotypy can in fact demonstrate a latent facilitation effect 
(Burch, Hemsley & Gray, 2004; but see De la Casa, Ruiz & Lubow, 1993), these findings are 
discussed next. 
 
Burch, Hemsley and Joseph (2004) employed a variant of the auditory between-
participant task previously employed by those such as Baruch et al. (1988b) and Allan et al. 
(1995) involving a visual version of the task in which participants were required to complete a 
masking task which involved counting the number of instances that a particular trigram of 
letters was presented on screen during the preexposure stage of the experiment. For the 
preexposure group only, these trigrams appeared on screen accompanied by irregularly-shaped 
polygons that subsequently served as the to-be-conditioned stimulus. The number of times that 
the preexposed stimulus accompanied the trigrams during preexposure was either 0 (for a non-
preexposed group), 5, 10, 40 or 80 trials. The subsequent task during the test phase consisted 
of both preexposed and non-preexposed groups learning that the polgygon (CS) signaled the 
increment of an on-screen counter (US). The learning of the polygon-increment association 
was increased for participants scoring high as compared to low (determined by median split) 
on the unusual experiences sub-dimension of the O-LIFE questionnaire (Mason et al., 1995) 
after only 5 preexposures to the polygon. For this group, learning was faster than for the non-
preexposed group. However, after 80 preexposures, no latent inhibition was observed in 
participants scoring high on the unusual experiences sub-dimension. Learning of the polygon-
increment association was only slowed for participants scoring low on this sub-dimension. 
These findings suggest that latent inhibition is a positive function of the amount of stimulus 
preexposure, and that with very low numbers of preexposure, latent facilitation will occur in 
high schizotypy individuals relative to the positive symptom dimension of schizophrenia.  
 
-83- 
 
What is clear from the above literature review is that where some authors report a 
reduction in latent inhibition with higher levels of schizotypy, others do not, and some suggest 
a reversal of latent inhibition with schizotypy (see also: Lubow & Weiner, 2010; Lubow, 
Kaplan & De la Casa, 2001; De la Casa & Lubow, 2002; Shira & Kaplan, 2009; Kaplan & 
Lubow, 2001; Lubow & Kaplan 1997). Adding further complexity to these discrepant results 
however is that the association between schizotypy and latent inhibition is typically reported 
with only small-to-moderate effect size (see Gray et al., 2003; Swerdlow et al., 2003). This 
may first limit the success in detecting effects of schizotypy upon latent inhibition, and second, 
it may indicate that schizotypy is perhaps not the only, or most, meaningful determinant of 
latent inhibition modulation in schizotypical individuals (and by extension schizophrenia). In 
support of this proposal, attenuated latent inhibition has been reported in both state and trait 
anxiety which has led to the conclusion that high schizotypal’s reduced ability to suppress 
attention to irrelevant stimuli is related to both high levels of anxiety and schizophrenia-like 
symptoms (Braunstein-Bercovitz, 2000, 2001, 2002). Curiously however, there are no data 
examining whether anxiety or stress levels play a role in the modulation of latent inhibition 
observed in patients with schizophrenia. The attempts to cross this boundary in sub-clinical 
populations are explored in the following section.  
 
2.1.4 Latent inhibition, schizotypy and anxiety 
 Schizotypy is a personality characteristic that is co-morbid with a number of other traits 
(see secion 1.6.1.2). It is therefore possible that some of the variations in latent inhibition with 
schizotypy are in fact a consequence of the influence of other, correlated personality traits. This 
issue was addressed by Braunstein-Bercovitz (2000) and in the first instance 219 participants 
completed the SPQ and the trait subscale of the STAI (Speilberger et al., 1970). A factor 
analysis of the items of the SPQ revealed two factors; the first that was correlated with trait 
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anxiety scores (labelled ‘anxiety- loaded’) and included interpersonal deficits and 
disorganization factors such as social anxiety, no close friends, constricted affect and 
suspiciousness. The second factor did not correlate with trait anxiety (labelled ‘perceptual-
disorganisation’) and included factors such as odd beliefs or magical thinking, unusual 
perceptual experiences, odd or eccentric behavior, and odd speech. Participants were then 
required to complete a latent inhibition task, similar to the masked between-participants task 
used by Baruch et al (1988a, b) and Allan et al. (1995). In this task participants were required 
to complete a masking task by indicating whether a pair of letters, presented on screen, were 
the same or different. For the pre-exposed group only, these letters were accompanied by 
irregular polygons. For the non-preexposed group, only the letter pairs were presented. The 
subsequent task during the test phase consisted on both preexposed and non-preexposed groups 
learning that the polygons signaled the increment of an on-screen counter. Participants were 
required to make a response when they thought the counter would increment.   
 
Using a median split of scores, participants were separated into high and low groups on 
either factor 1 (anxiety loaded) or factor 2 (not anxiety loaded) of the SPQ. Latent inhibition 
was attenuated only as a function of the anxiety loaded factor (factor 1), and not as a function 
of the perceptual disorganization factor (factor 2). Thus when participants were separated into 
high and low schizotypy groups on the basis of factor 1, latent inhibition was only evident in 
the low group. For the high group, learning was as rapid in the preexposed, as in the non-
preexposed groups. Whereas, on the basis of factor 2; a reliable latent inhibition effect was 
detected in participants who were both high and low in schizotypy. Since the ‘interpersonal 
deficits’ component of factor 1 (anxiety loaded) is associated with the negative symptoms of 
schizophrenia and schizotypy (see Raine, 1992), it appears that the negative and not positive 
symptoms of schizophrenia are characterized by elevated levels of anxiety. However, both 
-85- 
 
schizotypy and anxiety modulated latent inhibition independently, suggesting high 
schizotypals’ (and by extension, individuals with schizophrenia) reduced ability to suppress 
attention to irrelevant stimuli, is related to both high levels of anxiety and schizophrenia-like 
symptoms (Braunstein-Bercovitz, 2000). Further support for this finding stems from a 
subsequent study (see Braunstein-Bercovitz, 2001) in which participant’s level of state anxiety 
was manipulated using an acute stress induction procedure (see also Chapter 4). Participants in 
the high, but not low, stress condition exhibited attenuated latent inhibition. However, the 
limitations associated with existing latent inhibition paradigms question the validity of these 
findings (both in relation to anxiety and schizotypy); these limitations are highlighted in the 
following section.  
 
2.1.5 Experimental paradigms of latent inhibition: conceptual and 
methodological limitations. 
 
The latent inhibition procedures described thus far have modified its basic procedure in 
order to ensure that participants engage within the experiment during preexposure. First, the 
outcome from the second stage of the experiment might also be included in the first stage of 
the experiment – unpaired with the cue (e.g. Swerdlow et al., 1996; Cohen et al., 2004; Gal et 
al., 2009; Lubow & Kaplan, 1997; De la Casa & Lubow, 2001; Lubow & De la Casa, 2002). 
Second, a masking task may be presented that accompanies the presentation of the stimulus 
during the preexposure stage (e.g. Baruch et al., 1988a,b; Gray, Hemsley & Gray, 1992). The 
explicit use of a masking task has been employed to divert participant’s attention from the 
preexposed cue. It has been suggested that a masking task is a necessary condition for the 
production of the latent inhibition effect in human participants (see Lubow & Gerwirz, 1995). 
Given that animal latent-inhibition studies do not require the use of either of these 
modifications to observe latent inhibition, the suggestion that human and animal latent 
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inhibition are not mediated by the same underlying attentional processes undermines the use 
of latent inhibition as an animal model of schizophrenia (for a review see: Le Pelley & Schmidt-
Hansen, 2010; Lubow & Weiner, 2010). More importantly, however, these modifications also 
align themselves with alternative learning phenomena, rather than latent inhibition. For 
example, by exposing the target outcome during the preexposure stage of the experiment in an 
uncorrelated (or unpaired) fashion with the preexposed cue may result in the establishment of 
learned irrelevance or conditioned inhibition to the preexposed cue; both of these effects are 
known to retard the acquisition of later learning (e.g.: Baker & Mackintosh, 1997; Resccorla, 
1969) and are known to co-vary with schizotypy (Schmidt-Hansen et al., 2009; Le Pelley et 
al., 2010a; Migo et al., 2006). It could be argued, therefore, that all the studies that employed 
these modifications to the latent inhibition procedure (see Allan et al., 1995; Baruch et al., 
1988b; Braunstein-Bercovitz & Lubow, 1998; Della Casa et al., 1999; Gray et al., 2002; Lubow 
et al., 1992) may instead demonstrate alternative learning phenomena, other than latent 
inhibition.  
 
Evans et al. (2007) have described a within-participant latent-inhibition procedure that, 
they suggest, circumvents the inclusion of a masking-task during preexposure. In this task 
participants were presented with a series of letters, presented one after the other in the centre 
of the screen and instructed to press the spacebar as quickly as possible when the letter X was 
presented. The letter X was either preceded on some trials by a letter (e.g., H) that had been 
preexposed amidst the filler letters earlier in the experiment or by a letter (e.g., S) that had not 
been preexposed. This task showed a latent inhibition effect - participants were slower to 
respond to presentations of X when it was cued by the preexposed letter than the non-
preexposed letter, and a trend for a reduction in latent inhibition with the positive symptom 
dimension of schizotypy was observed. As this procedure did not include a concurrent masking 
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task during the preexposure stage of the experiment, it is difficult to explain this result in terms 
of learned irrelevance. Furthermore, at first blush, it seems difficult to explain this result in 
terms of conditioned inhibition, as the target outcome was not presented to participants during 
the preexposure phase either. However, as Evans et al note, an expectation of the target-
stimulus was established prior to the preexposure phase through instruction. Thus, conditioned 
inhibition might be generated because the target outcome was expected to appear (but did not) 
at a time when the preexposed stimulus was presented. This negative prediction error will lead 
standard associative models of learning (e.g. Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) to predict the 
formation of an inhibitory association between the preexposed stimulus and the target X, 
slowing later learning for reasons other than latent inhibition. Such limitations can be applied 
then, to other studies that have utilised a similar within participant paradigm and also report a 
deficit in latent inhibition related to the positive dimension of the O-LIFE questionnaire 
(Schmidt-Hansen et al., 2009; Granger et al., 2012). The problem of such confounds has not 
been addressed in the development of more recent paradigms. Overcoming interpretational 
problems in respect of latent inhibition dysfunction could enhance the development of 
cognitive explanations about psychotic phenomena.  
 
2.1.6 Aims and research questions 
Here we introduce a procedure that examines variations in latent inhibition with 
schizotypy under conditions where the contribution of conditioned inhibition and learned 
irrelevance are minimised in order to provide a less ambiguous measure of the impact of 
learned variations in attention. However, removing the masking task altogether would result in 
an experimental paradigm that participants have no requirement to engage in. An alternative 
strategy then is to keep the masking task in place during preexposure but in such a way as to 
establish it as task-relevant. The two experiments reported here explored this possibility. 
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Additionally, it is important to include a measure of anxiety based on existing propositions that 
a) attentional dysfunction in high anxiety individuals has also been indicated in latent inhibition 
studies (Braunstein-Bercovitz, 2000, 2002). And b) measures of anxiety have been shown to 
co-vary with schizotypal traits that appear to modulate latent inhibition performance 
(Braunstein-Bercovitz). Additional analyses are conducted to assess how the relationship 
between schizotypy and anxiety co-varies with latent inhibition (see section 2.3.2.3).  
2.2 Experiment 1 
 
The first aim of Experiment 1 was to create a within-participant latent-inhibition task 
that minimises the possibility of observing conditioned inhibition and learned irrelevance. The 
second aim was to examine how this task co-varies with schizotypy and anxiety. Presented here 
are two variations of a task by Evans et al. (2007; itself modified from that designed by Young 
et al., 2005, see section 2.1.5). The first version constituted a replication of the task described 
by Evans et al, to demonstrate latent inhibition, predominantly as a positive control. The second 
version constituted a modification of this task where no expectation of the target was 
established during the preexposure stage either through instruction or explicit exposure to the 
target outcome – thus removing the contribution of conditioned inhibition (where a reduction 
in learning of the cue-target association during the test stage would occur due to the cue 
predicting the absence of the target during preexposure). Instead, as suggested by Evans et al, 
during the preexposure stage participants were simply asked to count the number of instances 
of one of the filler letters (M). This manipulation also establishes all of the stimuli in stage 1 
as task relevant as participants must process each letter in order to determine whether it is a 
letter M or not. Consequently, this task is also less amenable to an explanation in terms of 
learned irrelevance. In the subsequent test stage of both versions of the task, participants 
continued to be presented with a series of letters, one after the other in the centre of the screen, 
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but were now instructed to make a response as quickly as possible when the letter X appeared. 
On some occasions the letter X was preceded by a non-preexposed cue, whereas on other trials 
it was preceded by a cue that had been rendered familiar by being presented during the 
preexposure stage. Based on the results of Evans et al. it was expected that response-times 
would be shorter to X when it had been preceded by the non-preexposed, rather than the 
preexposed cue. We are interested in assessing whether the same effect was evident in the 
modified version of the task, as this would suggest the effect of a mechanism on stimulus 
preexposure that is not sensitive to alternative effects of learning, and whether this is modulated 
by schizotypy and/or anxiety. 
 
2.2.1 Method 
2.2.1.1 Participants 
Sixty healthy Nottingham University participants and members of the general public 
(35 males and 25 females) took part, in exchange for course credit or a £4 inconvenience 
allowance. The age range was 18-54. Thirty participants completed the replicated version of 
the Evans et al. (2007) latent inhibition task (‘replicated-task condition’), and thirty completed 
a modified version of this task (‘modified-task condition’). Due to missing questionnaire data, 
three participants were excluded from the analysis leaving n= 28 in the replicated-task 
condition and n= 29 in the modified-task condition. A sample size of 60 was chosen based on 
an effect size (0.66) and a power of 0.95 for a linear regression with 3-4 predictors (see section 
2.2.2.2 but also section 2.3.2.3 which uses a pooled sample size n = 117). Previous studies 
using a similar task design in a similar cohort of participants have used a comparable sample 
size to the current study (see Schmidt-Hansen et al., 2009). 
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2.2.1.2 Apparatus & Stimuli 
All experimental stimuli appeared on a standard desktop computer running Windows 
XP, and were programmed using Psychopy (Peirce, 2007; www.psychopy.org). Stimuli were 
white capital-letters in Arial-font (7mm(H) x 5mm(W)) presented for 1 second each on a 
computer-screen (28cm(H) x 35cm(W)) with a grey background. The stimulus-letters were S 
and H, one of the letters served as the preexposed stimulus and the other was the non-
preexposed stimulus, counterbalanced across participants. The target was the letter X, with 
filler-letters D, M, T and V; see Figure 2.1.  
 
2.2.1.3 Procedure 
 2.2.1.3.1 Replicated-task Condition 
 
The task had two stages: preexposure and test. After reading an information sheet and 
signing a consent-form, the following instructions were presented to participants on the 
computer monitor:  
 
“In this task I want you to watch the sequence of letters appearing on the screen. Your 
task is to try and predict when a letter 'X' is going to appear. If you think you know 
when the 'X' will appear then you can press the space bar early in the sequence, that is 
before the 'X' appears on screen. Alternatively, if you are unable to do this please press 
the spacebar as quickly as possible when you see the letter 'X.' There may be more than 
one rule that predicts the 'X.' Please try to be as accurate as you can, but do not worry 
about making the occasional error. If you understand your task and are ready to start 
press the spacebar to begin.” 
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During the preexposure stage the preexposed stimulus was presented 20 times, 
intermixed in a random order with presentations of filler letters each of which was presented 
15 times; each stimulus was presented for 1000ms separated by a 50ms inter-stimulus interval. 
The non-preexposed stimulus and target letter X were not presented during the preexposure 
stage. The test stage followed, without interruption, the preexposure stage, during which the 
preexposed stimulus and the non-preexposed stimulus were each presented 20 times followed 
by a 1000ms presentation of the target stimulus X. There were also 20 non-cued presentations 
of X during which the target was preceded by one of the 4 filler letters, each of which preceding 
the target 5 times. In total there were 64 presentations of the filler letters throughout the test 
phase. The whole task lasted 7 minutes. Participants were required to press the space-bar, either 
when X appeared on screen, or if they could predict when the X would appear as the next letter 
in the sequence. 
 
2.2.1.3.2 Modified -task Condition   
The procedure for the modified version of the task was as described for the replicated 
version of the Evans et al. (2007) latent inhibition task (section 2.2.1.3.1), with the exception 
that participants received two sets of instructions, one set appeared on screen prior to the 
preexposure stage, instructing the following: 
 
“In this task I want you to watch the sequence of letters appearing on the screen. Your 
task is to count how many times the letter 'M' appears. This task will last about 3mins. 
When this task ends, you will be given a new set of instructions. Press any key when 
you are ready to start the experiment.”   
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Thus for the modified-task condition participants were not aware that the target 
stimulus would appear until after the preexposure phase. A second-set of instructions (identical 
to those administered at the outset of the replicated-task condition) were then presented prior 
to the test stage. Otherwise, all procedural details of the preexposure and test stages were 
identical to the replicated-task condition. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Experimental design and example stimuli for the test stage of the latent-inhibition task. 
Each trial comprised a 1000ms presentation of a stimulus separated by an inter-stimulus interval (ISI) 
of 50ms. Participants were required to press the spacebar either when the target stimulus ‘X’ appeared 
on screen, or before it appeared if they could predict it as the next letter in the sequence. The preexposed 
(PE) and non-preexposed (NPE) stimuli were counterbalanced across participants.  Numbers in 
parentheses in the insert refer to trial frequencies.  
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A computer-based version of the O-LIFE (Mason et al., 1995) was administered to 
assess individual schizotypy, see Appendix 3. This questionnaire assesses four dimensions of 
schizotypy. The Unusual Experiences (UnEx) subscale measures auditory hallucinations, 
magical thinking and perceptual aberrations reflecting positive symptoms of schizophrenia 
(e.g., “Have you ever felt you have special, almost magical powers?”). The Introvertive 
Anhedonia (IntAn) subscale reflects anhedonia (inability to experience pleasure); analogous to 
the negative symptoms of schizophrenia (e.g., “Do you feel lonely most of the time, even when 
you’re with people”). The Cognitive Disorganisation (CogDis) subscale assesses disruptions 
in attention/concentration; consistent with the disorganised symptoms of schizophrenia (e.g., 
“Do you ever feel that your speech is difficult to understand because the words are all mixed 
up and don’t make sense?”). Lastly, Impulsive Nonconformity (ImpNon) measures 
recklessness, impulsivity and antisocial behaviour (e.g., “Do you often have an urge to hit 
someone?”); similar to the Psychoticism scale of the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire 
(Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975). The O-LIFE questionnaire has good validity as it maps on to the 
same multi-dimensional structure as schizophrenia; assessing positive, negative and 
disorganised symptoms (Mason et al.).  
 
A paper-version of the STICSA (Ree et al., 2008) was administered to assess individual 
anxiety-levels, see Appendix 4. This questionnaire assesses somatic symptoms of anxiety (e.g., 
increased heart rate, sweating) and cognitive symptoms of anxiety (e.g., difficulty 
concentrating, confusion), both in general; how often the statements are true of the participant 
(trait-anxiety) and their current symptoms of anxiety; right now, at this very moment (state-
anxiety). Each scale (state and trait) encompasses 21 self-reported items, rated on a 4-point 
Likert-type scale (1 = not at all to 4 = very much so). The questionnaires were presented in a 
counterbalanced order across participants. 
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2.2.1.4 Scoring 
Reaction times (RT’s) in stage 2 were recorded from the onset of the preexposed and 
non-preexposed stimulus that preceded the target (X) for each participant. As each stimulus 
was presented for 1000ms separated by a 50ms inter-stimulus interval, participants’ RT could 
range from 0-2050ms. If participants’ RT was less than 1050ms they predicted the X; whereas 
if their RT was between 1050 and 2050ms, they responded to the X. Median RTs for responses 
to the preexposed stimulus and non-preexposed stimulus were calculated for each participant 
as it is less biased by extreme values compared to the mean. The scores derived for the four-
schizotypy subtypes (complete for Experiment 1 and the subsequent Experiment 2) are 
presented in Table 2.2. 
 
2.2.2 Results and Discussion 
 
2.2.2.1 Latent inhibition 
 Figure 2.2 shows the mean of individual median reaction times to X across the 20 test 
trials5 with the preexposed and non-preexposed stimuli. Both the replicated-task and the 
modified-task groups showed faster RTs to the non-preexposed stimulus than the preexposed 
stimulus – latent inhibition. A 2 (condition: replicated-task, modified-task) x 2 (stimulus: 
preexposed, non-preexposed) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) of individual median 
reaction times revealed a significant main effect of stimulus F(1,55) = 16.626, p  <.001, partial 
η² = .23, but no main effect of condition or interaction (Fs<1), suggesting reaction times were 
similar for participants in both the replicated-task and the modified-task irrespective of target 
expectation during preexposure. Although not strictly warranted from the main effect of 
                                                             
5 Due to a program limitation, trial order could not be specified; hence the data were collapsed across the trials of 
the test stage. An updated version of the program was used for all subsequent experiments which circumvented 
this issue. 
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stimulus, and the absence of an interaction, it is instructive to examine whether the latent 
inhibition effect is present in both conditions. When median RT is employed as the measure of 
central tendency, repeated measures t tests revealed an effect of preexposure for the replicated 
task condition (t (27) = 3.87, p=.001) and an effect of preexposure for the modified task 
condition that just missed statistical significance (t(28) = 2.02, p=.053). When mean RT is 
employed as the measure of central tendency instead, both comparisons reach statistical 
significance (smallest t (28) = 2.57, p=.016). Thus, to increase statistical power for the 
subsequent analyses, the data were combined from the two test conditions for subsequent 
analyses. 
 
Figure 2.2 The mean of individual median reaction times to the target cued by preexposed stimuli and 
non-preexposed stimuli for participants in the replicated-task condition and the modified-task 
conditions in stage 2 of experiment 1. Error bars are 1+/- within-subject standard error of the mean (see: 
Cousineau, 2005). 
 
2.2.2.2 Latent inhibition and schizotypy 
          A multiple regression analysis was carried out using the four schizotypy subscales taken 
from the O-LIFE: UnEx, IntAn, ImpNon and CogDis as the predictor variables, and median 
reaction time to the preexposed and non-preexposed stimuli as the dependent variables. If any 
of the predictor variables are associated with latent inhibition it would be expected that a 
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relationship would be found with the preexposed stimulus, but not with the control non-
preexposed stimulus. When reaction time to the preexposed stimulus was entered as the 
dependent variable, UnEx was a significant predictor of RTs (β =.362, p =.021), reflecting 
slower learning to the preexposed stimulus with individuals high in UnEx, i.e. enhanced latent 
inhibition. ImpNon was also a significant predictor of reaction time to the preexposed stimulus 
(β = -.360, p =.014), reflecting faster learning to the preexposed stimulus for individuals high 
in ImpNon, i.e. an attenuation of latent inhibition. Neither of the remaining schizotypy 
subscales (CogDis and IntAn) were significant predictors of reaction time to the preexposed 
stimulus (ps >.05). When median reaction time to the non-preexposed stimulus was entered as 
the dependent variable, the only significant predictor of reaction time was ImpNon, which 
again was negatively correlated with RT (β = -.318, p =.035). None of the remaining schizotypy 
dimensions were significant predictors of reaction to the non-preexposed stimulus (ps >.05). 
All standardised regression coefficients and R² values can be seen in Table 2.1.  
 
Table 2.1 
Beta-coefficients from the multiple regression analyses of schizotypy subscales (predictor 
variables), with reaction times to preexposed and non-preexposed stimuli as dependent 
variables. Summary information includes all participants from the replicated-task and 
modified-task conditions of Experiment 1. 
  
                        Beta-coefficient    
   Preexposed             Non-preexposed 
Unusual Experiences          .362*        .188 
Cognitive Disorganisation        -.179       -.054 
Introvertive Anhedonia         .032        .026 
Impulsive Non-conformity        -.360*       -.318* 
R²            .164        .092 
Note: * p <.05; Significant results are in bold. 
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The results indicate that individuals high in UnEx are slower to learn the association 
between the preexposed stimulus and the target than individuals low in UnEx. This, in 
conjunction with the finding that UnEx was not a significant predictor of reaction time to the 
non-preexposed stimulus, indicates that individuals high in this subtype are exhibiting an 
enhancement of latent inhibition. A relationship between ImpNon and RTs to both the 
preexposed and non-preexposed stimuli was also found, this suggests that ImpNon is associated 
with responding irrespective of whether the stimulus is familiar or novel, as opposed to being 
related to latent inhibition per se. Additional analyses which assess how the relationship 
between schizotypy and anxiety co-varies with latent inhibition are reported in section 2.3.2.3.  
 
The enhancement of latent inhibition with high UnEx, does not agree with a number of 
schizotypy studies that have used a similar experimental procedure (Evans et al., 2007; 
Schmidt-Hansen et al., 2009; Granger et al., 2012). However, the attenuated latent inhibition 
effect with unusual experiences reported by Evans et al and Schmidt-Hansen et al did not reach 
the conventional cut-off point for statistical significance. A significant reduction in latent 
inhibition was attained by Granger et al, but this was a result of an association between the 
difference between the preexposed and non-preexposed stimuli and unusual experiences. 
Furthermore, it cannot be ruled out that the latent inhibition task employed in each of these 
studies could be showing alternative learning phenomena instead of latent inhibition, due to 
the limitations previously described. However, before we can draw any further conclusions, it 
is important to acknowledge the possibility that we still might be observing a co-variation of 
schizotypy with learned irrelevance in the current study, as opposed to latent inhibition. Whilst 
the modified-task condition successfully minimised the contribution of conditioned inhibition, 
it still included a masking task (count the letter M). Although this procedure – which requires 
continuous monitoring of the experimental stimuli - establishes a situation in which all of the 
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experimental stimuli are task relevant, it is conceivable that it still establishes learned 
irrelevance. In this task, participants are required to respond (albeit covertly) to the letter M, 
rather than any other stimulus. In this sense, then, the preexposed stimulus is irrelevant to the 
task in hand, thus learned irrelevance may still be the cause of the slower learning to the 
preexposed stimulus, rather than latent inhibition. As previously discussed, learned irrelevance 
is an effect which has been shown to influence human learning (Le Pelley & McLaren, 2003) 
and also co-vary with schizotypy (Schmidt-Hansen et al; Le Pelley et al., 2010a). However, as 
previously outlined, it would be problematic to remove the masking task altogether as 
participants would have no requirement to engage in the task during the preexposure stage. 
Therefore, the aim of Experiment 2 was to design a procedure that examined latent inhibition 
under conditions where the contribution of both learned irrelevance and conditioned inhibition 
were minimised, but keep the masking task in place during preexposure but in such a way as 
to establish it as directly relevant (as opposed to irrelevant) to the preexposed stimulus. If latent 
inhibition is still observed under these circumstances, it would permit an evaluation of the 
effect in terms of models of attention that do not emphasise the importance of learned 
irrelevance (e.g. Pearce & Hall, 1980; Esber & Haselgrove, 2011).  
2.3 Experiment 2 
 
To minimise the contribution of learned irrelevance (as well as conditioned inhibition), 
the purpose of Experiment 2 was to adjust the parameters of the modified-task condition from 
Experiment 1. In the preexposure stage, participants were now asked to say out loud each of 
the letters that appeared on the screen. This manipulation directly establishes all of the stimuli 
in stage 1 as task relevant as participants must process each letter by reading each of them 
aloud. Consequently, this version of the task rules out an explanation of any subsequent 
attenuation of learning to the preexposed stimulus with an appeal to learned irrelevance. 
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Furthermore, as no expectation of the target stimulus (X) is established prior to, or during, 
preexposure the task is also not amenable to an explanation in terms of conditioned inhibition. 
The test stage of the task remained the same as the modified-task condition from Experiment 
1: participants were required to make a response as quickly as possible when the letter X 
appeared on screen. We are first interested in assessing whether an effect of stimulus 
preexposure is still observed under these different circumstances and second, to assess whether 
the task co-varies with schizotypy and anxiety. This being the case would suggest a relationship 
between these personality characteristics and stimulus preexposure that goes beyond learned 
irrelevance. 
  
2.3.1 Method  
2.3.1.1 Participants  
In keeping with Experiment 1, sixty healthy Nottingham University participants and 
members of the general public (10 males and 50 females) took part, in exchange for course 
credit or a £4 inconvenience allowance. The age range was 18-33 years.  
 
2.3.1.2 Apparatus  
The apparatus were the same as described in Experiment 1. 
 
2.3.1.3 Procedure 
  The procedure for Experiment 2 was as described in the modified-task condition in 
Experiment 1 with the exception that the instructions received prior to the preexposure stage 
asked participants to say aloud each letter that appeared on the screen. A second-set of 
instructions (identical to those administered at the outset of the test stage of the modified-task 
condition from Experiment 1) were presented prior to the test-phase. As per the previous 
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experiments, participants completed the O-LIFE (Mason et al., 1995) and the STICSA (Ree et 
al., 2008) questionnaires. All scoring was performed in the same manner as described in 
Experiment 1. 
 
2.3.2 Results and Discussion 
 
         The scores derived for the four schizotypy subtypes (complete for Experiments 1 and 2) 
are shown in Table 2.2. Unpaired t test analyses were carried out to assess if the reported 
schizotypy means differ from the population norms for each subscale. While the means for 
CogDis and IntAn do not differ significantly from the normative values, the means for UnEx 
and ImpNon are both significantly lower than the normative values for the modified-task 
version of Experiment 1, and for Experiment 2. Significant differences are highlighted in bold 
in Table 2.2. Previous studies have also obtained mean schizotypy scores that are below Mason 
et al.’s (1995) normative values, and similar to those reported here (e.g. Evans et al., 2007; 
Granger et al., 2012; Sellen et al., 2005).  
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Table 2.2 
Summary information for O-LIFE scores for the participants in the replicated-task and 
modified-task conditions of Experiment 1, and all participants from Experiment 2. All values 
are mean (SD). Population-norms taken from Mason et al., (1995), are also shown (mean (SD)). 
 
          O-LIFE dimension          Mean (SD)  
        UnEx   CogDis   IntAn  ImpNon                     
Experiment 1 
    Replicated Task                10.1 (6.7)       11.4 (6.3)  6.7 (4.3)  8.2 (3.6)          
    Modified Task      6.9 (6.3)* 11.2 (6.3)  6.0 (5.1)  7.8 (3.3)*  
  
Experiment 2    6.7 (5.4)* 12.3 (6.6)  5.0 (4.1)  7.1 (3.6)* 
Population Norm            9.7 (6.7) 11.6 (5.8) 6.1 (4.6) 9.7 (4.3) 
Note: * p <.05; Significant results that differ from the population norm for these subscales are in bold. 
 
2.3.2.1 Latent inhibition 
Figure 2.3 shows the median reaction times to X across the test trials of Experiment 2 
(shown in two-trial blocks) with the preexposed and non-preexposed stimuli. It can be seen 
that reaction times became faster following the non-preexposed than the preexposed stimulus 
as this stage progressed. This impression was confirmed with a 2 (stimulus: non-preexposed, 
non-preexposed) x 10 (trial block 1-10) ANOVA of individual reaction times, which revealed 
a significant main effect of stimulus, F(1,59) = 25.691, p <.001, partial η² = .303 and a 
significant main effect of trial number, F(9,51) = 7.949,  p <.001, partial η² = .584, but no 
significant interaction between these variables, F<1. 
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Figure 2.3. The median reaction times (sec) to the preexposed and non-preexposed stimuli over the 10 
two-trial blocks of stage 2 of Experiment 2. Dotted line indicates the slowest reaction time at which 
participants can be regarded as anticipating the target (< 1005ms). Error bars represent 1+/- within-
subject standard error (see: Cousineau, 2005).  
 
In line with both conditions from Experiment 1; Experiment 2 successfully generated 
an effect of preexposure on reaction times during subsequent learning- latent inhibition. The 
task presented in Experiment 2 however, produced latent inhibition when the target was not 
expected during preexposure, and importantly, when using a masking-task that was not 
irrelevant to stimulus preexposure. These results encourage the suggestion that that an effect 
of exposure on learning is being observed here – that is to say latent inhibition rather than 
conditioned inhibition or learned irrelevance. 
 
2.3.2.2 Latent inhibition and schizotypy 
In keeping with Experiment 1, a multiple regression was carried out using the four 
schizotypy subscales from the O-LIFE (UnEx, IntAn, ImpNon and CogDis) as the predictor 
variables, and reaction time to the preexposed and non-preexposed stimuli as the dependent 
variables. Again, when reaction time to the preexposed stimulus was entered as the dependent 
variable, UnEx was a significant predictor of reaction times to the preexposed stimulus (β 
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=.402, p =.021), reflecting slower learning to the preexposed stimulus with individuals high 
in UnEx – replicating the enhanced latent inhibition effect observed in Experiment 1. Unlike 
Experiment 1, however, ImpNon was not a significant predictor of reaction time to the 
preexposed stimulus, nor were the remaining schizotypy subtypes. When median reaction time 
to the non-preexposed stimulus was entered as the dependent variable, none of the schizotypy 
subtypes were significant predictors of reaction time to the non-preexposed stimulus (ps >.05). 
Standardised regression coefficients and R² values can be seen in Table 2.3.  
 
Table 2.3 
Beta-coefficients from the multiple regression analyses of schizotypy subtypes (predictor 
variables), with reaction times to preexposed and non-preexposed stimuli as dependent 
variables.  
                        Beta-coefficient    
 Preexposed             Non-preexposed 
Unusual Experiences          .402*        .238 
Cognitive Disorganisation        -.249        .012 
Introvertive Anhedonia         .015       -.019 
Impulsive Non-conformity        -.160       -.215 
R²            .111        .054 
Note: * p <.05; Significant results are in bold. 
 
In keeping with Experiment 1, the results of Experiment 2 show that individuals high 
in UnEx are slower to learn the association between the preexposed stimulus and the target 
than individuals low in UnEx. In both Experiments 1 and 2, we observed facilitation in RTs in 
individuals high in UnEx that was specific to the preexposed stimulus. These results encourage 
the suggestion that we are observing an enhancement of latent inhibition, rather than a more 
general effect of schizotypy on learning to both stimuli. Whilst the findings from both 
experiments presented here are comparable, the task employed in Experiment 2 is particularly 
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notable as it comprises a relatively ‘pure’ demonstration of latent inhibition, as it minimises 
the contribution of both conditioned inhibition and learned irrelevance to stimulus preexposure.  
 
2.3.2.3 Latent inhibition, schizotypy and anxiety  
         The purpose of the subsequent analyses was to address the question posed by Braunstein-
Bercovitz (2000); whether the attentional dysfunction in schizotypy is related to anxiety. The 
following analyses aimed to investigate the relationship between latent inhibition, schizotypy 
and anxiety. The scores for both anxiety-subtypes, for Experiment 1 (pooled data from the 
replicated and modified task conditions) and Experiment 2, are shown in Table 2.4.  
 
Table 2.4 
Summary information for STICSA-scores; all values are mean(SD). Values in brackets 
represent the range of scores for both anxiety-subtypes.  
 
                         Anxiety-Subtype                   Mean(SD)        
 
     State              State               State          Trait             Trait               Trait 
                   Somatic         Cognitive                         Somatic         Cognitive     
 
Experiment 1  31.3(8.4)     15.6(4.9)        16.4(6.1)      33.1(10.7)      14.9(5.1)        18.8(6.4)      
                  
Experiment 2  31.7(9.9)     15.5(4.7)        16.2(6.1)      33.6(9.5)        14.7(4.1)       18.6(6.0) 
                      
Population Norm  30.9(9.3)     13.6(4.0)        17.21(5.4)    32.4(8.1)       13.5(3.3)        18.8(4.8) 
 
            As a preliminary measure, Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients were run 
to assess whether the schizotypy dimensions were correlated with anxiety sub-types; given the 
exploratory nature of this analysis, no adjustments for multiple comparisons were made. There 
were significant correlations were within each schizotypy dimension and each anxiety subtype 
(see Table 2.5); all p-values <.01, excluding IntrovAn in Experiment 1; p >.05. These 
significant relationships suggest an anxiety component in the schizotypy scale; on this basis 
subsequent analyses were continued to examine the effect of schizotypy on latent inhibition 
once anxiety had been controlled for. Two hierarchical multiple regressions were conducted 
with reaction time to the (1) preexposed stimulus and (2) non-preexposed stimulus as the 
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dependent variables. State and trait anxiety scores were entered into the model in step 1 to 
assess the main effect of anxiety on latent inhibition and to control for the effect of anxiety on 
the subsequent relationships between UnEx, CogDis, IntAn and ImpNon, and latent inhibition 
in step 2. These analyses were completed separately using the data from Experiments 1 and 2, 
as described below.    
 
Table 2.5 
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients for anxiety and schizotypy variables: 
Experiments 1 (pooled data from the replicated and modified task conditions) and 2 
 
 
        Trait      Unex     CogDis    IntrovAn   ImpNon 
Experiment 1      
State .375** .513** .527** .080 .393** 
     
Trait  .461** .576** .153 .290* 
     
Unex   .484** .088 .415** 
     
CogDis    .248 .330* 
     
IntrovAn     .039 
 
Experiment 2 
     
State .734** .266* .444** .322* .340* 
      
Trait  .296* .428** .515** .354** 
      
Unex   .532** .120 .498** 
      
CogDis    .453** .350** 
      
IntrovAn     .253 
Note. Values shown are Pearson’s product-moment correlation coefficients. 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
    Significant results are bolded. 
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 2.3.2.3.1 Experiment 1 
Hierarchical multiple regression analyses were carried out using the state and trait 
anxiety subtypes taken from the STICSA (step 1) and the four schizotypy subtypes taken from 
O-LIFE; UnEx, IntAn, ImpNon and CogDis (step 2), as the predictor variables. Md reaction 
time to the preexposed and non-preexposed cues were entered as the dependent variables.  
 
When Md reaction time to preexposed trials was entered as the dependent variable, the 
effect of the predictor variables in step 1 was not significant R² = .027; F <1. Neither State nor 
trait anxiety were significant predictors of reaction time to the preexposed cue (p >.05). When 
the schizotypy subtypes were entered into the regression in step 2, the change in the variance 
accounted for (ΔR²) was significant; ΔR² =.209, p =.032, whilst the overall model was close to 
significance; F(6,56) =2.206, p=.058. The only significant predictor of reaction-time to the 
preexposed cue was ImpNon (β = -.375, p =.011). This finding reflects faster learning to the 
preexposed stimulus for individuals high in ImpNon and shows a comparable finding to that 
observed in the main analyses for Experiment 1. Also similar to the main analyses for 
Experiments 1 and 2, there was a trend for a relationship between UnEx and reaction time to 
the preexposed cue (β =.299, p =.070).  
 
When Md reaction time to non-preexposed trials was entered as the dependent variable, 
the effect of the predictor variables in step 1 was significant R² = .155; F(2,56) = 4.951, p 
=.011. Both state and trait anxiety were significant predictors of reaction time to the non-
preexposed cue (state anxiety; β = -.354, p =.011; trait anxiety; β = .350, p =.012); reflecting, 
faster learning to the non-preexposed cue for individuals high in state anxiety, and slower 
learning to the preexposed cue for individuals high in trait anxiety. There was no significant 
change in R² in step 2, but the effect of the predictor variables on learning to the non-preexposed 
were significant R² = .239; F(6,56) = 2.619, p =.028. Trait anxiety remained a significant 
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predictor (β = .404, p =.013), with state anxiety showing a trend for an association with the 
non-preexposed cue (β = -.277, p =.085). The only significant schizotypy predictor of reaction 
time to the non-preexposed cue was impNon (β = -.293, p =.041). Standardised regression 
coefficients and R² values can be seen in Table 2.6. 
            
              The results indicate a dissociation between state and trait anxiety for reaction time to 
the non-preexposed cue. Individuals high in state anxiety show faster learning to the non-
preexposed cue, whereas individuals high in trait anxiety show slower learning to the non-
preexposed cue. This could simply reflect a difference in the observed means between state 
and trait anxiety; as the mean (and range of scores) for trait anxiety is larger than those observed 
for state anxiety. Thus trait anxious individuals may be displaying slower learning compared 
to state anxious individuals (refer to Table 2.4) because their mean level of anxiety is higher. 
However, there was no relationship between state or trait anxiety and reaction time to the 
preexposed cue, suggesting anxiety influences basic associative learning, as opposed to latent 
inhibition more specifically. This finding is in opposition to the results reported by Braunstein-
Bercovitz (2000) who found an abnormality in learning that was specific to the preexposed 
stimuli in high anxious individuals. Once the schizotypy sub-dimensions were added to the 
regression model in step 2, there was no increase in the predictive validity using reaction time 
to either the preexposed cue or the non-preexposed as the dependent variable. The key finding 
of interest here is that our earlier observation indicating enhanced latent inhibition with high 
UnEx (see Experiments 1 and 2; sections 2.2.2.2 and 2.3.2.2, respectively) approached 
significance (p =.070). Considering, this relationship is no longer significant though, suggests 
anxiety-subtypes might mediate the relationship between unusual experiences and latent 
inhibition. Once anxiety is controlled for, our previously observed effect is reduced below the 
significance threshold. This would lend support towards findings which suggest latent 
inhibition might not be a specific marker for schizophrenia/schizotypy, but a non-specific effect 
-108- 
 
associated with anxiety (Braunstein-Bercovitz, 2000). In line with Experiment 1 though, we 
observe a relationship between ImpNon and both the preexposed and non-preexposed cues, 
suggesting that ImpNon influences learning irrespective of whether the cue is familiar or novel- 
an effect, which appears to be, independent of anxiety. This finding adds to the heterogeneity 
in the literature regarding the relationship between latent inhibition and ImpNon; with some 
authors reporting a trend for enhanced latent inhibition (Evans et al., 2007) and others reporting 
reduced latent inhibition due to the high degree of correlation between ImpNon and UnEx 
(Gray et al., 2002).   
  
2.3.2.3.2 Experiment 2 
As in Experiment 1, hierarchical multiple regression analyses were carried out using the 
state and trait anxiety subtypes taken from the STICSA (step 1) and the four schizotypy 
subtypes taken from O-LIFE; UnEx, IntAn, ImpNon and CogDis (step 2), as the predictor 
variables. Md reaction time to the preexposed and non-preexposed cues were entered as the 
dependent variables.   
 
When Md reaction time to preexposed trials was entered as the dependent variable, the 
effect of the predictor variables in step 1 was not significant R² = .018; F <1. Neither state nor 
trait anxiety were significant predictors of reaction time to the preexposed cue (p >.05). When 
the schizotypy subtypes were entered into the regression, the change in R² was not significant; 
ΔR² =.168, p >.05, similar to our main analysis for Experiment 2 (see section 2.3.2.2), unusual 
experiences was a significant predictor of reaction time to the preexposed cue (β =.433, p 
=.017), indicating an enhanced latent inhibition effect with high UnEx scores. In addition, we 
observe a novel relationship here as CogDis was also a significant predictor; (β = -.404, p 
=.031), indicating an attenuated latent inhibition effect with high CogDis scores. 
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 When Md reaction time to non-preexposed trials was entered as the dependent variable, the 
effect of the predictor variables in step 1 was not significant R² = .023; F <1. Neither state nor 
trait anxiety were significant predictors of reaction-time to the non-preexposed cue (p >.05). 
There was no significant change in R² in step 2, and the effect of the predictor variables on non-
preexposed were not significant R² = .073; F <1. None of the schizotypy variables were 
significant predictors of reaction time to the non-preexposed cue. Standardised regression 
coefficients and R² values can be seen in Table 2.6. 
 
           In contrast to the analyses of Experiment 1 (section 2.3.2.3.1), the results here indicate 
no relationship between state or trait anxiety and reaction time to the non-preexposed cue, 
which questions our previous observation indicating an influence of anxiety on basic 
associative learning. In addition, the pattern of results observed between state and trait anxiety 
and reaction time to the non-preexposed cue are in the opposite direction to those observed in 
Experiment 1; with high state anxious individuals now displaying slower learning towards the 
non-preexposed cue (albeit non-significantly) compared to high trait anxiety individuals. This 
discrepancy however, can possibly be explained by the difference in the observed range of 
scores between state and trait anxiety from Experiment 1 to Experiment 2, as the standard 
deviation of scores for trait anxiety is higher in Experiment 1 compared to Experiment 2 and 
the opposite is true for state anxiety (refer back to Table 2.4). Arguably of more importance 
though and comparable to Experiment 1, we observe no relationship between state or trait 
anxiety and reaction time to the preexposed cue. This encourages our previous suggestion that 
anxiety alone, does not appear to specifically influence latent inhibition. This contention is 
further supported from the results of Experiment 2, as both an enhanced effect of latent 
inhibition with high UnEx, and a reduced effect of latent inhibition with high CogDis, remain 
to be seen when anxiety is accounted for. Furthermore, the direction of results for each 
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schizotypy sub-domain relative to both the preexposed and non-preexposed cues are the same 
across both Experiments 1 and 2 thus indicating consistency in the observed findings (see Table 
2.6). 
 
          These results from Experiment 2 suggest enhanced latent inhibition with UnEx and 
attenuated latent inhibition with CogDis are specific effects of schizotypy that are not related 
to anxiety. These findings appear to contrast with those observed by Braunstein-Bercovitz 
(2000), which suggest latent inhibition is attenuated in relation to the negative dimensions of 
schizotypy (including disorganisational factors) that are loaded with anxiety- a factor derived 
using factor analysis. Based on our preliminary correlations (see Table 2.5) we do also observe 
a relationship between CogDis and both trait and state anxiety, but this relationship does not 
account for the attenuated latent inhibition effect we observe. Here we observe an attenuation 
of latent inhibition that is specifically related to increased CogDis scores. We return to this 
issue in the general discussion (see section 2.4).  
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Table 2.6 
Beta-coefficients from the hierarchical multiple regression analyses of schizotypy subtypes and anxiety subtypes (predictor variables), with 
reaction time to the preexposed and non-preexposed stimuli as dependent variables.  
 
                            Reaction-Time     
         PE                   NPE                    PE       NPE                                        
            Experiment 1          Experiment 2     
 
Step 1 
  State Anxiety         -.106       -.354*        .197     .045  
  Trait Anxiety          .172        .350*       -.125    -.183 
  R²            .027        .155        .018     .023 
 
Step 2 
  State Anxiety         .008       -.277        .306    .077 
  Trait Anxiety          .270        .404*       -.099   -.272 
  Unusual Experiences        .299        .176        .433*    .266 
  Cognitive Disorganisation       -.303       -.138       -.404*   -.064 
  Introvertive Anhedonia        .027        .008        .031    .131 
  Impulsive Non-conformity         -.375*       -.293*       -.217   -.148 
  R²          .209         .239        .168    .073 
 
Note. * p <.05; Significant results are bolded. 
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2.3.2.3.3 Summary of findings  
 
Consistent with some of the clinical literature (i.e., Rascle et al., 2001; Cohen et al., 
2004; Gal et al., 2009), a positive association was found between the rate of learning to the 
familiar, but not the novel, stimulus and the UnEx dimension of schizotypy – implying 
abnormally persistent latent inhibition in these high schizotypy individuals. Once anxiety 
was controlled for, the previously observed positive association between UnEx and latent 
inhibition approached significance in Experiment 1 and was significant in Experiment 2.  
There was also a negative association between the rate of learning to the familiar, but not 
the novel, stimulus and the CogDis dimension of schizotypy – implying an attenuation of 
latent inhibition in these high schizotypy individuals. These findings lend support for an 
attentional difference in schizotypy (and by extension schizophrenia) that suggests 
attentional dysfunctions are specific effects of schizotypy, and not non-specific effects 
related to anxiety. This conclusion contradicts reports by Braunstein-Bercovitz (2000, 
2001) - we return to a more detailed discussion of this, in the following section and in the 
overall general discussion (see Chapter 5). 
2.4 General Discussion 
 
Two experiments revealed slower learning of a stimulus-target association with a 
stimulus that had been rendered familiar through prior exposure than a stimulus that had 
not – latent inhibition. In both experiments learning about the preexposed, but not the non-
preexposed stimulus was related to the UnEx dimension of the O-LIFE – revealing an 
enhancement of latent inhibition in individuals scoring higher on the positive dimension of 
schizotypy. Experiment 2, in particular, arranged preexposure in a manner that resulted in 
the subsequent retardation of learning to be explicable in terms of the effects of mere 
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exposure but not the confounding effects of conditioned inhibition or learned irrelevance. 
This is in contrast to other studies in the latent inhibition literature (e.g. Swerdlow et al., 
1996; Braunstein-Bercovitz, 2000, 2001; De la Casa & Lubow, 2002; De la Casa & Lubow, 
2001; Lubow & De la Casa, 2002; Evans et al., 2007; Schmidt-Hansen et al., 2009; Granger 
et al., 2012), which can be explained in terms of these alternative learning phenomena. 
Using the refined latent inhibition procedure described in Experiment 2, the previously 
observed enhanced latent inhibition effect in high schizotypal individuals remained 
significant once anxiety was controlled for. In addition, neither state nor trait anxiety were 
related to learning about the preexposed and non-preexposed cues, which also contrasts 
with previous research findings (see Braunstein-Bercovitz, 2000, 2001) that are confounded 
by alternative learning phenomena. The current findings suggest enhanced latent inhibition 
in individuals with high UnEx scores are specific effects of schizotypy that are not related 
to anxiety. 
 
To the best of our knowledge, the current data constitute the first observation of 
enhanced latent inhibition in sub-clinical high schizotypy individuals. Three studies (Rascle 
et al., 2001; Cohen et al., 2004; Gal et al., 2009) have reported enhanced latent inhibition 
in schizophrenia patients. The first study by Rascle et al. used a between-participants design 
in which chronic schizophrenia patients in the preexposed group showed slower learning in 
comparison to controls, resulting in an enhancement of latent inhibition. The remaining 
studies, by Cohen et al. and Gal et al, like the current study, employed a within-subject 
manipulation of stimulus familiarity to demonstrate latent inhibition and were able to show 
an abnormality in learning that was specific to the preexposed stimuli. Both Cohen et al. 
and Gal et al. showed that latent inhibition enhancement was associated with the negative 
symptoms experienced by adolescents with schizophrenia. These results are what would be 
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predicted based on Weiner’s (2003) model that suggests enhanced latent inhibition is 
associated with depleted levels of glutamate (see Javiit, 2007; Javiit, 2010), which may be 
related to the prevalence of negative symptoms. On the other side of the coin, is the reported 
relationship between the positive symptoms of schizophrenia and attenuated latent 
inhibition (e.g. Baruch et al., 1988a; Gray et al., 2002; Gray et al., 1992; Rascle et al; Vaitl 
et al., 2002). This latter pattern of results is consistent with Gray et al’s (1991) model for 
cognitive and neural associates of positive acute schizophrenia symptoms: that a loss of 
latent inhibition is due to over-activity in the mesolimbic dopaminergic system. At first 
glance, the results presented here, an enhancement of latent inhibition with the positive 
UnEx dimension of schizotypy, conflict with these analyses.   
 
There has been considerable disagreement about the relationship between the 
attenuation of latent inhibition in schizophrenia and positive symptomatology: some 
authors have found a relationship between latent inhibition and positive symptoms (Baruch 
et al., 1988a; Gray et al., 2002; Gray et al., 1992; Vaitl et al., 2002), others have not (Rascle 
et al., 2001; Swerdlow et al., 1996; Williams et al., 1998; Cohen et al., 2004; Gal et al., 
2009; for a review see: Schmidt-Hansen et al., 2012). In particular, Rascle et al. reported 
an attenuation of latent inhibition was associated with low levels of negative symptoms in 
patients with schizophrenia, rather than with levels of positive symptoms. Whereas Cohen 
et al. reported no difference in the magnitude of latent inhibition between high levels of 
positive symptoms in schizophrenia patients, and healthy controls. These findings, along 
with the current results, do not support the relationship between latent inhibition attenuation 
and positive symptomatology. On the other hand, the proposition by Weiner (2003) - that 
enhanced latent inhibition is related to negative symptoms, refers mainly to chronic 
patients. However, the findings reported by Cohen et al. and Gal et al. were able to show 
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an association between enhanced latent inhibition and clinical condition (chronic 
schizophrenia), but not with the level of negative symptoms per se. The discrepancy 
between these findings, and the results reported here are possibly due to the nature of the 
tasks employed by Cohen et al and Gal et al; as previously highlighted, these existing tasks 
confound learned irrelevance with latent inhibition itself. How the refined latent inhibition 
task reported here covaries with individuals with schizophrenia, is the focus of future 
research. 
 
Only two other studies have attempted to bridge the gap between schizotypy and 
anxiety in relation to learned attentional functioning to assess whether the anxiety that 
characterises schizophrenia and schizotypy accounts for the difficulties individuals with 
schizophrenia and schizotypal individuals have in ignoring irrelevant information (see 
Braunstein-Bercovitz, 2000, 2001). In contrast to the results observed by Braunstein-
Bercovitz, the current results suggest that neither component of anxiety, state nor trait, 
influence latent inhibition alone, or modulates the ability of schizotypy to modify learning 
about a preexposed stimulus. Although, as previously discussed, the limitations associated 
with existing latent inhibition paradigms question the validity of the findings reported by 
Braunstein-Bercovitz (2000, 2001). The latent inhibition task employed in their study 
included a secondary masking task (whether a pair of letters were the same or different) 
which accompanied the presentation of the preexposure stimulus (irregularly shaped 
polygons) during the preexposure phase of the experiment (see section 2.1.4). By presenting 
the preexposed cue in a manner that is irrelevant to the solution of the masking task raises 
the possibility of learned irrelevance being measured in this study instead of latent 
inhibition; an effect which has been shown to influence human learning (Le Pelley et al., 
2010b). The current findings instead suggest that when a refined latent inhibition task is 
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used that removes the confound of such alternative learning effects, the variations observed 
in latent inhibition appear to be specific effects of schizotypy, as opposed to non-specific 
effects of anxiety. We return to a more detailed discussion of this finding in the general 
discussion (see Chapter 5).   
 
 One possible shortcoming of employing the multiple regression analysis that we 
have used in Experiments 1 and 2, see sections 2.2.2.2 and 2.3.2.2, respectively, is that the 
observed correlations between UnEx and RT to the non-preexposed stimulus could have 
been caused by any processes that impact upon the RTs to the preexposed stimulus, 
including those which also impact on RTs to the non-repexposed stimulus; that is to say, 
the common variance components affecting RTs to both preexposed and non-preexposed 
conditions. In order to evaluate this possibility, we pooled the data across Experiments 1 
and 2 and conducted a hierarchical multiple regression in which RTs to the non-preexposed 
stimulus were added in the model in step 1 to act as a covariate, and examined the 
subsequent relationships between UnEx, CogDis, IntAn and ImpNon (as predictor 
variables), and RTs to the pre-exposed stimulus (as the dependent variable) in step 2. UnEx 
remained as a significant predictor of RT to the pre-exposed stimulus in step 2, β = .230, t 
= 2.614, p=.010, as did CogDis now, β = -.175, t = 2.067, p=.041. The remaining sub 
dimensions of the O-LIFE were not significant however, βs < -.010, ts < 1.204, ps >.231. It 
therefore appears that the relationship that we observed between schizotypy and RT in the 
current studies is specific to the pre-exposed stimulus. For the purposes of completeness, 
we also repeated the previous regression but this time with RTs to the pre-exposed stimulus 
entered as a covariate in step 1, and examined the subsequent relationships between UnEx, 
CogDis, IntAn and ImpNon (as predictor variables), and RTs to the non-preexposed 
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stimulus (as the dependent variable) in step 2. None of the beta coefficients were 
significant; βs < .031, ts < 1.043, ps >.385. 
 
In order to ensure that participants were engaged with the task during the 
preexposure stage of Experiment 2, a secondary task was employed in which participants 
were required to repeat, out loud, each stimulus that was presented on the screen. We have 
argued that immersing preexposure within such a procedure precludes the current results 
from being explained in terms of learned irrelevance – as the preexposed stimulus was 
established as task relevant. This raises the question, then, of whether the current results are 
a demonstration of latent inhibition or, instead, a circumstance in which establishing a 
stimulus as task relevant in stage 1 might hinder learning in stage 2 when the same stimulus 
is established as an explicit cue for a target stimulus. On balance, this possibility seems 
unlikely, for a number of studies have established a stimulus as relevant to the solution of 
one task have then gone on to show that the same stimulus is subsequently better, not worse, 
at serving as a cue for a second stimulus in different task than a control stimulus (e.g. Le 
Pelley et al., 2010b; Bonardi, Graham, Hall & Mitchell, 2005), and performance in tasks of 
these sort has been shown to have a negative, not a positive, correlation with schizotypy 
(e.g Le Pelley et al., 2010a). To the best of our knowledge there is only one demonstration, 
in humans, of a stimulus being established as task relevant then going on to show a 
subsequent retardation in learning (Griffiths, Johnson & Mitchell, 2011). However, this 
negative transfer effect was demonstrated under circumstances in which the task type was 
the same between pre-exposure and learning (only the magnitude of the target outcome was 
changed). Furthermore, to date, there is no evidence of this effect having any relationship 
with schizotypy.   
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To summarise, the two experiments presented here show an effect of schizotypy 
(that is not underpinned by anxiety) on learning about a preexposed stimulus using a refined 
latent inhibition procedure. Both Experiments 1 and 2 show a comparable and novel effect 
of enhanced latent inhibition in individuals high in UnEx, that is not influenced by anxiety. 
We advocate the use of the task described in Experiment 2, as this task successfully 
minimised the contribution of both conditioned inhibition and learned irrelevance on the 
preexposure effect, and could be a useful tool for assessing attentional dysfunction in 
schizophrenia, as well as other clinical and sub-clinical populations. The aim of the 
following chapter is to explore the comparability of these findings using an alternative task 
that also measures an (arguably more direct) effect of attention on learning; learned 
irrelevance. 
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Chapter 3:  
Learned irrelevance: The relationship with schizotypy and anxiety 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
3.1.1 Latent inhibition: Overview & limitations 
As discussed in the preceding chapters the association between latent inhibition, 
schizophrenia and schizotypy has a well-established framework that has been investigated 
both pharmacologically, neuropsychologically, and incorporated into a neuropsychological 
model for schizophrenia (see Gray et al., 1991; Gray, 1998; see Chapter 1 for a review). 
Latent inhibition has since become a prominent model of choice in studies investigating the 
attentional dysfunction view of schizophrenia; mostly because studies investigating latent 
inhibition have often assumed that latent inhibition provides a direct measure of attentional 
processing in human associative learning (Bender et al., 2001; Rascle et al., 2001). This 
approach explains latent inhibition as reflecting a reduction in attention to the stimulus 
during non-reinforced preexposure (Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce & Hall, 1980; Lubow, 1989; 
Kruschke, 2001).  
 
However, the findings surrounding latent inhibition, schizophrenia and schizotypy 
have not been consistently demonstrated in the literature. Some authors suggest latent 
inhibition is either normal (Swerdlow et al., 1996; Williams et al., 1998; Rascle et al., 2001), 
or even enhanced (Rascle et al., 2001; Cohen et al., 2004; Gal et al., 2009, see also Chapter 
2), with others suggesting that the anxiety components of schizophrenia are accountable for 
disruptions observed in latent inhibition (see Braunstein-Bercovitz, 2000). Adding further 
complexity to the interpretation of the latent inhibition-schizophrenia relationship however, 
is the fact that many existing latent inhibition paradigms either include an explicit masking 
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paradigm (e.g. Baruch et al., 1988a; Gray, Hemsley & Gray, 1992), or include the outcome 
from the second stage of the experiment in the first stage of the experiment – unpaired with 
the cue (e.g. Swerdlow et al., 1996; Cohen et al., 2004; Gal et al., 2009; Lubow & Kaplan, 
1997; De la Casa & Lubow, 2001; Lubow & De la Casa, 2002). As a consequence, these 
paradigms encompass components of learned irrelevance, rather than true latent inhibition. 
Whether this is an important distinction; and whether learned irrelevance and latent 
inhibition are manifestations of similar cognitive processes, remains to be established and 
is a focus of the current chapter. The following sections provide a comparison of latent 
inhibition and learned irrelevance summarised from the existing literature, before moving 
on to explore the relationship between learned irrelevance, schizotypy and anxiety in more 
detail. How the results from Experiments 1 and 2, which observed an enhanced effect of 
latent inhibition in high schizotypy individuals using a refined latent inhibition task, 
corroborates with a learned irrelevance task that uses a similar task design is explored across 
Experiments 3 and 4. 
 
3.1.2 Latent inhibition vs learned irrelevance  
There are numerous accounts of latent inhibition that make no reference to attention 
(Weiner, 1990; Hall, 1991; Bouton, 1993; Gray & Snowden, 2005) which has raised 
concerns over the interpretation of attention dysfunction in schizophrenia and schizotypy 
(i.e., Le Pelley et al., 2010a). These accounts argue that attention is not reduced to the 
preexposed cue and instead regard latent inhibition as a deficit in the translation between 
learning and performance. For example, Bouton (1993; 1997) attributed latent inhibition to 
an effect of proactive interference in which memory for a cue-no target association is 
established during preexposure that subsequently interferes with memory for retrieval of 
the cue-target associations during conditioning. Bouton suggests that retrieval of these 
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opposing associations is determined by contextual stimuli, including time delay intervals 
between preexposure and conditioning (see McCloskey & Cohen, 1989). Miller and 
Matzel’s (1988) comparator hypothesis instead argues that during preexposure an 
association is established between the cue and the context which subsequently strengthens 
an indirect activation of the target during conditioning (via cue-context and context-target 
links). This initial cue-context association reduces the strength of the direct target activation 
which thus hinders learning of the cue-target relationship. It has also been argued that latent 
inhibition can result from participants computing conditional probabilities, where the 
conditional probability of a particular outcome given the presence of a cue will be lower 
for a cue that has had extensive nonreinforced preexposure than for a cue that has not (see 
Le Pelley et al., 2010a,b; Lubow & Weiner, 2010). 
  
Le Pelley et al (2010a) instead propose the use of the ‘learned irrelevance’ paradigm 
to investigate the attentional view of schizophrenia. The most commonly accepted view of 
learned irrelevance states that it reflects a reduction in learning rate to a cue as a result of 
prior experience of that cue’s irrelevance with respect to an outcome. This retardation in 
learning is taken to reflect a decrease in attention to the cue (on the assumption that attention 
is determined by relevance; see Mackintosh, 1975; Kruschke, 2001) and there is 
experimental evidence (including eye-tracking data; Beesley et al., 2011) to support this 
view which was discussed in Chapter 1; for a review see Livesey, Harris & Harris (2009). 
In contrast to latent inhibition, learned irrelevance has been proposed a less ambiguous 
measure of the impact of attention on associative learning, as it is less amenable to non-
attentional theories of its occurrence, such as rational inference (as discussed in the general 
introduction; see also Le Pelley et al., 2010a,b). Whether the true measure of latent 
inhibition used in Experiments 1 and 2 (Chapter 2) aligns itself with a comparable design 
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to measure learned irrelevance is explored in this chapter; this comparison will help to 
elucidate whether learned irrelevance and latent inhibition are manifestations of similar 
cognitive processes. A review of the experimental paradigms used to measure learned 
irrelevance are recapitulated in the following section (see also Chapter 1, section 1.5.2 for 
a review) before moving on to discuss existing research relative to patients with 
schizophrenia (Gal et al., 2005; Orosz et al., 2008; Young et al., 2005) and schizotypy 
individuals (Schmidt-Hansen et al., 2009; Le Pelley et al., 2010a). 
  
3.1.3 Experimental paradigms of learned irrelevance 
As described in Chapter 1, two different procedures have been employed to generate 
an effect of learned irrelevance. The first involves exposure to inconsistent/uncorrelated 
presentations of a cue and an outcome, or target (rather than the cue presented without a 
target in tasks of latent inhibition). Several authors have employed variations of the ‘letters 
sequence’ paradigm used in Experiments 1 and 2 to generate learned irrelevance in which 
participants are presented with a series of letters, presented one after the other in the centre 
of the screen and are instructed to press the spacebar as quickly as possible when a target 
letter, X, is presented. Amidst filler letters, the letter X is either preceded by either a novel 
letter (e.g., H) or by a letter that has been preexposed (e.g., S) in conjunction with 
uncorrelated presentations of X. Therefore, the preexposed letter (e.g., S) is presented 
without consequence on some trials, and precedes the occurrence of X on the others (e.g., 
Young et al., 2005; Gal et al., 2008; Orosz et al., 2009; Schmidt-Hansen et al., 2009; refer 
back to Table 1.1, Chapter 1). Here, a learned irrelevance effect is shown when participants 
are slower to respond to presentations of X when it was cued by the preexposed letter than 
the novel letter. However, the following section (3.1.4) discusses some limitations in the 
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task parameters chosen by these authors which questions whether learned irrelevance, or 
alternative learning phenomena are being measured. 
 
The second paradigm used to generate learned irrelevance differs in that the cue(s) 
are always followed by a given outcome but the predictive validity of these cues (the degree 
to which they reliably predict an outcome) are established as either relevant cues 
(consistently predict an outcome) or irrelevant cues (inconsistently predict an outcome). A 
particularly clear demonstration of this learned irrelevance paradigm was described in detail 
in Chapter 1, section 1.5.2, but to reiterate, this task included eight compound cues (pictures 
of two different fruits) during stage 1, and two possible outcomes (i.e., nausea or diarrhoea; 
see Chapter 1, Table 1.2). One of the cues was established as being a relevant predictor of 
a reaction to the food, whereas the other cue in each compound was irrelevant, being 
followed by one outcome on 50% of the trials, and a second outcome on the remaining 50% 
of the trials. In the second stage of training, new compounds of foods are created which 
each consisted of one previously relevant cue and one previously irrelevant cue; these are 
paired with different reactions to stage 1, importantly, however, all cues were equally 
predictive of the novel outcomes in stage 2. In a final test stage participants rate the cues 
that were previously predictive of an outcome during stage 1 as significantly more 
predictive of an allergic reaction in stage 2, than compounds that were previously irrelevant 
as a predictor during stage 1. As the cues and compounds were all equally predictive of the 
outcomes during stage 2, the results at test are taken as evidence for the acquisition of 
differences in attention to these cues during the initial stage of training which biased 
subsequent learning in stage 2 (see: Le Pelley, Oakeshott, Wills & McLaren, 2005; Le 
Pelley et al., 2010b). 
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The following section provides an overview of existing studies which have utilised 
these two different learned irrelevance paradigms to examine their relationship with 
individuals with schizophrenia and high schizotypyal individuals. The literature does not 
report on any studies that have examined the relationship between learned irrelevance and 
anxiety but the possible confound of learned irrelevance in some existing latent inhibition 
paradigms is discussed and it is parsimoniously suggested how these findings relate to 
anxiety (e.g., Braunstein-Bercovitz, 2000, 2001).    
 
  3.1.4 Learned irrelevance and schizophrenia 
In comparison to the latent inhibition literature, there are only a limited number of 
studies that have explored the learned irrelevance effect as a way in which to study the 
cognitive disruptions observed in patients with schizophrenia (e.g., Young et al., 2005; Gal 
et al., 2005; Orosz et al., 2008; Morris et al., 2012). For example, using variations of the 
single-cue ‘letter sequence’ task to produce learned irrelevance, Young et al. (2005), Gal et 
al (2005) and Orosz et al. (2008) each showed attenuated learned irrelevance effect in 
patients with acute schizophrenia as acquisition of the cue-target associations for the 
preexposed irrelevant cue were just as fast as for the non-preexposed relevant cue, 
compared to healthy volunteer participants. Each of these studies also demonstrated some 
degree of learned irrelevance impairments with patients in a chronic phase of schizophrenia. 
Thus these findings are also in line with some of the latent inhibition-schizophrenia 
literature which has shown variations in latent inhibition with both acute and chronic 
schizophrenia patients (e.g., Baruch et al., 1988; Gray et al., 1992; Rascle et al., 2001; Gray 
et al., 2002; Vaitl et al., 2002). However, the task parameters utilised by Young et al. (2005), 
Gal et al (2005) and Orosz et al. (2008) to generate learned irrelevance can be criticised of 
being subject to measuring latent inhibition instead. 
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In the Young et al. (2005) study there were five 30 second presentation blocks which 
each used a different vowel as the preexposed irrelevant letter. Within each block one of 
the vowels and the target letter X were each presented 5 times in a random order, followed 
by a test phase in which the vowel was again presented 5 times but now consistently 
followed by the X- thus appearing to conform to a learned irrelevance procedure. However, 
the key issue here is that within each of the 5 blocks the stimuli were counterbalanced so 
that a vowel from the preceding block which would have previously presented without 
consequence (not followed by X), would then be used as the preexposed irrelevant letter 
(the to-be conditioned cue) in the next block. Thus this sequence reflects the influence of a 
preexposed cue that has in previous blocks been presented without consequence – thus 
conforming more to a latent inhibition rather than a learned irrelevance procedure. A similar 
limitation can be applied to the Gal et al and Orosz et al studies. In each of these studies, a 
single preexposure and test phase was included in which preexposure consisted of 5 cued 
presentations of the preexposed irrelevant cue followed by 5 presentations of the target, as 
well as 20 random presentations of the preexposed irrelevant cue. Therefore, there were 
more presentations of the preexposed irrelevant cue without consequence, than there were 
presentations of the preexposed irrelevant cue followed by the target. Thus, again 
presenting a paradigm that is potentially influenced by a preexposure effect akin to latent 
inhibition, rather than learned irrelevance. The confounding effect of latent inhibition in 
these paradigms thus permits interpretation of their effects in patients with schizophrenia 
to suffer from the same non-attentional accounts that may apply to the latent inhibition 
literature. The same limitation can be ascribed to the single cue learned irrelevance-
schizotypy research, as Schmidt-Hansen et al. (2009) also presented the preexposed 
irrelevant cue without consequence on more occasions (16 presentations) than the 
preexposed irrelevant cue followed by the target (4 presentations), see section 1.5.2. Thus 
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their findings which suggest an attenuated effect of learned irrelevance in high schizotypy 
individuals is confounded by latent inhibition and possibly conditioned inhibition. 
 
Instead, Morris et al. (2012) used a variant of the compound-cue learned irrelevance 
paradigm (described by Le Pelley and McLaren, 2003) to assess the co-variation of this 
task in patients with schizophrenia. This task instead equates latent inhibition by presenting 
all cues an equal number of times. The difference being, that the validity of these cues (the 
degree to which they reliably predict an outcome) is manipulated in order to establish them 
as either relevant cues (consistently predict an outcome on 100% of trials) or irrelevant cues 
(inconsistently predict an outcome – one cue followed by one outcome on 50% of trials, 
and a second outcome on the remaining 50% of the trials). Across two experiments, the 
results were consistent with models of attention which suggest that cues predictive of an 
outcome attract more attention that cues non-predictive of an outcome in healthy 
individuals (Kruschke, 2001; Le Pelley, 2004; Mackintosh, 1975). However, in individuals 
with schizophrenia, this normal attentional bias was impaired as patients were unable to 
distinguish between previously relevant and irrelevant cues and there was a positive 
correlation between learning about the previously irrelevant cue and high-positive symptom 
severity, measured using the PANSS assessment for schizophrenia (Kay, Fiszbein & Opler, 
1987).  
 
3.1.5. Learned irrelevance and schizotypy 
Using a variant of the learned irrelevance compound-cue paradigm (Le Pelley & 
McLaren, 2003), Le Pelley et al (2010a) assessed whether an observed attentional bias 
towards previously established relevant cues is also reduced in high schizotypy individuals. 
Le Pelley et al. demonstrated an effect of learned irrelevance when participants were taken 
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as a whole; participants learnt more in stage 2 about previously relevant cues, relative to 
previously irrelevant cues. Importantly, however, individuals scoring highly on the 
unusual-experiences (UnEx) dimension of schizotypy showed an abolished effect of 
learned irrelevance, with high schizotypal individuals learning significantly more about the 
previously irrelevant cues, than previously relevant cues, compared to low schizotypal 
individuals. In an extension of these findings, Haselgrove et al. (2015) demonstrated that a 
schizotypy related difference in learning about previously relevant and irrelevant stimuli 
was accompanied by a corresponding difference in overt attention (measured using eye-
tracking). These findings support the suggestion that schizotypy is associated with a deficit 
in the appropriate allocation of attention to stimuli based on their previously experienced 
relevance; with a specific inability to reduce attention to irrelevant information (see Lubow 
& Weiner, 2010). This finding is consistent with attentional interpretations of latent 
inhibition and consistent with some of the existing schizophrenia and schizotypy literature 
that proposes a reduction in latent inhibition is associated with positive symptomatology 
(e.g., Baruch et al., 1988a; Gray et al., 2002). It is important to bear in mind that these 
findings might be comparable because previous demonstrations of latent inhibition have 
been confounded by learned irrelevance. 
 
3.1.6 Learned irrelevance and anxiety 
Similar to schizophrenia, several lines of existing research suggest anxiety is 
associated with a reduced ability to ignore irrelevant stimuli/information, reflecting a 
general inability to maintain attentional focus (Eysenck et al., 1987; Mathews & MacLeod, 
1985; Mogg et al., 1989). However, whilst there are studies that have looked at the 
relationship between ‘latent inhibition’ and anxiety, as discussed in preceding chapters (i.e., 
Braunstein-Bercovitz, 2000, 2001) there are no studies that have directly attempted to 
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investigate the relationship between anxiety and learned irrelevance. However, as discussed 
at length previously, the limitations encompassed within existing latent inhibition 
paradigms (i.e., the inclusion of an explicit masking task) makes it possible that these 
existing paradigms are actually generating an effect of learned irrelevance, instead of latent 
inhibition. In which case, these existing results might be interpreted as a reduction in 
learned irrelevance with high anxiety individuals. Therefore, how a task specifically 
designed to measure learned irrelevance, covaries with anxiety, as well as schizotypy, is 
explored in the following experiments. 
 
 
3.1.7 Aims and research questions 
Experiments 1 and 2 (Chapter 2) used a latent inhibition task which measured a pure 
effect of exposure. Thus, the finding that latent inhibition was enhanced in high schizotypy, 
but not high anxiety, individuals is difficult to explain in terms of an effect of learned 
irrelevance. Interestingly, the absence of a relationship between latent inhibition and 
anxiety seemingly contradicts previous research findings (i.e., Braunstein-Bercovitz, 2000, 
2001) which claim that latent inhibition is reduced in high anxious individuals. However, 
as previously highlighted, the limitations encompassed within those existing latent 
inhibition designs makes it plausible that Braunstein-Bercovtiz (2000, 2001) were actually 
observing an attenuation of learned irrelevance in individuals with high anxiety, and also 
high schizotypy. Thus, the first aim of Experiments 3 and 4 was to examine the relationship 
between learned irrelevance, anxiety and schizotypy. To ensure a direct measure of learned 
irrelevance, exposure to all cues were equated across these experiments; a description of 
these tasks are provided below. 
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The second aim of this chapter was to explore how the latent inhibition results from 
Experiments 1 and 2 corroborate with a learned irrelevance task that uses similar task 
parameters whilst removing the potential confound of latent inhibition. Thus allowing us to 
compare the effects of a pure effect of preexposure (latent inhibition; Experiments 1 and 2) 
with a direct measure of learned irrelevance (Experiments 3 and 4). If learned irrelevance 
is underpinned by the same unitary mechanism (i.e., attentional mechanism; e.g. 
Mackintosh, 1975) as latent inhibition, it would be expected that the effect of schizotypy, 
and anxiety, observed in the latent inhibition paradigm to be comparable in a learned 
irrelevance paradigm. Whether this assumption holds true, is assessed following the 
subsequent learned irrelevance experiments. Alternatively, if learned irrelevance and latent 
inhibition paradigms are not underpinned by the same psychological mechanism, then 
understanding this difference and exploring how it co-varies in the schizophrenia spectrum 
will allow further insights into the mechanisms of the disease.  
 
One reason to question this prediction is based on the results provided by Le Pelley 
et al (2010a), which suggest that schizotypy individuals show a reduced (as opposed to the 
predicted enhanced) effect of learned irrelevance. Although, the learned irrelevance 
paradigm employed by Le Pelley et al (2010a) is a rather complex design that used 
compound cues, which is in contrast to the simple, single cue task that employed for the 
latent inhibition experiments in the preceding Chapter 2; making comparisons across these 
experiments difficult. What is desirable then is to generate a single-cue paradigm similar to 
that used for the latent inhibition design, to enable more direct comparisons, to examine the 
effects of latent inhibition and learned irrelevance on schizotypy and anxiety. To the best 
of current knowledge, an effect of learned irrelevance using single cue training has only 
been utilised in one other study (see Le Pelley et al., 2010b), which did not take measures 
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of schizotypy or anxiety into account; this omission is addressed in the following 
experiments.  
 
3.2 Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 presents a learned irrelevance task, the procedure of which is 
comparable to that employed in Experiments 1 and 2 to generate latent inhibition. In this 
learned irrelevance task, participants were presented with a series of letters, presented one 
after the other in the centre of the computer monitor, and required to make a response as 
quickly as possible when a target letter appeared. Immersed within this task was a relevant 
versus irrelevant target design employing four types of cues, U, O, C and D (see Table 3.1). 
During the training-stage, participants received trials in which two cues (U and O) were 
consistently followed by the same target (an X or a Y respectively), thus establishing U and 
O as task relevant cues. Two other cues (C and D) were each followed on half of the trials 
with one of the targets (X) and on the remaining trials with the other target (Y) thus 
establishing them as task irrelevant cues. In the second, test, stage all cues were established 
as reliable predictors of two novel targets (P and Q). If attention to U and O is greater than 
to C and D then learning about U and O, as measured by reaction times, should proceed 
more rapidly in stage 2. Table 3.1 provides a summary of the overall design of Experiment 
3. Individual measures of schizotypy and anxiety were also taken to explore their 
relationship with learned irrelevance. 
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Table 3.1 
Experimental Design of Experiment 3 
 
Stage 1 
 
Stage 2 
U – X (10) U – P (20) 
 
O – Y (10) O – Q (20) 
 
C – X (5) C – P (20) 
 
C – Y (5) D – Q (20) 
  
D – X (5)  
  
D- Y (5) 
 
 
Filler trials 
 
Filler trials 
 
J –  (40) J –  (40) 
 
T –  (40) T –  (40) 
 
L –  (40) L –  (40) 
 
 
3.2.1 Method 
  
3.2.1.1 Participants 
Sixty-four healthy students from Nottingham University and members from the 
general public took part in exchange for course credit, or a £5 inconvenience allowance. 
There were 50 females and 14 males, age range 18-36. Given the comparable nature of the 
current procedure to Experiments 1 and 2, a comparable sample was also selected. 
 
3.2.1.2 Apparatus 
All experimental stimuli appeared on a standard desktop computer running 
Windows XP, and were programmed using Psychopy (Peirce, 2007; www.psychopy.org). 
Stimuli were white capital-letters in Arial-font (7mm(H) x 5mm(W)) presented for 1 second 
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each on a computer-screen (28cm(H) x 35cm(W)) with a grey background. All participants 
received acquisition training with four cues (D, U, O and C), two of which were consistently 
followed by an outcome (relevant-cues) and two of which were intermittently followed by 
an outcome (irrelevant-cues); counterbalanced across participants. During acquisition 
training, target letters were X and Y, the target letters during the test phase were changed 
to P and Q. Filler letters (L, T and J), were randomly interspersed throughout the acquisition 
and test phase. As in the previous experiments; a computerized version of the O-LIFE 
questionnaire (Mason et al., 1995) was administered to assess individual schizotypy levels, 
and a paper-version of the STICSA (Ree et al., 2008) was administered to assess individual 
anxiety levels.  
 
3.2.1.3 Procedure 
After reading an information sheet and signing a consent form, the following 
instructions were presented to participants on the computer monitor prior to commencement 
of the task: 
 
“Thank you for participating in this experiment. In this experiment you will see 
individual letters appear in the centre of the screen. It is your job to press X when 
you see X appear and press Y when you see Y appear. At first you will only be able 
to respond to these letters when you see them, but as the experiment continues, you 
might be able to anticipate when they are going to be presented. If you think you 
know when either X or Y are going to appear, you can press them BEFORE they 
are presented. Please try to respond as quickly as you can when you think you know 
when X or Y are going to appear. If you have no questions, please have your fingers 
ready over the X and the Y, and then press the space bar to begin the experiment.” 
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During the acquisition stage, the relevant-cues and the irrelevant-cues (either U, O, 
C or D) were each presented 10 times in a random order, followed by a 1s presentation of 
the target-letters (either X or Y); the inter-stimulus interval was 1s. One relevant-cue was 
always followed by X (presented 10 times), and the other relevant-cue was always followed 
or Y (presented 10 times). Following each of the irrelevant-cues were 5 presentations each 
of X and Y. Filler letters were randomly interspersed within this sequence each presented 
a total of 40 times (but were not presented after U, O, C and D). Participants were required 
to press X when they saw they letter X on screen, and Y when they saw Y appear, or if they 
could predict when then these letters would appear as the next letter in the sequence. The 
test-phase followed on from acquisition, and prior to the test-phase participants were given 
a new set of instructions, stating the following: 
 
“Now, we would like you to continue to watch a sequence of letters appearing on 
the screen. However, your task now is to press P when you see P appear and press 
Q when you see Q appear. Again, you will at first only be able to respond to these 
letters when you see them, but as the experiment continues, you might be able to 
anticipate when they are presented. If you think you know when either P or Q are 
going to appear, you can press them BEFORE they are presented. Please try to 
respond as quickly as you can when you think you know when P or Q are going to 
appear. Please have your fingers ready over the P and the Q, and then press the 
space bar to begin”. 
 
During the test phase, the target letters were P and Q each presented 40 times and 
were consistently preceded by either the previously relevant or irrelevant cues. Thus during 
stage 2, the cues (D, U, O and C) were consistently predictive (100%) of the target (P or 
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Q). The previously relevant and irrelevant cues (D, U, O and C) were each presented 20 
times. Each stimulus was presented for 1s separated by a 1s inter-stimulus interval. Filler 
letters were randomly interspersed within this sequence each presented a total of 40 times 
(but were not presented after U, O, C and D). Participants were required to press P when 
they saw the letter P on screen, and Q when they saw Q appear, or if they could predict 
when these letters would appear as the next letter in the sequence. The whole task lasted 
approximately 15 minutes. Following completion of the task, participants completed the O-
LIFE (Mason et al., 1995) and the state and trait sub-scales of the STICSA (Ree et al., 2008) 
questionnaire. 
 
3.2.1.4 Scoring 
In keeping with Experiments 1 and 2, RT’s were recorded for each participant. RT’s 
could range from 0-3000ms, as the predictive and non-predictive letters were shown for 
1000ms, followed by a 1000ms inter-stimulus interval, and the target-letter presented from 
2000ms-3000ms. Therefore, if participants’ RT was less than 2000ms they predicted the X 
or Y; whereas if their RT was between 2000 and 3000ms, they responded to the target. 
Mean RT for responses to the predictive and non-predictive cues were calculated for each 
participant.  
 
3.2.2 Results and Discussion 
 
The scores for each of the four schizotypy sub-dimensions and for both anxiety-
subtypes are shown in Tables 3.2 and 3.3, respectively. Unpaired t test analyses were carried 
out to assess if the reported schizotypy and anxiety means differ from the population norms 
for each subscale. Comparable to Experiments 1 and 2 for schizotypy, the means for CogDis 
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and IntAn do not differ significantly from the normative values but the means for UnEx 
and ImpNon are both significantly lower than the normative values. As discussed in the 
preceding chapter, previous studies have also obtained mean schizotypy scores that are 
below Mason et al.’s (1995) normative values, and similar to those reported here (e.g. Evans 
et al., 2007; Granger et al., 2012; Sellen et al., 2005). Significant findings are highlighted 
in bold in Table 3.2. For the anxiety subtypes, means were not significantly different from 
the normative values. 
 
Table 3.2 
Summary information for O-LIFE scores; all values are mean(SD). Values in brackets 
represent the range of scores for each schizotypy-dimension. Population-norms taken from 
Mason et al., 1995, are also shown (mean (SD)). 
 
  
                   O-LIFE-dimension             Mean (SD)  
 
      UnEx              CogDis       IntAn           ImpNon  
                    
All Participants (N= 64)  7.6 (6.1)*        12.2 (6.1)       5.7 (4.0)        7.8 (3.4)* 
                             
 
Population Norm            9.7 (6.7)          11.6 (5.8)       6.1 (4.6)        9.7 (4.3) 
 
 
Table 3.3 
Summary information for STICSA-scores; all values are mean(SD). Values in brackets 
represent the range of scores for both anxiety-subtypes.  
 
 
       Anxiety-Subtype                       Mean(SD)                         
 
        State         State               State              Trait               Trait               Trait 
                 Somatic          Cognitive                               Somatic         Cognitive 
All Participant 33.5(9.2)            17.0(5.1)          16.3(5.8)        35.0(8.8)        16.0(4.2)            18.9(5.7) 
(N= 64)       
 
Population           30.9(9.3)             13.6(4.0)        17.21(5.4)       32.4(8.1)        13.5(3.3)            18.8(4.8) 
Norm     
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3.2.2.1 Learned irrelevance  
Figure 3.1 shows the mean reaction-times across 10 2-trial blocks of stage 1. There 
was a small trend for reaction-times to be faster to relevant-cues than irrelevant-cues. The 
relevant trials were compared with the irrelevant-trials using a 2 (cue: relevant-cue, 
irrelevant-cue) x 20 (trials 1-20) repeated measures ANOVA. For stage 1 this analysis 
revealed a significant main-effect of cue; F(1,63) = 5.739,  p  =.020, partial η² = .083, and 
a significant main-effect of trial number; F(19,45) = 5.232,  p  <.001, partial η² = .688, with 
no significant interaction; F(< 1). 
 
Figure 3.2 shows the mean reaction times across the 20 2-trial blocks of stage 2. 
Reaction times remained marginally faster to the cues that had previously been a consistent 
predictor of an outcome than those that had been an inconsistent/uncertain predictor. The 
relevant-trials were compared with the irrelevant-trials using a 2 (cue: relevant-cue, 
irrelevant-cue) x 20 (blocked trials 1-20) repeated measures ANOVA but this analysis 
revealed no significant main-effect of cue F <1, a significant main-effect of trial number; 
F(1, 19) = 10.827, p  <.001, partial η² = .821, with no significant interaction; F <1. 
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Figure 3.1. Reaction times to target cued by relevant and irrelevant cues for stage 1. Dotted line indicates 
the point of anticipation for predicting the target (< 2000ms). Error bars represent 1+/- within-subject standard 
error (see: Cousineau, 2005). 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Reaction times to target cued by relevant and irrelevant cues for stage 2. Dotted line indicates 
the point of anticipation for predicting the target (< 2000ms). Error bars represent 1+/- within-subject standard 
error (see: Cousineau, 2005). 
 
In contrast to the single-cue learned irrelevance task employed by Le Pelley et al 
(2010b), the current findings fail to observe a learned irrelevance effect. It is not entirely 
clear why the relevant and irrelevant cues were learnt about at comparable rates in stage 
two. Perhaps the amount of training in stage 1 was  not sufficient to observe variations in 
stimulus attention which is supported by the fact that participants were not responding 
below <2000ms by the end of stage 1 and thus not predicting the occurrence of the target. 
Alternatively, it is possible that the data do contain an effect of relevance and irrelevance 
on cue associability, but this is being masked by a personality characteristic, which we go 
on to address next.  
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3.2.2.2 Learned irrelevance, Schizotypy and Anxiety 
3.2.2.2.1 Preliminary analyses  
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients were computed between the 
learning scores (calculated for each participant by subtracting the difference in RT between 
relevant and irrelevant cues; higher learning scores indicate better learning about the 
predictive cues) for stage 1 and stage 2 data, and each of the four schizotypy dimensions 
and both state and trait anxiety subscales (Pearson’s r, using all participants; see Table 3.4). 
Given the preliminary, exploratory nature of this analysis, no adjustments for multiple 
comparisons were made. For stage 1 learning score, correlations were significant for; 
CogDis; r= -.269, p=.031, ImpNon; r= -.276, p= .027 and stage 2 learning score; r= .384, 
p= .002. Stage 1 data thus provides evidence for a general deficit in learning the difference 
between relevant and irrelevant cues associated with high schizotypy (ImpNon and CogDis 
sub-dimensions), but not with state or trait anxiety. The significant correlation between 
stage 1 and stage 2 learning scores suggests a possible transfer of reaction time from stage 
1 to stage 2; this possibility is further explored in the general discussion). During stage 2, 
the only correlation that was significant was that between the learning score and state 
anxiety; r= -.313, p= .012. The direction of this correlation indicates a reduced learned 
irrelevance effect in high state anxious individuals. Contrary to expectations, there were no 
correlations with schizotypy. The results of experiments 1 and 2, in direct contrast, showed 
an augmentation of a purported attentional effect (latent inhibition), in high schizotypy 
individuals. This omission also contrasts with existing research findings that support an 
attentional dysfunction in high schizotypy individuals (see Le Pelley et al., 2010a). We 
return to a more detailed discussion concerning this finding in the General Discussion (see 
section 3.4). 
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Table 3.4 
Correlation matrices among study variables 
 
 
  
Stage 2 
Learning Score   UnEx CogDis IntrovAn ImpNon State Trait 
         
Stage 1 Learning Score .384** -.160 -.269* -.012 -.276* -.203 -.157 
       
Stage 2 Learning Score  -.113 -.074 .046 -.104 -.313* -.147 
       
UnEx   .515** -.031 .194 .344** .490** 
       
       
CogDis    .135 .186 .359** .622** 
       
       
IntrovAn     -.219 .016 .155 
       
       
ImpNon      .353** .352** 
       
       
State       .691** 
       
Note. Values shown are Pearson’s product-moment correlation coefficients. 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
    Significant results are bolded. 
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3.2.2.3 Learned irrelevance and Anxiety  
Based on the preliminary correlational analyses participants were assigned into a 
‘low’ state anxiety group (N = 31) if their score lay on or below a mean state anxiety score 
of 31, and to a ‘high’ state anxiety group (N = 33) if their score lay above this mean. This 
split was determined by the population norm (mean =30.9) reported for state anxiety in a 
healthy student population (see Ree et al., 2008), similar to the sample representative of the 
current studies. To investigate whether there was a significant effect of high or low state 
anxiety on attention to relevant and irrelevant cues, a 2 (state anxiety: high, low) x 2 (cue: 
relevant-cue, irrelevant-cue) mixed ANOVA was carried out for stage 1 and stage 2.  
 
Figure 3.3 shows the mean reaction-times to relevant and irrelevant-cues collapsed 
across all trials for the high and low anxiety groups in stage 1. It is evident from this figure 
that reaction-times were faster to the relevant-cues compared to the irrelevant-cues for all 
participants. This impression was confirmed for stage 1 as there was a significant main-
effect of cue F(1, 62) = 6.274, p =.015, partial η² = .092, and no significant main-effect of 
state-anxiety (F<1) and no significant stimulus x state anxiety interaction F(1, 62) = 3.678, 
p >.05. 
 
Figure 3.4 shows the mean-reaction times to the relevant and irrelevant-cues, for 
high and low anxiety groups in stage 2. Low-anxiety individuals showed faster reaction-
times to cues that had previously been a consistent predictor of an outcome than those that 
had been an inconsistent/uncertain predictor. In contrast, high-anxiety individuals show, if 
anything, the reverse pattern of results. Analysis of stage 2 revealed no significant main-
effect of cue (F<1), and no significant main-effect of state-anxiety (F<1) but a significant 
state-anxiety x cue-interaction; F(1, 62) = 5.644, p =.021, partial η² = .083. Follow-up 
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simple effects analysis revealed a significant effect of cue for the low-anxiety group, F(1, 
62) = 5.057, p =.028, partial η² = .075 but not for the high-anxiety group (F<1), see Figure 
3.4.   
 
Figure 3.3. Reaction times to target cued by relevant and irrelevant cues for stage 1. Error bars represent 1+/- 
within-subject standard error (see: Cousineau, 2005). 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4. Reaction times to target cued by relevant and irrelevant-cues for stage 2. Error bars represent 1+/- 
within-subject standard error (see: Cousineau, 2005). 
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The results from the reaction-time data for stage 2 indicate that individuals low in 
state-anxiety are faster to learn the association between the relevant-cues and the target than 
between the irrelevant-cues and the target; suggesting that low state-anxiety individuals 
devote more attention to stimuli that are good predictors of subsequent events than to 
stimuli that are followed by irrelevant/uncertain events. In contrast, there appeared to be no 
influence of prior relevance on the cues on novel learning for individuals high in state-
anxiety, as the learning rate between the relevant-cues and the irrelevant-cues with the 
target was not significant. Indicating that, high-anxious individuals show approximately 
equal learning about these cues in stage 2. However, Figure 3.4 illustrates, a reverse in the 
direction of results for high anxiety individuals (increased learning to irrelevant-cues), in 
comparison to low anxiety individuals. The significant state-anxiety x cue-interaction does 
not survive, however, if we include participants’ schizotypy scores (for each subscale) and 
mean RT responses to the predictive and non-predictive cues during stage 1 (to control for 
any differences in learning rates between high and low state anxiety individuals) as 
covariates; F(1, 55) = 2.133, p =.150. This analysis suggests that the effect of anxiety on 
the current learned irrelevance task is influenced by both stage 1 learning and individuals 
schizotypy scores.  
 
Based on our findings from Experiments 1 and 2 which indicated an enhanced effect 
of latent inhibition in high schizotypy individuals (but not in high anxiety individuals), we 
anticipated to find a comparable effect of schizotypy on learned irrelevance. More 
specifically we expected to observe a superior learned irrelevance effect with individuals 
high in unusual experiences, with no effect of anxiety on learned irrelevance. This follows 
from single-process models of learning and attention (e.g. Mackintosh, 1975) which 
employs the same (single) algorithm to vary attention to a cue- whether it be in a case of 
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simple pre-exposure (latent inhibition) or in a situation where the cue is more (or less) 
predictive of an outcome (learned irrelevance). That we can double-dissociate latent 
inhibition and learned irrelevance with schizotypy and anxiety suggests a single mechanism 
of attention is not sufficient (e.g., Le Pelley, 2004; Le Pelley, Haselgrove & Esber, 2012; 
Pearce & Mackintosh, 2010).  
 
3.2.2.4 Summary of findings 
The current findings fail to observe an overall effect of learned irrelevance when 
participants are taken as a whole. Additionally, and contrary to expectations, there was no 
effect of schizotypy on learned irrelevance but there was an effect of anxiety on learned 
irrelevance with high state anxiety individuals - who demonstrated insensitivity to the 
difference between relevant and irrelevant information, relative to low state anxiety 
individuals (who shown increased learning towards the previously predictive cue). This 
finding is consistent with the existing literature that high anxiety individuals are impaired 
in their ability to distribute attention appropriately between previously experienced relevant 
and irrelevant information; with an inappropriate allocation of attention to irrelevant 
stimuli. This finding has previously been indicated by existing studies of latent inhibition 
(Weiner, 1990; Weiner & Feldon, 1997; Braunstein-Bercovitz, 2000; 2001; 2002). 
However, before we attempt to draw any conclusions from the results obtained here, it is 
important to acknowledge the possibility that we might simply be observing a transfer of 
reaction time from stage 1 to stage 2; (i.e., low anxious individuals were learning faster 
about the predictive cues in stage 1, which might explain faster learning about these cues 
in stage 2 - based on the similarity between stage 1 and stage 2 tasks).  This possibility is 
further supported by the fact that the cue x anxiety interaction did not remain significant 
once stage 1 learning was included as a covariate in the ANOVA model and based on the 
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significant correlation observed between stage 1 and stage 2 learning scores (see Table3.4). 
The aim of Experiment 4 was to circumvent this problem by using an entirely different task 
and a different cover story between stage 1 and stage 2 of the task (see Le Pelley et al., 
2010b). Using a novel task during stage 2 will ensure attention to all cues for novel 
outcomes, begin stage 2 at zero (no difference in the α of the cues); thus providing a 
paradigm that can assess a pure difference in associability. Therefore any subsequent 
difference in learning rate to these cues can be attributed to a difference in attention to cues 
previously experienced as being relevant or irrelevant. Using this task, the purpose of 
Experiment 4 was to assess the generality of Experiment 3.  
3.3 Experiment 4  
 
As per Experiment 3, this study used single-cue training design during stage 1 (Le 
Pelley et al., 2010b). Here, participants were asked to predict which of two background 
colours (pink or orange) a particular fictional company had used for their business cards. 
Letters A-Y in Table 3.5 represents different company names. Stage 1 comprised each of 
the 6 trial types shown in Table 3.5; each company appeared twice in each block. 
Throughout stage 1 companies A-D were consistently paired with the same colour; cues A 
and D were paired with pink and B and C with orange. Thus cues A-D are referred to as 
relevant cues. Whereas, companies X and Y were inconsistent predictors; in each block, 
each company was paired once with pink and once with orange. Thus cues X and Y are 
referred to as irrelevant cues. It is important to highlight that all cues were trained 
individually; on each trial, only one company name was presented. If participants thought 
the background colour for the business cards was ‘orange’ they had to press ‘O’ or if they 
thought the background colour was ‘pink’ they had to press ‘P’ on the computer keyboard. 
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During each stage 2 trial, participants were told that they had invested in a company 
and had to predict whether that company would make a profit or a loss. In Table 3.5, ‘A-
profit’ for example, indicates that investment in a company would be profitable, whereas 
‘B-loss’ indicates that investment would be loss-making. In stage 2 cues were either paired 
with all profits or all losses. The point of interest here is how quickly participants are able 
to learn about profitability during stage 2. The objective statistical relationship between the 
cues and profitability was identical for companies that had been predictive of business card 
colours during stage 1, and for those that had been non-predictive. Therefore, companies A 
and C (relevant-cues) were paired with the same amount of profitability as was company X 
(an irrelevant-cue), and companies’ B and D (relevant-cues) were paired with the same 
amount of losses as was company Y (an irrelevant-cue). Thus, any subsequent differences 
in learning rate about these cues can be attributed from differences in their learned 
relevance/irrelevance regarding stage 1 colours. On the basis of Le Pelley et al.’s (2010b) 
findings, more rapid learning is expected about relevant-cues, than irrelevant-cues. 
Learning was assessed using participant’s responses during stage 2 of the task, i.e., if the 
participant thought the company would make a loss they had to rate the company low on a 
21-point scale, and if they thought the company would make a profit, they had to rate the 
company high on the 21-point scale. Here there is a change in the dependent variable from 
stage 1 (keyboard response to business card colour) to stage 2 (mouse click to rate the 
companied profitability on the 21-point scale), so unlike Experiment 3 the results will be 
more difficult to interpret in terms of a straightforward transfer of responding. 
 
 
 
 
-146- 
 
Table 3.5 
Experimental Design of Experiment 4 
 
Stage 1 
 
Stage 2 
A – Pink (12) A – Profit (10) 
 
B – Orange (12) B – Loss (10) 
 
C – Orange (12) C – Profit (10) 
 
D – Pink (12) D – Loss (10) 
 
X – Pink/Orange (12) X – Profit (10) 
 
Y – Pink/Orange (12) Y – Loss (10) 
 
 Note. The number in parentheses indicates the number of each repetition of each trial type. 
 
3.3.1 Method 
3.3.1.1 Participants 
Eighty-eight healthy university of Nottingham students and members of the general 
public took part in exchange for course credit, or a £5 inconvenience allowance. There were 
68 females and 20 males, age range 18-54. A sample size of 88 was based on previous 
studies using a similar learned irrelevance task in a similar population of participants (see 
Haselgrove et al., 2015). 
 
3.3.1.2 Apparatus 
All experimental stimuli appeared on a standard desktop computer running 
Windows XP, and were programmed using Psychopy (Peirce, 2007; www.psychopy.org). 
The six company names were Stonedge, Hedgend, Woodrow, Cornfield, Lakeside and 
Maylawn. These names were independently assigned to the letters A-Y in the experimental 
design, and fully counterbalanced, for each participant. As per previous experiments, the 
O-LIFE questionnaire (Mason et al., 1995) was administered to assess individual 
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schizotypy levels, and a paper-version of the STICSA (Ree et al., 2008) was administered 
to assess individual anxiety levels.  
 
3.3.1.3 Procedure 
After reading an information sheet and signing a consent form, the following 
instructions were presented to participants on the computer monitor prior to commencement 
of the task: 
 
“Thank you for participating in this experiment. Six companies have purchased 
several batches of business cards. It is your task to decide which colour the company 
has used for the background of their cards. On each trial, two different coloured 
business cards (PINK and ORANGE) will appear on the screen, each bearing the 
company name. At first you will have to guess the colour, but after each trial you 
will be told which colour that company used for their business cards, and you can 
use this feedback to guide your subsequent decisions. If you think the background 
colour for that particular batch is ORANGE, press 'O' or if you think the 
background colour is PINK press 'P' on the computer keyboard. To continue press 
the 'SPACE' bar on your keyboard.” 
 
The task was self-timed and on each trial, the message “which colour did [company 
name] use for this batch of business cards?” appeared above images of two cards, each 
stating the name of the company listed at the top of the screen and differing only in their 
background colour (one pink, the other orange), see Figure 3.5(a). The colour of the 
business cards and their position on the screen (presented on either the left or the right) was 
determined randomly for each participant, but remained consistent across stage 1. 
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Participants made their decision by pressing ‘P’ on the computer keyboard if they thought 
the background colour was ‘Pink’ and “O” if they thought the colour was ‘Orange’. Stage 
1 comprised 6 training blocks, with each of the 6 trial types shown in Table 3.5, occurring 
twice per block in a random order. Stage 2 followed on from stage 1, and prior to stage 2, 
participants were given a new set of instructions, stating the following:  
 
“For the next part of the task you will be told that you have invested in a company 
and it is your task to predict whether that company will make a profit or a loss. If 
you think that the company will make a loss then rate that company low on the 21 
point scale. If you think that company will make a profit then rate that company 
high on the scale. If you think that company is equally likely to make a profit or a 
loss then rate that company in the middle of the scale. Please try to be as accurate 
as you can with your ratings and use the feedback you get to guide your ratings. 
Please press the 'SPACE' bar to begin the next part of the task.”  
 
On each trial the message at the top of the screen read “You have invested in 
[company name]. What do you think will happen?” Below the message was a horizontal 
scale with 21 marked gradations. The low anchor point of the scale was labeled “Sure to 
make a loss” and the upper anchor point of the scale was labeled “Sure to make a profit”, 
see Figure 3.6(a). After participants made their selection on the rating scale, and confirmed 
their choice by clicking the box containing the number underneath the rating scale, 
immediate feedback was provided. If the trial was a profit trial, the message “You made a 
profit” appeared in green; if it was a loss trial, the message “You made a loss” appeared in 
red, see Figure 3.6(b). During stage 2, each of the 6 trial types shown in Table 3.5, appeared 
once per block in a random order, with 10 blocks in total. Following completion of the task, 
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participants completed the O-LIFE (Mason et al., 1995) and the state and trait sub-scales of 
the STICSA (Ree et al., 2008) questionnaire. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6(a) Screenshot example of a typical trial from stage 2; (b) Screenshot example 
of stage 2 trial feedback 
 
3.3.1.4 Scoring 
For stage 1 the mean percentages of correct responses were averaged separately for 
relevant and irrelevant cues. For stage 2, mean discrimination scores were calculated 
separately for relevant and irrelevant cues. There scores were calculated by subtracting the 
A 
A 
B 
B 
Figure 3.5(a) Screenshot example of a typical trial from stage 1; (b) Screenshot example of stage 1 trial 
feedback 
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mean rating for loss making companies from that received by profit making companies, to 
remove valence as a factor. An overall discrimination score was then calculated for each 
participant by subtracting relevant-cues from irrelevant-cues.   
 
3.3.2 Results and Discussion 
 
The scores derived for the four schizotypy subtypes and the two anxiety subtypes 
are shown in Tables 3.6 and 3.7, respectively.  Unpaired t test analyses were carried out to 
assess if the reported schizotypy and anxiety means differ from the population norms for 
each subscale. Comparable to previous experiments for schizotypy (Experiments 1, 2 & 3), 
the means for CogDis and IntAn do not differ significantly from the normative values but 
the means for UnEx and ImpNon are both significantly lower than the normative values. 
As discussed previously, existing studies have also obtained mean schizotypy scores that 
are below Mason et al.’s (1995) normative values, and similar to those reported here (e.g. 
Evans et al., 2007; Granger et al., 2012; Sellen et al., 2005). Significant findings are 
highlighted in bold in Table 3.6. For the anxiety subtypes, means were not significantly 
different from the normative values. 
 
Table 3.6 
Summary information for O-LIFE scores; all values are mean(SD). Values in brackets 
represent the range of scores for each schizotypy-dimension. Population-norms taken from 
Mason et al., 1995, are also shown (mean (SD)). 
  
             O-LIFE-dimension          Mean(SD)            [Range] 
 
        UnEx              CogDis        IntAn          ImpNon     
                 
All Participants (N= 88)  6.5 (5.9)*          11.8 (6.1)      5.2 (4.3)        7.7 (3.8)* 
                                  
 
Population-Norm                              9.7 (6.7)          11.6 (5.8)       6.1 (4.6)        9.7 (4.3) 
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Table 3.7  
Summary information for STICSA-scores; all values are mean(SD). Values in brackets 
represent the range of scores for both anxiety-subtypes.  
 
                   Anxiety-Subtype                             Mean(SD)                         
 
                   State                    State              State             Trait            Trait           Trait 
                                              Somatic       Cognitive                            Somatic     Cognitive 
 
All Participants (N= 88) 32.7(8.7)           15.5(3.8)           17.1(6.1)     35.6(9.1)      15.6(3.5)         20.1(6.4) 
       
Population Norm               30.9(9.3)            13.6(4.0)       17.21(5.4)     32.4(8.1)      13.5(3.3)        18.8(4.8) 
   
 
3.3.2.1 Learned irrelevance 
Figure 3.7 shows the mean percentages of correct-responses per block across the 6 
blocks of stage 1. As expected, accuracy increased rapidly for the relevant cues as the 
participants learnt the correct responses, in comparison to the irrelevant cues, which 
remained slightly below the chance level of 50% throughout stage 1 (as the irrelevant cues 
were only 50% predictive of an outcome). One-sample t tests using the mean percentages 
correct data for the irrelevant and cues collapsed across the 6 blocks of stage 1, revealed 
that participants did score significantly below chance (50%) for the irrelevant cues; t(87) = 
-7.010, p <.001, and significantly above chance for the relevant cues; t(87) = 14.815, p 
<.001. Subsequently, the relevant trials were compared with the irrelevant trials using a 2 
(cue: relevant cue, irrelevant cue) x 6 (block 1-6) repeated measures ANOVA. For stage 1 
this analysis revealed a significant main effect of cue; F(1,87) = 299.265,  p  <.001, partial 
η² = .775, a significant main effect of trial number; F(5, 435) = 8.217,  p  <.001, partial η² 
= .086, and a significant interaction; F(5, 435) = 4.341,  p  <.01, partial η² = .048. Follow-
up simple effects analysis revealed a significant effect of cue across all 6 trial blocks- trial 
1; Smallest F(1, 87) = 21.529,  p  <.001, partial η² = .196. 
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Figure 3.8 shows the mean discrimination scores across stage 2; the mean 
discrimination scores for previously relevant-cues appear higher than previously irrelevant-
cues during the first few blocks, with equal discrimination scores by the end of stage 2. The 
relevant trials were compared with the irrelevant trials using a 2 (cue: relevant cue, 
irrelevant cue) x 10 (blocked trials 1-10) repeated measures ANOVA but this analysis 
revealed no significant main effect of cue; F(1,87) = 2.034,  p  =.157, a significant main-
effect of trial number; F(9,783) = 37.190,  p  <.001, partial η² = .299, with a trend towards 
a significant interaction F(9,783) = 1.698,  p  =.086.  
  
Figure 3.7. Mean percentages of correct responses across the six blocks of stage 1, averaged separately for 
relevant and irrelevant cues. Dotted line shows theoretical level of chance responding (50%). Error bars 
represent 1+/- within-subject standard error (see: Cousineau, 2005). 
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Figure 3.8. Mean discrimination scores for stage 2, averaged separately for relevant and irrelevant cues. 
Error bars represent 1+/- within-subject standard error (see: Cousineau, 2005). 
 
 
Whilst the overall cue x trial interaction did not reach the conventional threshold for 
significance the current findings do show suggest an effect of learned irrelevance which is 
present early on in stage 2 (between blocks 1-5) with the mean discrimination score for 
previously relevant-cues appearing higher than previously irrelevant-cues. This impression 
was confirmed across the first five trials using a 2 (cue: relevant cue, irrelevant cue) x 5 
(blocked trials 1-5) repeated measures ANOVA which revealed a significant main effect of 
cue; F(1,87) = 4.837,  p  =.031, partial η² = .053, a significant main effect of trial number; 
F(4,348) = 26.321,  p  <.001, partial η² = .473, with no significant interaction F(4,348) = 
2.036,  p  =.089. This finding lends support to the study by Le Pelley et al (2010b). 
However, it is possible that the data across all 10 trials do contain an effect of predictiveness 
and uncertainty on cue associability, but this is being masked by a personality characteristic. 
It is arguable that participants in the study carried out by Le Pelley et al. were less varied 
in their personality traits, thus allowing an overall effect of learned irrelevance to be 
demonstrated. 
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3.3.2.2 Learned irrelevance, Schizotypy and Anxiety 
3.3.2.2.1 Preliminary Analyses  
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients were computed between: the 
mean percentages of correct responses for relevant and irrelevant cues for stage 1; the mean 
discrimination scores for relevant and irrelevant cues for stage 2; the overall difference 
scores (relevant cues minus irrelevant cues) for both stage 1 and stage 2; and each of the 
four schizotypy dimensions and both state and trait anxiety subscales (Pearson’s r, using 
all participants; see Tables 3.8 & 3.9). Given the preliminary, exploratory nature of this 
analysis, no adjustments for multiple comparisons were made. For stage 1, there were no 
significant correlations for any of the personality variables with either overall 
discrimination score, relevant or irrelevant cues.  For stage 2, correlations were only 
significant for the relevant-cue and state anxiety; r= -.229, p= .032. In keeping with 
experiment 3, there were no correlations with schizotypy. We return to a more detailed 
discussion concerning this finding in the General Discussion (section 3.4).  
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Table 3.8 
Correlation matrices among study variables for stage 1 
 
 Stage 1  
 Relevant Cue 
Stage 1  
Irrelevant Cue State Trait Unex Cogdis Introvan Impnon 
Discrimination Score .784** -.506** -.065 -.111 -.090 .009 .110 -.074 
         
Stage 1 Relevant cue  .139 -.094 -.099 -.071 -.038 .013 -.038 
 
 
       
Stage 1 Irrelevant cue   -.027 .039 .046 -.067 -.157 .065 
         
State    .757** .524** .672** .280** .301** 
   
 
     
Trait     .584** .811** .395** .273** 
    
 
    
UnEx      .653** .531** .293** 
         
CogDis       .540** .304** 
         
IntrovAn        .239* 
         
Note. Values shown are Pearson’s product-moment correlation coefficients. 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
    Significant results are bolded. 
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Table 3.9 
Correlation matrices among study variables for stage 2 
 
 Stage 2 
 Relvant Cue 
Stage 2  
Irrelevant Cue State Trait Unex Cogdis Introvan Impnon 
Discrimination Score .380** -.500** -.048 -.065 .049 .000 -.050 .114 
         
Stage 1 Relevant cue  .612** -.229* -.146 -.157 -.116 .002 .021 
         
Stage 1 Irrelevant cue   -.173 -.081 -.189 -.109 .044 -.077 
         
State    .757** .524** .672** .280** .301** 
         
Trait     .584** .811** .395** .273** 
         
UnEx      .653** .531** .293** 
         
CogDis       .540** .304** 
         
IntrovAn        .239* 
         
Note. Values shown are Pearson’s product-moment correlation coefficients. 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
    Significant results are bolded. 
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3.3.2.3 Learned irrelevance and Anxiety  
Based on the preliminary correlational analyses, participants were assigned into a ‘low’ 
state anxiety group (N = 46) if their score lay on or below a mean state anxiety score of 31, and 
to a ‘high’ state anxiety group (N = 42) if their score lay above this mean. This split was 
determined by the population norm (mean =30.9) reported for state anxiety in a healthy student 
population (see Ree et al., 2008). To investigate whether there was a significant effect of high 
or low state anxiety on attention to relevant and irrelevant cues, a 2 (state anxiety: high, low) x 
2 (cue: relevant cue, irrelevant cue) mixed ANOVA was carried out for stages 1 and 2.  
 
Figure 3.9 shows the mean percentages of correct responses to the relevant and 
irrelevant cues collapsed across the six blocks for high and low anxiety groups in stage 1. It is 
evident from this figure that the percentage of correct responses was higher to the relevant-
cues compared to the irrelevant cues for all participants. This impression was confirmed for 
stage 1 as there was a significant main effect of Cue F(1, 86) = 296.919, p < .001, partial η² = 
.775, no significant main-effect of State anxiety (F<1) and no significant Stimulus x State 
anxiety interaction (F<1). 
 
Figure 3.10 shows the mean discrimination scores for the relevant and irrelevant-cues 
collapsed across all trials of stage 2, for the high and low anxiety groups. Low anxious 
individuals show increased learning to previously relevant-cues, than to previously irrelevant-
cues. In contrast, high-anxious individuals show, if anything, the reverse pattern of results. 
Analysis of stage 2 revealed no significant main effect of Cue F(1, 86) = 1.395, p =.241, and 
no significant main effect of State anxiety F(1, 86) = 2.787, p =.099 but a significant State 
anxiety x Cue interaction; F(1, 86) = 4.183, p =.044, partial η² = .046. Given the significant 
state-anxiety x cue interaction, follow-up simple effects analysis revealed a significant effect 
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of cue for the low anxiety group, F(1, 86) = 5.452, p =.022, partial η² = .060, but not for the 
high anxiety group (F<1), see Figure 3.10. Additionally, the significant state-anxiety x cue-
interaction survives if we include participants schizotypy scores (for each subscale) and mean 
accuracy responses to the predictive and non-predictive cues during stage 1 (to control for any 
differences in learning rates between high and low state anxiety individuals) as covariates; F(1, 
79) = 7.052, p =.010. This analysis suggests that the effect of anxiety on the current learned 
irrelevance task is not influenced by stage 1 learning and the effect is specific to the state 
anxiety subscale.   
 
Figure 3.9. Percentage of correct responses to target cued by relevant and irrelevant cues for stage 1. Dotted line 
shows theoretical levels of chance responding (50%). Error bars represent 1+/- within-subject standard error (see: 
Cousineau, 2005). 
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Figure3.10. Mean discrimination scores for stage 2, averaged separately for relevant and irrelevant cues for the 
low and high anxious groups. Error bars represent 1+/- within-subject standard error (see: Cousineau, 2005). 
 
When participants are taken as a whole, the current results suggest a trend towards an 
effect of learned irrelevance early on in stage 2 (between trials 1-5). This finding is comparable 
to that observed by Le Pelley et al. (2010a) who also observed better discrimination for relevant 
cues than for irrelevant cues during trial blocks 1-5. Crucially, and in keeping with Experiment 
3, the results from stage 2 indicate that individuals low in state anxiety are faster to learn the 
association between the previously relevant cues and the target than between the previously 
irrelevant cues and the target; suggesting that low state-anxiety individuals devote more 
attention to stimuli that are good predictors of subsequent events than to stimuli that are 
followed by uncertain events. In contrast, there appeared to be no influence of prior relevance 
of the cues on novel learning for individuals high in state-anxiety, as the learning rate between 
the relevant cues and the irrelevant cues with the target was not significant. Indicating that, 
high anxious individuals show approximately equal learning about these cues in stage 2. The 
results from Experiment 4 thus indicate a replication of the direction of results presented in 
Experiment 3, but extend their generality; as the current Experiment 4 employed a task design 
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that directly examined a difference in associability, and therefore the amount of attention paid 
to the predictive and uncertain cues.  
 
3.3.2.4 Summary of findings 
From these results it appears we are observing insensitivity to the difference between 
relevant and irrelevant information in high state anxiety individuals. This finding is however 
in contrast to our predictions; based on our findings from Experiments 1 and 2. Across all 4 
experiments (presented in the current and preceding chapter) it appears that we are observing 
a double dissociation; an effect of schizotypy (but not anxiety) that co-varies with latent 
inhibition, and an effect of anxiety (but not schizotpy) that co-varies with learned irrelevance. 
This possibility is explored in more detail, in the general discussion.  
3.4 General Discussion 
 
Two experiments revealed that learning about a cue that was previously predictive of 
an outcome was higher than the cue that was previously irrelevant, but only in low state-anxious 
participants. Therefore, low anxious individuals, successfully demonstrated a significant 
learned irrelevance effect, whereas high anxious individuals showed a disruption of this effect. 
In contrast to predictions, there was no relationship between schizotypy and learned 
irrelevance; suggesting variations observed in learned irrelevance are specific to state anxiety. 
This suggestion is supported, particularly by the findings reported for Experiment 4, which 
show that when variations in the schizotypy subscales were statistically controlled for, the 
criticial interaction between state anxiety x cue persisted.  
 
Based on the results from Experiments 1 and 2, these findings contradict our 
predictions; we expected no effect of anxiety on learned irrelevance, as we saw no effect of 
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anxiety on latent inhibition. We did however expect to observe an enhanced effect of learned 
irrelevance in high schizotypy individuals, comparable to the enhanced effect of latent 
inhibition observed across Experiments 1 and 2. This prediction is based on the assumption of 
single-process models of attention and learning such as Mackintosh (1975) and Pearce and Hall 
(1980) which assume that the mechanism underlying an effect of latent inhibition (in this case, 
attentional) is the same mechanism underlying an effect of learned irrelevance. 
 
These opposing findings suggest that learned irrelevance and latent inhibition may not 
underpinned by the same unitary, attentional mechanism as predicted by attentional theories of 
associative learning (i.e., Mackintosh, 1975). A  more detailed discussion of this double 
dissociation is discussed in the overall General Discussion (see Chapter 5). Whilst the 
difference in learning rate between the previously relevant cues and irrelevant cues are not 
significant for high anxiety individuals, in either Experiment 3 or 4; Figures 3.4 and 3.10 
illustrate a reverse in the direction of the results in comparison to low anxiety individuals. This 
tentative direction of results suggests that high-anxiety is associated with faster learning to 
previously irrelevant cues, and falls in line with the Pearce and Hall (1980) theory of attention 
on learning. Whereas the finding that low anxiety is associated with significantly faster learning 
to the previously relevant/predictive cues falls in line with the predictions of the Mackintosh 
(1975) model. These results may suggest a dual-process model of attention (e.g.: Le Pelley, 
2004) on anxiety, in which the relative weightings of Pearce-Hall-like and Mackintosh-like 
effects are determined by state anxiety. 
 
The results of Experiments 3 and 4 are however comparable, suggesting reduced 
learned irrelevance is related to high state (but not trait) anxiety scores – suggesting an impaired 
ability to distribute attention appropriately between cues on the basis of their previously 
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experienced relevance, is specific to state anxiety using single cue learned irrelevance 
paradigms. At first glance, this finding does appear consistent with the existing literature. For 
example, others have reported that high anxiety individuals are impaired in their ability to 
distribute attention appropriately between previously experienced relevant and irrelevant 
information; with an inappropriate allocation of attention to irrelevant stimuli. This finding has 
previously been indicated by existing studies of latent inhibition (Weiner, 1990; Weiner & 
Feldon, 1997; see Braunstein-Bercovitz, 2002). However, as previously discussed, the 
limitations encompassed within existing latent inhibition task designs, makes it possible that 
existing latent inhibition tasks are actually generating an effect of learned irrelevance. In light 
of this limitation, it is possible that previous observations of reduced latent inhibition with 
anxiety (i.e., Braunstein-Bercovitz, 2000, 2001), are actually generating reduced learned 
irrelevance, which would be consistent with the results we are observing here. If the effect of 
prior relevance of cues on subsequent learning depends on the ability to unequally distribute 
attention between relevant/irrelevant cues, then naturally we might anticipate that individuals 
with impaired ability to equally distribute attention will show a reduced effect of prior 
relevance of cues. Therefore, the reduced attentional bias towards previously relevant-cues in 
high anxious individuals may be taken as evidence of an attentional deficit- but, is an effect 
restricted to observations of learned irrelevance, not latent inhibition. This possibility could 
also lend support to the null finding observed with anxiety and latent inhibition, observed in 
the previous Experiments 1 and 2.  The fact that schizotypy did not however have an effect on 
learned irrelevance contradicts existing research findings which report a reduced learned 
irrelevance effect in high positive schizotypy individuals using a compound cue learned 
irrelevance task (see Le Pelley et al., 2010a). This could however have something to do with 
the inherent differences between compound cue tasks (e.g., Le Pelley et al., 2010a) and single 
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cue tasks (used in the current experiments); this idea is explored further in the overall general 
discussion (see Chapter 5). 
 
 It is important to note this disrupted learned irrelevance effect was observed using only 
neutral (non-emotional/non-threat related) information (See also: Derryberry and Reed, 
2002; Eysenck et al., 2007; Pacheco-Unguetti et al., 2010). Great difficulty to disengage 
attention from threat related information in anxious participants has been shown in different 
studies (for a review see: Pergamin-Hight et al., 2014). These studies have typically used 
compound cues as it has previously been claimed that no associations have been found in tasks 
where one emotional or neutral stimulus is presented as a single cue (e.g. Mathews & Milroy, 
1994). Therefore, an important contribution of the current findings is that we observed the 
effects typically expected for anxious individuals dealing with threatening stimuli, in spite of 
using stimuli presented as single cues with no affective value. Furthermore, the current results 
corroborate this and extend it to circumstances in which attentional biases are acquired during 
learning. Here, people with high levels of state anxiety failed to show the normal attentional 
bias towards information that was relevant to the solution of a learning task. This suggests that 
everyday anxiety disrupts people’s appropriate allocation of attention to stimuli based on their 
previous experiences. This discovery is important because the natural variation in attention that 
stems from people’s interaction with the environment permits them to tune out irrelevance. If 
this is disrupted, then the repercussions are substantial, as a diminished ability to tune out 
irrelevance may slow the solution of complex tasks and perpetuate a focus on unimportant 
information (see Hullinger, Kruschke & Todd, 2014). To the best of current knowledge, this 
result constitutes the first observation of disrupted learned irrelevance in high state anxious 
individuals.   
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 Pacheo-Unguetti et al. (2010) demonstrate that state and trait anxiety influence 
attentional processes differently and suggest the effects of state and trait anxiety on attentional 
bias can be dissociated. More specifically, they report high state anxiety involves a vigilant 
state associated with assessing cue relevance and the detection of infrequent stimuli. Whereas 
high trait anxiety is linked to attentional processes underpinned by the executive control 
network, involving conflict resolution between two stimuli presented in compound. On this 
basis then, it is not surprising that we only observe a disruption in high state anxious individuals 
using the single cue learned irrelevance tasks employed here. As the relevant and irrelevant 
cues are presented singularly, rather than in compound, there is no need for the activation of a 
mechanism where conflict resolution (i.e., between two stimuli) is required. The cues are 
trained to be either predictive (100%) or irrelevant (50%) to the occurence of the outcome, and 
thus providing an apt situation for the effects of state anxiety to be detected. Thus, it would be 
of interest for future research to assess whether a comparable compound cue learned 
irrelevance task would elicit a disruption with high trait anxiety individuals. This remains for 
future research to determine. 
 
The current findings propose a more ambitious framework to explain the attentional 
functioning of anxious individuals. Currently, the hypervigilance theory (Eysenck, 1992), 
suggests that anxious individuals, as compared with non-anxious individuals, have a greater 
tendency to scan the environment regardless of the presence of threat or aversive stimuli (see 
also: Mathews, May, Mogg, & Eysenck, 1990). Our results suggest this framework does not 
only operate when multiple neutral cues are competing for attention, but when single, neutral 
cues are presented. Therefore the learned irrelevance paradigm could be a useful tool to 
investigate the attentional view of anxiety; more specifically, for how individuals in a transient 
state of anxiety learn and shift their attention to everyday cues.  
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At this juncture however, the causal status of the relationship between disrupted learned 
attention and anxiety is unclear. It is unclear whether high anxiety causes an inability to direct 
attention, or alternatively whether the inability to distinguish previously relevant from 
irrelevant cues induces a state of anxiousness. Existing research has served to establish the 
causal nature of the relationship between anxiety and an attentional bias for threat related 
information (see Mathews & MacLeod, 2002). Such research has focused on the hypothesis 
that induced processing biases can cause anxiety, while leaving open the possibility that causal 
effects could also operate in the reverse direction, providing a feedback loop (see also Chapter 
4). Findings that implicate a threat-related attention bias in anxiety (i.e., Mathews & MacLeod, 
2002) have generated interest in a novel ‘Attention Bias Modification Treatment’ (ABMT). 
ABMT arises from the notion that cognitive biases result in pathological anxiety. This idea also 
underlies Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) which targets a range of biases, for example; 
exposure to feared situations in order to learn that feared situations/objects are safe. However, 
in contrast to CBT, ABMT currently has a direct target of therapeutic action that focuses on a 
specific bias in threat-related attention (For reviews see: Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Hakamata et 
al., 2010). Whilst previous research findings are promising in showing support for ABMT as a 
novel treatment for anxiety, the findings from the current study and those of others (e.g. 
Pacheco-Unguetti et al., 2010) also using neutral information in the absence of affective 
stimuli, urges the continued development of these cognitive-training programmes. In relation 
to learned attention tasks, for example; there are important ramifications for this type research 
on learning and shifting attention to everyday cues for individuals experiencing stressful 
situations that might elevate current levels of anxiety. Part of therapy could not only include 
retraining of attention but also retraining, more generally, what the cues are associated with. 
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In conclusion, the findings of the present chapter contribute to existing knowledge 
highlighting the disrupted attentional mechanisms that are involved in individuals experiencing 
anxiety and how they could be related to the day-to-day difficulties associated with clinical 
anxiety. It is important to highlight that we have identified an effect of state anxiety on these 
disorders by using neutral, single cue, information. The current findings allow a greater 
opportunity to generalise existing knowledge; with insights that have potential implications for 
the treatment of anxiety problems in general and attentional control strategies in particular. The 
causal direction of the relationship between anxiety and learned attention to cues with a history 
or relevance or irrelevance, is the focus of the following chapter before more specific 
conclusions can be drawn regarding the future development of cognitive-training programmes, 
such as ABMT.  
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Chapter 4:  
Learned irrelevance: The relationship with induced anxiety and schizotypy  
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 3 investigated the relationship between anxiety, and learning about stimuli that 
have a history of learned-predictiveness or irrelevance. Across two experiments, learning about 
the cue that was previously predictive (100%) was higher than the cue that was previously 
irrelevant (50%), but only in low state-anxious individuals. High state-anxious individuals 
demonstrated a reduced attentional bias towards previously established predictive cues, 
suggesting an impaired ability of high anxiety individuals to distribute attention appropriately 
between cues based on their previously experienced relevance (e.g., Braunstein-Bercovitz, 
2001; Eysenck et al, 2007). At this juncture however, the causal status of the relationship 
between disrupted learned attention and anxiety is ambiguous. It is unclear whether high 
anxiety causes an inability to direct attention appropriately, or alternatively whether the 
inability to distinguish previously relevant from irrelevant cues induces a state of anxiousness. 
The experiments reported in this chapter aim to address this question. The following sections 
discuss the literature which has previously endeavoured to establish the causal status of the 
relationship between attentional biases and anxiety, before moving on to discuss, in more 
detail, how the current experiments provide advancement in this literature.  
 
4.1.1 Attentional bias and vulnerability to anxiety 
Existing research has served to establish the causal nature of the relationship between anxiety 
and an attentional bias for threat related information (see Mathews & MacLeod, 2002; 
MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy & Holker, 2002). Such research has focused on 
the hypothesis that induced processing biases (i.e., experimentally biasing participants’ 
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responses towards processing negative/threat information) can cause anxiety, while leaving 
open the possibility that causal effects could also operate in the reverse direction (i.e., anxiety 
causing a bias towards processing negative/threat information), providing a feedback loop. For 
example, MacLeod et al. employed a dot probe task designed to induce a temporary attentional 
bias either towards or away from threat-related information, followed by exposure to a mildly 
stressful task to assess the effects of an induced attentional bias (i.e., toward negative 
information) on emotional vulnerability to subsequent stress. During this dot probe task, 
participants were presented, briefly, with two words simultaneously, one negative threat-
related word and one neutral word. Following the termination of this display, a small dot probe 
was presented in the prior location of one of these two words and participants were required to 
press a response button, corresponding to target identity, as quickly as possible, whenever the 
probes were detected. The discrimination latencies relative to the probes occurring in either 
location provided a measure of individual’s attentional response to emotional/threat-related 
stimuli. During the training trials, the probes always appeared in the vicinity of threat-related 
word for half of the participants, to induce an attentional bias towards negative stimuli. For the 
other half of participants, the probes always appeared in the vicinity of the neutral word to 
induce an attentional bias away from negative stimuli and toward neutral stimuli. During the 
test trials the probes were presented in the vicinity of either the neutral or the threat-related 
word, with equal frequency and the discrimination latencies to detect the probes in each 
location served to indicate the attentional impact of the training manipulation. At the end of 
this task, all participants were exposed to a stressor task involving the attempt to complete 30 
difficult or insoluble anagrams under timed conditions whilst being videotaped and anxiety 
levels measured pre- and post-test (MacLeod et al).  
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For participants exposed to the training procedure designed to induce an attentional bias 
towards the threat-related words, reaction times were faster to the probes in the vicinity of these 
words relative to the neutral words, thus resulting in an attentional vigilance to this information. 
Whereas those individuals exposed to the training procedure designed to induce an attentional 
avoidance away from threat-related words, reaction times were faster to the probes in the 
vicinity of the neutral words relative to the neutral words. Thus the dot probe training procedure 
effectively manipulated participant’s attentional responses. Furthermore, the induction of a 
differential attentional bias served to modify individual’s reactions to the subsequent stressor 
task. Participants trained to exhibit an attentional bias towards threat-related stimuli, 
demonstrated increased elevations of anxiety in response to the anagram stress task relative to 
those participants trained to orient attention away from emotionally negative information. 
These findings therefore provide support for the hypothesis that attentional biases towards 
threat-related information can exert a causal influence on increased emotional vulnerability.   
 
On the basis of the above results it appears that induced biases can affect vulnerability 
to anxiety through their influence on how stimuli are processed or interpreted. However, whilst 
findings using tasks such as the dot probe (Mathews & MacLeod, 2002) can tell us how forced 
selective attention, either towards or away from threat related stimuli, (by experimentally 
inducing a processing bias) can serve to establish individuals vulnerability to a situational level 
of anxiety, it cannot tells us how learned selective attention (i.e., attention that is governed by 
whether a stimulus reliably predicts an outcome or not)  towards or away from cues correlates 
with individuals level of situational anxiety or what the causal direction of this relationship 
might be. To date there are only two experiments that have looked at the causal relationship 
between anxiety and learned variations in attention (see Braunstein-Bercovitz, 2001), and these 
are discussed in the following section.  
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4.1.2 Experimentally induced anxiety and latent inhibition 
As discussed in the preceding chapters (see Chapter 1, section 1.6), there is empirical 
evidence that shows a general attentional bias towards irrelevant stimuli, in the absence of 
threat, in individuals who are characterised by high levels of anxiety (e.g. Derryberry & Reed, 
2002; Poy et al., 2004; Bishop, 2009; Pacheo-Unguetti, Acosta, Callejas & Lupiáñez, 2010). 
As with latent inhibition, for example, high trait anxious individuals show an inability to gate 
out irrelevant information resulting in high distractibility and difficulty in focusing attention 
on information that is task relevant; the consequence of which is attenuated latent inhibition 
(Braunstein-Bercovitz, 2000). In an extension of these findings, Braunstein-Bercovitz et al. 
(2001) suggested that situational stress should also disrupt latent inhibition because it is known 
to elicit anxiety (e.g., Houston, 1987) and to increase scores on the state anxiety scale of the 
STAI (Speilberger et al., 1970), which is correlated with trait anxiety. Thus on the basis that 
state and trait anxiety are related then task-induced stress should attenuate latent inhibition, 
comparable to trait anxiety.  
 
To test this prediction Braunstein-Bercovitz (2001) conducted two experiments using 
two separate stress manipulation procedures and an established latent inhibition procedure 
(Braunstein-Bercovitz & Lubow, 1998a, 1988b). In this latent inhibition task, participants were 
either preexposed, or not preexposed to an irrelevant shape (preexposed stimulus), whilst they 
completed a masking task in which they had to indicate whether a pair of letters, presented on 
screen, were the same or different. In the subsequent test stage of the experiment participants 
had to make a response when they thought an on-screen counter would increment. The 
increment in the counter was preceded by presentation of the polygon (see Chapter 2, section 
2.1.4 for the full procedure). In experiment 1, stress was induced by threats to self-esteem in a 
difficult number-series completion task said to be related to intelligence (high stress group). 
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For the low stress group, the number task was easy and not related to intelligence (Keinan, 
Friedland, Kahneman & Roth, 1999). In experiment 2, the participants were job seekers and 
the latent inhibition task was described as part of the interview selection process (high stress 
group) or not (low stress group). Across both experiments latent inhibition was attenuated in 
high as compared to low stress induced individuals; suggesting induced stress/anxiety impairs 
selective attention caused by disrupted attentional inhibition. This finding adds to the generality 
of previous findings and suggests that the attentional processes governing latent inhibition (if 
we accept the attentional view of latent inhibition; i.e., Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce & Hall, 1980) 
are impaired by trait anxiety, as well as by situations such as induced-stress which elevate 
levels of state anxiety. As previously discussed, Braunstein-Bercovitz (2000) also report 
attenuated latent inhibition is the result of high levels of anxiety experienced in high 
schizotypal individuals (see Chapter 2, section 2.1.4). However, one reason to question these 
findings is based on the inherent limitations encompassed with latent inhibition designs. For 
example, the latent inhibition procedure described by Braunstein-Bercovitz (2000, 2001) 
includes an explicit masking task, consequently encompassing components of learned 
irrelevance within the paradigm. Thus the conclusion of the findings reported by Braunstein-
Bercovitz (2000, 2001) remains open to debate. Whether there is, however, an important 
distinction between latent inhibition and learned irrelevance; and whether they are 
manifestations of similar cognitive processes, is an on-going question that this thesis aims to 
answer. As discussed in the preceding chapters, the learned irrelevance paradigm is a less 
ambiguous measure of the impact of attention on associative learning. Therefore, the current 
experiments make use of the learned irrelevance paradigm employed in Chapter 3, Experiment 
4 (see section 4.1.3 for a rationale) to establish the causal status of the relationship between 
anxiety and disrupted learned attention. Therefore, the focus of the following experiments is 
to establish the relationship between induced state anxiety and its effect on learned attention, 
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in a similar way to that of previous studies (i.e., Braunstein-Bercovitz, 2001). In a further 
extension of this literature, we also include a relaxation task (low anxiety) and a neutral task 
(control condition) to compare with a group of individuals induced with a state of anxiety, 
using a stressor task. Failure to find evidence of the existence of a relationship between induced 
state anxiety and disrupted learned attention may suggest that the causal effect operates in the 
reverse direction.   
 
4.1.3 Aims and research questions 
Here, we introduce a mood induction procedure to examine the relative influence of 
state anxiety on learned attention, using the learned irrelevance task previously employed in 
Chapter 3, Experiment 4. This learned irrelevance task was used over that employed for 
Experiment 3 because it has the sensitivity to examine a pure difference in associability using 
a different cover story between stages 1 and 2 of the task. For the mood induction procedure, 
participants either received a negative mood inducing task (a speech stressor task) to elevate 
state-anxiety levels; a positive mood inducing task (relaxed breathing/meditation exercises) to 
reduce state-anxiety levels; or a neutral mood inducing task (passage from the National 
Geographic) to act as a control group. The first part of this chapter explores the effectiveness 
of these mood induction tasks in modulating state anxiety (Experiment 5) before assessing their 
ability to influence learned variations in attention using an established learned irrelevance 
procedure (Experiment 6). In a second part to this chapter, mediation analyses are run to 
explore whether there is a direct causal relationship between state anxiety and learned 
irrelevance or whether schizotypy is a mediator of this relationship. 
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Part 1: Mood Manipulation 
4.2 Experiment 5 
  
The aim of Experiment 5 was to investigate the effectiveness of the mood induction 
procedures; here we assess the ability of a negative and positive mood induction procedure to 
induce a state of anxiety different from baseline mood state scores, and the ability of a neutral 
mood induction procedure to maintain state anxiety levels relative to baseline. Participants 
were either exposed to: a speech stressor task (see Sayette, Martin, Perrott, Wertz, and 
Hufford’s, 2001)6 designed to elicit a transient anxious state; a relaxation response task (NHS 
Choices, 2015) to induce a calming state by reducing state anxiety (or at least not increase their 
level of state anxiety if it is already of a low level at baseline); or a neutral reading task (see 
Dyson & Haselgrove, 2000) designed to neither increase or decrease state anxiety levels.  
 
4.2.1 Method 
 
 4.2.1.1 Participants 
 Eighteen healthy Nottingham University participants (3 males and 15 females) took 
part, in exchange for course credit. The age range was 18-27. The participants were randomly 
allocated to one of three conditions, with 6 participants in each. One group of participants was 
designated the ‘speech stressor condition,’ and given a task designed to induce a transient state 
of anxiousness. The second group were designated the ‘relaxation response condition’ and were 
given a task to induce a state of relaxation. The third group made up the control group and 
designated the ‘neutral reading condition’ designed to maintain participants state anxiety score 
comparative to their baseline measure. The sample size was kept deliberately low prior to 
                                                             
6 These task instructions have been chosen for the following study due to the sensitivity and effectiveness of these 
tasks being established in an undergraduate population (see Phillips & Giancola, 2008).  
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Experiment 6 as the effectiveness of the mood induction conditions, in our lab, was unknown 
thus a small pilot study was necessary to explore the ability of the mood induction tasks to 
modulate levels of state anxiety. In addition, based on previous research findings (see Phillips 
& Giancola, 2008) it was anticipated that the stress induction would be effective and thus a 
large sample size would be redundant. An n of 18 also ensured equal counterbalancing across 
the 3 mood conditions.  
 
4.2.1.2 Materials 
  4.2.1.2.1 Speech Stressor Task 
 A Canon DVD DC95 video camera and a full screen on-line stopwatch 
(http://www.online-stopwatch.com/full-screen-stopwatch/) presented on a standard desktop 
computer were used to enhance the subjective stressfulness of this procedure. 
 
  4.2.1.2.2 Relaxation Response Task 
Relaxation meditation music (taken from: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n17BzBecv8w) was played using Windows Media 
Player through a standard desktop computer. Lightening in the laboratory was darkened and 
mood lights used to create ambient and relaxing lighting effects. 
 
4.2.1.2.3 Mood Assessment Scale 
To assess individual state anxiety levels, the state anxiety sub-scale of the STICSA 
questionnaire (Ree et al., 2008) was administered. The state anxiety sub-scale of this 
questionnaire assesses somatic and cognitive-symptoms of anxiety; right now, at this very 
moment. The scale encompasses 21 self-reported items, rated on a 4-point Likert-type scale (1 
= not at all to 4 = very much so). 
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4.2.1.3 Procedure 
After reading an information sheet and signing a consent form, participants completed 
the state anxiety subscale of the STICSA (Ree et al., 2008) questionnaire to measure each 
individual’s baseline level of state-anxiety upon entering the study. One of the three task 
conditions (‘speech stressor,’ ‘relaxation response’ or ‘neutral reading’: see below) was then 
completed before the state anxiety subscale was administered for a second time. The 
comparison between the scores on this mood scale immediately before and immediately after 
the designated task enabled an examination of the degree to which the mood manipulation 
procedure served to elevate, reduce or maintain individual level of state-anxiety. This 
procedure lasted 25 minutes. At the end of the session participants were fully debriefed about 
the true purpose of the study and for participants in the stressor condition, the relaxation 
exercises, which formed the relaxation condition, was offered as a way to lower individual’s 
level of state anxiety back to baseline before leaving the laboratory. 
 
4.2.1.3.1 Speech Stressor Task 
This task was an adaptation of the procedure introduced by Sayette, Martin, Perrott, 
Wertz, and Hufford’s (2001), administered to elicit a transient state of anxiousness. In this task 
participants were informed that their ‘thinking style’ was being assessed by their ability to 
prepare and deliver a short speech in front of a video camera. Informed consent for the video 
recording was sought after participants were read aloud the following task instructions:  
 
“This part of the study is to test your thinking style. We are interested in your 
ability to think quickly with limited time for preparation. Research has shown that these 
skills are related to cognitive ability. For this task you must quickly prepare and then 
deliver a short speech about what you like and dislike about your body while standing 
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directly in front of this video camera that will record your speech. You will have 5 
minutes to prepare a 3-minute speech. Your speech will be delivered later in the study 
when prompted by the researcher. It is very important that you think about the speech 
you are about to give and how best to present this to the video camera. This stopwatch 
will now give you a 5-minute countdown. You will have this time to prepare your speech 
in your mind. When the 5 minutes are up, you will be given your next instructions”. 
 
At the end of the session, participants were debriefed about the true purpose of the 
study, informed that they did not have to deliver a speech, and given the assurance that no video 
record of their performance had actually been taken. 
 
4.2.1.3.2 Relaxation Response Task 
A relaxation response task (recommended by NHS Choices as an effective relaxation 
procedure:  
http://www.nhs.uk/Conditions/stress-anxiety-depression/Pages/ways-relieve-stress.aspx) was 
administered to reduce the level of state anxiety in each participant. In this task participants 
were informed that they would practice deep breathing exercises for 5 minutes whilst listening 
to relaxation meditation music (taken from: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n17BzBecv8w). The following instructions were read 
aloud and presented visually to participants on the computer screen: 
 
“For this part of the study you will be given 5 minutes to practice deep breathing 
exercises whilst listening to relaxation meditation music. Please sit comfortably in your 
chair, placing your arms on the chair arms with your palms up. Good relaxation always 
starts with focusing on your breathing, and the way to do this is to breathe in and out 
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slowly and in a regular rhythm as this will help to relax the body and induce a calming 
state. Please follow the step by step instructions in front of you, and repeat for 5 
minutes. The researcher will inform you when the time is up.”  
 
At this stage, the relaxation meditation music was started and the following step by step 
instructions were read aloud once to participants (and presented visually on the computer 
screen for the duration of the exercises) before being left to practice the exercises unaided:  
 
“1. Fill up the whole of your lungs with air, without forcing. Imagine you're filling up 
a bottle, so that your lungs fill from the bottom.  
2. Breathe in through your nose and out through your mouth.  
3. Breathe in slowly and regularly counting from one to five (don’t worry if you can’t 
reach five at first).  
4. Then let the breath escape slowly, counting from one to five.  
5. Keep doing this for approximately 3 minutes, or until you feel calm. Breathe 
without pausing or holding your breath.”  
 
Once the 5 minutes were up, the researcher turned off the meditation music, and in their 
own time participants were asked to let the researcher know when they felt ready to begin the 
next part of the experiment. At the end of the session, participants were debriefed about the 
true purpose of the study. 
 
4.2.1.3.3 Neutral Reading Task 
A neutral reading task (passage taken from the National Geographic) was administered 
to elicit/maintain a neutral mood state, providing a neutral control group. In this task 
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participants were simply asked to read a passage provided on paper in front of them for 5 
minutes. At the end of the session, participants were fully debriefed about the true purpose of 
the study. 
 
4.2.2 Results and Discussion 
 
Figure 4.1 shows the mean, pre and post-test state anxiety scores for each mood 
induction condition. It is evident from this figure, that prior to any mood induction condition; 
mean state anxiety scores were similar across all participants. Whereas observation of state 
anxiety scores, post mood induction, show an increase in mean state anxiety scores for 
participants in the speech stressor condition; a decrease in mean state anxiety scores for the 
relaxation condition and little or no change in mean state anxiety scores for the neutral 
condition. This impression was confirmed using a 2 (state anxiety: pre, post) x 3 (mood 
condition: stress, relaxation and neutral) mixed ANOVA which revealed no significant main 
effect of pre and post state anxiety (F<1), but a significant pre post state anxiety x mood 
condition interaction F(2, 15) = 7.188, p =.006, partial η² = .489. Follow up simple main effects 
analysis with applied Bonferroni adjustment7 revealed no significant effect of state anxiety 
between each of the mood conditions at pre-test (Fs<1), whereas, there was a significant effect 
of state anxiety between each of the mood conditions at post-test F(2, 15) = 4.853, p =.024, 
partial η² = .393. At post-test, state anxiety scores were only significantly different between 
the speech condition (M = 41.00, SD = 13.84) and the relaxation condition (M = 25.33, SD = 
3.88), p =.028. 
 
                                                             
7 Bonferroni adjustment was applied for the current analyses due to multiple comparisons made between the 3 
mood conditions which is in contrast to Experiments 3 and 4 that only compared high versus low anxiety. 
-179- 
 
Simple main effects analysis also revealed state anxiety scores were: significantly 
higher posttest than pretest in the speech stressor condition F(1, 15) = 6.902, p =.019, partial 
η² = .315, and significantly lower posttest than pretest in the relaxation response condition F(1, 
15) = 7.155, p =.017, partial η² = .323. State anxiety scores at pretest and posttest did not 
significantly differ in the neutral condition (F<1), see Figure 4.1.  
 
 
Figure 4.1. Mean state anxiety scores at pre-test and post-test for each mood condition; speech, relaxation and 
neutral. Error bars are 1+/- between-subject standard error of the mean. 
 
The results of this experiment confirm the ability of the speech and relaxation 
procedures to induce either a high or low level of state anxiety, respectively. Furthermore, the 
neutral condition sustained anxiety at its initial, intermediate, level.  The primary aim of 
Experiment 6 was to assess the ability of these mood induction procedures to influence learned 
variations in attention, using the learned irrelevance paradigm described by Le Pelley et al. 
(2010b). 
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4.3 Experiment 6 
 
The first aim of Experiment 6 was to replicate the results from Experiment 5: that the 
three mood induction procedures; speech, relaxation and neutral tasks serve to increase, 
decrease or maintain levels of state anxiety, respectively. The second aim was to examine how 
the varying levels of induced state anxiety influence learned variations in attention, using a 
learned irrelevance paradigm (see Le Pelley et al., 2010b). Experiment 6 employed the same 
learned irrelevance paradigm as described in Experiment 4, (see Chapter 3; learned irrelevance 
and anxiety for further discussion). Assuming that the mood manipulation procedures prove 
effective in creating three groups of participants who differ in their level of state anxiety 
(comparable to the pattern of results observed in Experiment 5); comparisons of participant’s 
performance on the learned irrelevance task will enable appraisal of whether high anxiety 
causes an inability to direct attention, resulting in a disruption of learned irrelevance, relative 
to low anxious individuals and controls. First the effectiveness of the mood induction task in 
modulating state anxiety is explored before assessing the ability of these procedures to 
influence learned variations in attention. 
 
4.3.1 Method 
 
 4.3.1.1 Participants 
 
Ninety healthy Nottingham University participants and members of the general public 
(25 males and 65 females) took part, in exchange for course credit or a £5 inconvenience 
allowance. The age range was 18-52. The participants were randomly allocated to one of the 
three mood induction conditions (speech stressor, relaxation response, or neutral reading), with 
30 participants in each. A sample size of 90 ensured equal counterbalancing across the 3 mood 
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conditions and a total sample size in keeping with Experiment 4 (as the current experiment 
employed the same learned irrelevance paradigm as described in Experiment 4). 
 
4.3.1.2 Materials & Apparatus 
4.3.1.2.1 Mood induction tasks 
 The materials for the speech stressor task and relaxation response task were the same 
as described in sections 4.2.1.2.1 and 4.2.1.2.2, respectively.  
4.3.1.2.2 Mood Assessment Scale 
 As per previous experiments, the STICSA; both state and trait subscales (Ree et al., 
2008) and the O-LIFE (Mason et al., 1995) were administered for participants to complete.  
4.3.1.2.3 Learned irrelevance task 
 The apparatus were the same as described in Chapter 3, Experiment 4: section 3.3.1.2.  
 
4.3.1.3 Procedure 
4.3.1.3.1 Mood induction tasks 
 The procedure for the speech stressor task, relaxation response task and neutral reading 
task was the same as described in sections 4.2.1.3.1, 4.2.1.3.2 and 4.2.1.3.3, with participants 
completing only one task condition. The state anxiety subscale of the STICSA (Ree et al., 2008) 
was completed both before and after the mood induction procedure to measure baseline and 
post-mood induction level of state anxiety. The STICSA was then completed for a third time 
following completion of the learned irrelevance task (see section 4.3.1.3.2 below) to assess 
whether levels of state anxiety following the mood induction procedure, remained consistent 
at follow-up (after completion of the learned irrelevance task), see Figure 4.2 below. 
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Figure 4.2. A flow diagram to illustrate the order of task completion for Experiment 6. 
 
4.3.1.3.2 Learned irrelevance task 
The procedure was the same as described in Chapter 3, Experiment 4: section 3.3.1.3. 
At the end of the session, all participants were fully debriefed about the true purpose of the 
study. Again, for participants in the stressor condition, the relaxation exercises, which formed 
the relaxation condition, were offered as a way to lower individual’s level of state anxiety back 
to baseline before leaving the laboratory. The complete produce lasted approximately 40 
minutes. 
4.3.1.3.2.1 Scoring 
The scoring was the same as described in Chapter 3, Experiment 4: section 3.3.1.4.  
 
4.3.2 Results and Discussion 
 
First, it is necessary to analyse the mood induction data to determine whether the 
separate procedures were effective in inducing differential mood states for this group of 
participants. If this mood induction procedure is found to be effective, then the data collected 
from the learned irrelevance task can be analysed to reveal the attentional variation as a 
consequence of inducing either a high, low or neutral state of anxiety.  
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Figure 4.3 shows the mean pre-test, post-test and follow-up state anxiety scores for each 
mood induction condition. It is evident from this figure, that prior to any mood induction 
condition; mean state anxiety scores were similar across all participants. Whereas state anxiety 
scores post mood induction, show an increase for participants in the speech stressor condition; 
a decrease for the relaxation condition and little or no change for the neutral condition. State 
anxiety scores at follow-up show there is a slight convergence towards the mean for the speech 
and relaxation conditions but mean state anxiety scores remain higher than both neutral and 
relaxation conditions. This impression was confirmed using a 3 (state anxiety: pre, post, follow-
up) x 3 (mood condition: stress, relaxation and neutral) mixed ANOVA which revealed a 
significant main effect of state anxiety F(2, 86) = 3.348, p =.040, partial η² = .072, and a 
significant state anxiety x mood condition interaction F(4, 174) = 20.002, p <.001, partial η² = 
.315. Simple main effects analysis with applied Bonferroni adjustment8 revealed no significant 
effect of state anxiety between each of the mood conditions at pre-test (F<1), whereas, there 
was a significant effect of state anxiety between each of the mood conditions at post-test F(2, 
87) = 22.706, p <.001, partial η² = .343, and at follow-up F(2, 87) = 6.089, p =.003, partial η² 
= .123. At post-test, state anxiety scores for the speech condition were significantly different 
from both the relaxation condition and the neutral condition. However, with Bonferroni 
correction in place, there was no significant difference between the state anxiety scores for the 
relaxation and neutral conditions at post-test. At follow-up, state anxiety scores remained 
significantly different between the speech condition and the relaxation condition, see Table 
4.1. 
 
 
                                                             
8 Bonferroni adjustment was applied for the current analyses due to multiple comparisons made between the 3 
mood conditions which is in contrast to Experiments 3 and 4 that only compared high versus low anxiety.  
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Figure 4.3. Mean state anxiety scores at pre-test, post-test and follow-up for each mood condition; speech, 
relaxation and neutral. Error bars are 1 +/- between-subject standard error of the mean. 
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Table 4.1 
Pairwise comparisons for state anxiety scores between the different mood condition at pre-test, 
post-test and follow-up. 
 
  Mean Differences  
  
Speech 
 
Relaxation 
 
Neutral 
Pre-test 
 
   
Speech - 
 
-.967 
 
5.433E-015 
Relaxation .967 
 
- .967 
 
Neutral -5.433E-015 
 
-.967 - 
Post-test 
 
   
Speech - 12.267* 
 
8.433* 
Relaxation -12.267* 
 
-            -3.833 
Neutral -8.433* 
 
3.833 - 
Follow-up 
 
   
Speech - 6.767* 
 
4.667 
Relaxation -6.767* 
 
- -2.100 
Neutral -4.667 
 
2.100 - 
Note. *. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
          b. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
 Significant findings are bolded. 
 
Additional simple main effects analysis revealed state anxiety scores were significantly 
different at pre-test, post-test and follow-up for individuals in the speech condition F(2, 86) = 
34.530, p <.001, partial η² = .445, those in the relaxation condition F(2, 86) = 38.288, p <.001, 
partial η² = .471, and the neutral condition F(2, 86) = 3.567, p =.032, partial η² = .077. As can 
be seen in Table 4.2 there was a significant increase in state anxiety scores for the speech 
condition from pre-test (M = 32.27, SD = 6.52) to post-test (M = 38.83, SD = 9.44), and a 
significant decline in state anxiety scores from post-test to follow-up (M = 35.00, SD = 9.31). 
For the relaxation condition, there was a significant decrease in state anxiety scores from pre-
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test (M = 33.23, SD = 5.52) to post-test (M = 26.57, SD = 4.65), and no significant difference 
from post-test to follow-up (M = 28.23, SD = 5.30). For the neutral group, there were no 
significant changes in state anxiety score between pre-test (M = 32.27, SD = 7.07), post-test (M 
= 30.04, SD = 6.73) and follow-up (M = 30.33, SD = 7.91) with Bonferroni correction in place. 
 
Table 4.2 
Pairwise comparisons for the pre, post and follow-up anxiety scores for each of the mood 
conditions.  
 
  Mean Differences  
  
Pre-test 
 
Post-test 
 
Follow-up 
Speech 
 
   
Pre-test - -6.567* 
 
-2.733* 
Post-test 6.567* 
 
- 3.833* 
Follow-up 2.733* 
 
-3.833* - 
Relaxation 
 
   
Pre-test - 6.667* 
 
5.000* 
Post-test -6.667* 
 
- -1.667 
Follow-up -5.000* 
 
1.667 - 
Neutral 
 
   
Pre-test - 1.867 
 
1.933 
Post-test -1.867 
 
- .067 
Follow-up -1.933 
 
-.067 - 
Note. *. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
          b. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
              Significant findings are bolded. 
 
 
4.3.2.1 Learned irrelevance 
Figure 4.4 shows the mean percentages of correct responses per block across the 6 
blocks of stage 1. Accuracy increased rapidly for the relevant cues as the participants learnt the 
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correct responses, in comparison to the irrelevant cues. The relevant trials were compared with 
the irrelevant trials using a 2 (cue: relevant-cue, irrelevant-cue) x 6 (block 1-6) repeated 
measures ANOVA. This analysis revealed a significant main-effect of cue; F(1,89) = 255.528,  
p  <.001, partial η² = .742, a significant main-effect of trial number; F(5, 85) = 6.232,  p  <.001, 
partial η² = .268, and a significant interaction; F(5, 85) = 1.782,  p  =.125. 
 
Figure 4.5 shows the mean discrimination scores across stage 2; the mean 
discrimination scores for previously relevant-cues appear higher than previously irrelevant-
cues during the first few blocks, with equal discrimination scores by the end of stage 2. The 
relevant trials were compared with the irrelevant trials using a 2 (cue: relevant-cue, irrelevant-
cue) x 10 (blocked trials 1-10) repeated measures ANOVA. This analysis revealed a significant 
main-effect of cue; F(1,89) = 8.658,  p  =.004, partial η² = .089, a significant main-effect of 
trial number; F(9, 81) = 20.379,  p  <.001, partial η² = .694, and a significant interaction F(9, 
81) = 2.286,  p  =.024, partial η² = .203.  
 
Figure 4.4. Mean percentages of correct responses across the six blocks of stage 1, averaged separately for 
relevant and irrelevant cues. Dotted line shows theoretical level of chance responding (50%). Error bars are 1+/- 
between-subject standard error of the mean. 
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Figure 4.5. Mean discrimination scores for stage 2, averaged separately for relevant and irrelevant cues. Error 
bars are 1+/- between-subject standard error of the mean. 
 
 
In contrast to Experiment 4 (see Chapter 3) that used this same task, the current results 
provide support for an effect of learned irrelevance, similar that reported by Le Pelley et a. 
(2010b), when taking into account all 10 blocks of stage 2. It is possible that the data presented 
in Experiment 4, do contain an effect of predictiveness and uncertainty on cue associability, 
but varying levels of state anxiety are masking this effect (as previously discussed in Chapter 
3, see section 3.3.2.1). Due to the nature of the mood induction tasks used in Experiment 6, it 
would be expected that levels of anxiety would be at the extremes for the speech and relaxation 
groups, and in the middle for the neutral groups. Therefore, levels of state anxiety are expected 
to be less variable in experiment 6 (relative to Experiment 4), thus allowing an effect of 
predictiveness and uncertainty on cue associability to be demonstrated. The statistical power 
of the current sample may also be increased due to the larger sample size. How these induced 
levels of state anxiety co-vary with learned irrelevance, is the focus of the following section. 
In order to make a direct comparison with Experiments 3 and 4, we first calculated a total state 
anxiety score and dichotomised participants into high and low anxiety groups. This analysis 
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
M
ea
n
 D
is
ct
im
in
in
at
io
n
 S
co
re
Trial Block
Stage 2
Irrelevant
Relevant
-189- 
 
permitted assessment as to whether a comparable result was observed in the current experiment 
relative to Experiments 3 and 4 before moving on to investigate the 3 separate mood induced 
conditions and their relationship with learned irrelevance. 
 
4.3.2.2 Learned irrelevance and anxiety – high vs low state anxiety groups  
In order then to make a direct comparison with Experiments 3 and 4, a total state anxiety 
score was calculated for each participant in the current experiment (average of pre-test, post-
test and follow-up state anxiety scores), assigned into a ‘low’ state anxiety group (N = 48) if 
their score lay on or below a mean state anxiety score of 31, and to a ‘high’ state anxiety group 
(N = 42) if their score lay above this mean. Comparable to the previous experiments, this split 
was determined by the population norm reported for state anxiety in a healthy student 
population (see Ree et al., 2008). To investigate whether there was a significant effect of high 
or low state anxiety on attention to relevant and irrelevant-cues, a 2 (state anxiety: high, low) 
x 2 (cue: relevant cue, irrelevant cue) mixed ANOVA was carried out for stage 1 and a 2 (state 
anxiety: high, low) x 2 (cue: relevant, relevant) x 3 (trial block: 1-3) mixed ANOVA was 
carried out for stage 2.  
 
Figure 4.6 shows the mean percentages of correct responses to the relevant and 
irrelevant cues collapsed across the six blocks for high and low anxiety groups in stage 1. It is 
evident from this figure that the percentage of correct responses was higher to the relevant cues 
compared to the irrelevant cues for all participants. This impression was confirmed for stage 1 
as there was a significant main effect of Cue F(1, 87) = 246.504, p < .001, partial η² = .739, no 
significant main effect of State anxiety (F<1) and no significant Stimulus x State anxiety 
interaction (F<1). 
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Figure 4.7 shows the mean discrimination scores for the relevant and irrelevant cues 
collapsed across the three 3-trial blocks of stage 2, for high and low anxiety groups. Indicating 
a pattern of results in keeping with Experiments 3 and 4; low anxious individuals show 
increased accuracy to previously relevant cues, than to previously irrelevant cues. In contrast, 
high anxious individuals show a reduced influence of prior relevance of the cues on novel 
learning. Although, analysis of stage 2 did reveal a significant main effect of Cue F(1, 87) = 
8.834, p =.004, and no significant main effect of State anxiety F(<1) = 2.787, p =.099 but no 
significant State anxiety x Cue interaction; F <1. This non-significant interaction suggests a 
weaker relationship between anxiety and learning about the previously relevant and irrelevant 
cues (in comparison to the results of experiments 3 and 4). However, in light of the comparable 
pattern of results to the previous experiments, and the expected differences between the high 
and low anxious groups, simple main effects analysis with Bonferroni adjustment were carried 
out and revealed a significant effect of cue for the low-anxiety group, F(1, 87) = 7.213, p =.009, 
partial η² = .077 but not for the high anxiety group F(1, 87) = 2.449, p =.121, partial η² = .027, 
see Figure 4.7.   
 
Figure 4.6. Percentage of correct responses to target cued by relevant and irrelevant cues for stage 1. Dotted line 
shows theoretical levels of chance responding (50%). Error bars are 1+/- between-subject standard error of the 
mean. 
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Figure 4.7. Mean discrimination scores for stage 2, averaged separately for relevant and irrelevant cues for the 
low and high anxious groups. Error bars are 1+/- between-subject standard error of the mean. 
 
 
 
4.3.2.3 Learned irrelevance and anxiety – Speech, Relaxation and Neutral conditions 
Figure 4.8 shows the mean percentages of correct responses to the relevant and 
irrelevant cues collapsed across the six blocks for relaxation, neutral and speech groups for 
stage 1. It is evident from this figure that the percentage of correct responses was higher to the 
relevant cues compared to the irrelevant cues for all participants. To investigate whether there 
was a significant effect of mood manipulation condition on attention to relevant and irrelevant-
cues, a 3 (mood manipulation: speech, relaxation and neutral) x 2 (cue: relevant cue, irrelevant 
cue) mixed ANOVA was carried out for stage 1. This analysis revealed a significant main effect 
of Cue F(1, 87) = 256.824, p < .001, partial η² = .742, a significant main effect of Mood 
manipulation F(1, 87) = 5.565, p =.005, partial η² = .742, but no significant Cue x Mood 
manipulation interaction F(1, 87) = 1.226, p =.299. Follow-up simple main effects analysis was 
ran to explore the significant main effect across mood conditions. This analysis revealed that 
the percentage of correct responses (collapsed across cue) were higher for participants in the 
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relaxation condition compared to the speech stressor condition F(2, 87) = 5.565, p =.005, partial 
η² = .113. 
 
Figure 4.9 shows the mean percentages of correct responses to the relevant and 
irrelevant cues collapsed across the 3 3-trial blocks of stage 2, for relaxation, neutral and speech 
groups. Similar to the pattern of data from stage 1, it is evident from this figure that all 
participants show increased accuracy to previously relevant cues, than to previously irrelevant 
cues. A 3 (mood manipulation: speech, relaxation and neutral) x 2 (cue: relevant, relevant) x 3 
(trial block: 1-3) mixed ANOVA was carried out for stage 2 which revealed a significant main-
effect of Cue F(1, 87) = 9.686, p =.003, partial η² = .100, no significant main-effect of Mood 
manipulation F <1 and no significant Mood manipulation x Cue interaction; F <1.  
 
  
Figure 4.8. Percentage of correct responses to target cued by relevant and irrelevant cues for stage 1. Dotted line 
shows theoretical levels of chance responding (50%). Error bars are 1+/- between-subject standard error of the 
mean. 
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Figure 4.9. Mean discrimination scores for stage 2, averaged separately for relaxation, neutral and control 
conditions. Error bars are 1+/- between-subject standard error of the mean. 
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effect size. In order to achieve this, the data from the 88 participants recruited from Experiment 
49 were used to calculate the mean difference between high and low anxiety individuals and 
learning about the previously predictive cue10; a mean difference of 2.91 was observed. In the 
current experiment, a mean difference of -2.17 (SE = 1.48) was observed between the speech 
and relaxation conditions for learning about the previously predictive cue. Following Dienes 
(2011: see also http://www.lifesci.sussex.ac.uk/home/Zoltan_Dienes/inference/Bayes.htm), 
Experiment 6 was modelled with a 2-tailed distribution with a mean of 0 (indicating no 
difference in learning about the previously relevant cue between the speech and relaxation 
conditions) and a SD set to 2.91. This yielded a Bayes factor of 1.06, indicating no support for 
either hypothesis. However on the basis of the current findings from Experiment 6, which point 
in the opposite direction to both Experiments 3 and 4, suggests that if we were to recruit more 
participants, we would either sustain or increase the effect being observed here, rather than the 
reverse effect.  
 
There are two possible reasons why all participants, regardless of their induced level of 
anxiety, show increased learning towards the previously predictive cue over the non-predictive 
cue. First, it might be argued that the mood induction procedures fail to manipulate anxiety in 
the same way in which anxiety is influenced in the real world. For example, some authors 
suggest that stressful life episodes do not induce stress unless the situation is appraised as 
threatening. Therefore, the way individuals think about situations determines how they respond 
emotionally to them (e.g., Lazarus, 1990; See the General Discussion for further exploration 
of this issue). Second, there might be additional variables that correlate with anxiety, such as 
                                                             
9 Data from experiment 4 were used for the Bayes factor analysis as this experiment uses the same learned irrelevance task 
as that used in the current experiment 6. 
10 Here the predictive cue is used in the analysis as the correlations in Experiment 4 were only significant between state anxiety 
and learning about the previously predictive cue. A significant SE is required for Bayes analysis to determine whether a 
comparative non-significant result supports the null hypothesis, or no conclusion at all (see Dienes, 2011).  
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schizotypy, which subsequently mediate the relationship between state anxiety and disrupted 
learned irrelevance. The following analyses explore the correlations between the study 
variables from experiment 6, to enable direct comparisons with experiments 3 and 4 (that 
instead measured non-induced levels of anxiety). Part 2 of this chapter then moves on to assess 
potential mediators of the relationship between anxiety and learned irrelevance.  
 
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients were computed between: relevant and 
irrelevant cues and the overall discrimination scores (calculated by subtracting the relevant 
cues from irrelevant cues); state anxiety scores (pre-test, post-test and follow-up); trait anxiety 
scores; each of the four schizotypy sub-dimensions (Pearson’s r, using all participants; see 
Table 4.3 & 4.4). Given the exploratory nature of this analysis, no adjustments for multiple 
comparisons were made. For stage 1 there were significant correlations between the 
discrimination score and unusual experiences; r= -.212, p= .046, the irrelevant-cue and unusual 
experiences; r= -.213, p= .045 and the predictive-cue and follow-up state anxiety scores; r= -
.213, p= .044. For stage 2, correlations were only significant for the relevant-cue and unusual 
experiences; r= -.229, p= .032. Therefore, in contrast to Experiments 3 and 4; Experiment 6 
revealed a weaker relationship between state anxiety and learned irrelevance which suggests 
variations in anxiety that have been generated in the current experiment do not have the same 
relationship with learning as naturally occurring variations in anxiety, as observed in 
Experiments 3 and 4 (see general discussion for a more detailed discussion concerning this 
finding). There were however significant positive correlations between state anxiety, trait 
anxiety and the four sub-dimensions of schizotypy suggesting that levels of anxiety exist in the 
schizotypy scales. Whether schizotypy is a mediating factor in the relationship between state 
anxiety and learned irrelevance is explored in Part 2 of this chapter using a mediation analysis. 
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Table 4.3 
Correlation matrices among study variables for stage 1. 
 
 Stage 1 
Relevant 
Cue 
Stage 1 
Irrelevant 
Cue 
Pre-
Mood 
State 
Post-
Mood 
State 
Follow-
up Mood 
State 
 
Trait 
 
UnEx 
 
CogDis 
 
IntrovAn 
 
ImpNon 
Stage 1 
Discrimination-score .833
** -.625** -.074 -.058 -.172 -.031 .212* -.116 .062 .011 
 
Stage 1 Relevant Cue 
 
 
-.089 -.041 -.143 -.213* -.020 .120 -.113 .072 -.118 
Stage 1 Irrelevant Cue 
 
  
.075 -.099 .009 .029 -.213* .050 -.010 -.186 
Pre-Mood State 
 
   
.621** .672** .657** .228* .386** .147 .197 
Post-Mood State 
 
    
.763** .374** .164 .241* .222* .240* 
Follow-up Mood State 
 
     
.545** .128 .266* .143 .177 
Trait  
 
      
.281** .578** .180 .209* 
UnEx 
 
       
.340** .277** .525** 
CogDis 
 
        
.350** .192 
IntrovAn 
 
        
 .200 
Note. Values shown are Pearson’s product-moment correlation coefficients. 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
    Significant results are bolded. 
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Table 4.4 
Correlation matrices among study variables for stage 2. 
 
 Stage 2 
Relevant 
Cue 
Stage 2 
Irrelevant 
Cue 
Pre-
Mood 
State 
Post-
Mood 
State 
Follow-
up Mood 
State 
 
Trait 
 
UnEx 
 
CogDis 
 
IntrovAn 
 
ImpNon 
Stage 2 
Discrimination-score .344
** -.295** -.118 -.063 -.115 -.015 -.166 -.106 -.023 -.103 
 
Stage 2 Relevant Cue 
 
 
.796** -.116 .017 -.129 -.149      -.280** -.173 .012 -.090 
Stage 2 Irrelevant Cue 
 
  
-.042 .058 -.058 -.142 -.177 -.106 .028 -.024 
Pre-Mood State 
 
   
.621** .672** .657** .228* .386** .147 .197 
Post-Mood State 
 
    
.763** .374** .164 .241* .222* .240* 
Follow-up Mood State 
 
     
.545** .128 .266* .143 .177 
Trait  
 
      
.281** .578** .180 .209* 
UnEx 
 
       
.340** .277** .525** 
CogDis 
 
        
.350** .192 
IntrovAn 
 
        
 .200 
Note. Values shown are Pearson’s product-moment correlation coefficients. 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
    Significant results are bolded. 
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Part 2: Learned irrelevance - Experiments 3, 4 and 6 combined 
 
4.4 Experiments 3, 4 & 6 combined 
Part 1 of this chapter observed a null result in terms of the relationship between the 3 
induced mood conditions (speech, relaxation and neutral) and learned irrelevance. However, 
follow-up correlation analyses (see Table 4.4) suggests there may be personality variables (i.e., 
schizotypy) that mediate the relationship between state anxiety and reduced learned 
irrelevance. This is further supported by the contention that latent inhibition has previously 
been reported to be the result of high levels of anxiety experienced in high schizotypal 
individuals (see Braunstein-Bercovitz, 2000; see Chapter 1, section, 1.6.1.2) which begs the 
question as to whether schizotypy mediates the relationship between anxiety and learned 
irrelevance. Particularly given the limitations with previous latent inhibition methods and 
whether these findings actually represent learned irrelevance (see Chapter 2, section 2.1.5). 
Support for this investigation stems from further inspection of the results from Experiments 3, 
4 and 6. Upon observation of the correlation matrices drawn from these experiments (see 
Tables 3.4, 3.8, 3.9, 4.3 and 4.4), there are significant positive correlations between both state 
and trait anxiety scores, and the schizotypy sub-dimensions. These significant correlations 
suggest that schizotypal scales may contain an anxiety factor. Furthermore, the data show a 
trend for individuals high in unusual experiences displaying reduced learning about both 
previously predictive and irrelevant cues, and thus a reduced effect of learned irrelevance. This 
is consistent with existing research findings that show an attenuated effect of learned 
irrelevance with individuals high in unusual experiences (see Le Pelley, 2010a; see also 
Chapter 1, section 1.5.2.1.1 and Chapter 3, section 3.1.5 for a discussion). These findings 
provide a basis for the subsequent analyses to investigate whether unusual experiences mediate 
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the relationship between state anxiety and learned irrelevance. To increase statistical power, 
the data from Experiments 3, 4 and 6 were combined in order to carry out a mediation analysis.  
 
4.4.1 Scoring 
The dependent variable for Experiment 3 (reaction time to the predictive and irrelevant 
cues) was inverted using the transformation 1/reaction-time. This transformation ensured a 
comparable dependent variable across all experiments, allowing the data from each to be 
combined (Total N = 242). Z scores were then calculated for the predictive cue, irrelevant cue 
and the discrimination score (predictive cue minus irrelevant cue) for each experiment, to be 
used as the dependent variables. The state anxiety scores from Experiment 6, collected at the 
three separate time points (pre-test, post-test and follow up) were averaged across the 3 mood 
conditions to calculate an overall state anxiety scores for each participant, comparable to 
Experiments 3 and 4.    
 
4.4.2 Preliminary analysis 
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients were computed between the 
discrimination scores, relevant and irrelevant cues for stage 2, and both state and trait anxiety 
subscales, and the four dimensions of the schizotypy subscale (Pearson’s r, using all 
participants; see Table 4.5). As this initial part of the analysis was preliminary, no adjustments 
for multiple comparisons were made. Correlations were significant for the relevant-cue with; 
state anxiety r= -.146, p= .035; trait anxiety r= -.136, p= .035 and; unusual experiences r= -
.189, p= .033. The irrelevant cue was also significantly correlated with unusual experiences r= 
-.157, p= .015, and the correlations approached significance for discrimination score and state 
anxiety r= -.115, p= .074, and unusual experiences r= -.121, p= .060. 
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Table 4.5 
Correlation matrices among study variables for stage 2. 
 
 Stage 2 
Relevant 
Cue 
Stage 2 
Irrelevant 
Cue 
State Trait UnEx CogDis ImpNon IntrovAn 
 
Discrimination Score 
 
.236** -.334** -.115 -.078 -.121  -.084 .064 -.022 
 
Stage 2 Relevant Cue 
 
 .761** -.146* -.136* -.189**       -.106 -.048 -.024 
 
Stage 2 Irrelevant Cue 
 
  -.069 -.095 -.157* -.075 -.031 -.015 
 
State 
 
   .682** .369** .461** .176** .280** 
 
Trait 
  
    .452** .675** .255** .263** 
 
UnEx 
 
     .508** .295** .357** 
         
CogDis       .366** .234** 
 
ImpNon        .124 
 
        
Note. Values shown are Pearson’s product-moment correlation coefficients. 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
    Significant results are bolded. 
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4.4.3 Mediation analysis 
 
To investigate whether unusual experiences mediates the relationship between state anxiety 
and learned irrelevance, a mediation analysis was conducted. A mediation analysis allows 
exploration of whether there is a variable(s), known as the mediator variable, which underlies 
an observed relationship between an independent and a dependent variable. A mediation model 
proposes that rather than a direct causal relationship between the independent variable (i.e., 
anxiety) and dependent variable (learned irrelevance), it is the independent variable which 
influences the mediator variable (i.e., schizotypy; unusual experiences), which in turn 
influences the dependent variable. Thus the mediator variable serves to clarify the nature of the 
relationship between the independent variable, and the dependent variable (Fields, 2008). A 
real world example is the positive correlation between ice cream sales (independent variable) 
and people drowning in the sea (dependent variable). The mediating variable is temperature; 
when it is hot more people go swimming in the sea, and eat ice cream. 
 
The pre-requisite for mediation analysis is that the variables of interest are all significantly 
correlated; the independent variable and the proposed mediator must correlate, as must the 
independent variable and the dependent variable (Field, 2008). As can be seen from Table 4.5, 
both state and trait anxiety significantly correlate with unusual experiences, and each of these 
personality variables independently correlates with learning about the previously predictive 
cue (consistent with Experiments 3 and 4). Therefore, the aim of the subsequent analyses was 
to assess whether unusual experiences and trait anxiety mediate the relationship between state 
anxiety and learning in stage 2 about the previously predictive cue (Model 1), and whether 
unusual experiences and state anxiety mediate the relationship between trait anxiety and 
learning about the previously predictive cue (Model 2). Such findings would contribute and 
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extend existing knowledge regarding the relationship between schizotypy and anxiety, and 
their subsequent effects on learned variations in attention. 
 
(1) Model 1: Unusual experiences and trait anxiety as mediators of the relationship 
between state anxiety and learning about the previously predictive cue 
 
A mediation analysis was performed using bootstrapping analyses (see Preacher & 
Kelley, 2011) to test the mediation model of unusual experiences and trait anxiety as mediators 
of the relationship between state anxiety and learning about the previously predictive cue.  In 
these analyses, mediation is significant if the 95% Bias Corrected and accelerated confidence 
intervals (BCa CI) do not include 0 (Preacher & Kelley). Refer to Figure 4.10 for the path 
diagram that corresponds to this mediation analysis. 
 
Results based on 1000 bootstrapped samples indicated that whilst the total effect of 
state anxiety on learning towards the previously predictive cues was significant, b = -.018, BCa 
CI [-.033, -.002, p = .023], the direct effect was not b = -.010, BCa CI [-.031, .011, p = .346]. 
There was a significant indirect effect of state anxiety on learning towards the previously 
predictive cue through unusual experiences, b = -.007, BCa CI [-.014, -.001], and through trait 
anxiety, b = -.007, BCa CI [-.014, -.001]. Thus, individuals who indicated high levels of state 
anxiety, through high levels of unusual experiences, and through high levels of trait anxiety, 
showed reduced learning towards the previously predictive cue. A sobel test indicated that only 
the indirect coefficient for state anxiety on learning towards the previously predictive cue 
through unusual experiences was significant (z = -1.957, p < .05, two tailed). However, because 
zero is not in the 95% CI for either indirect effects, both are considered significantly different 
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from zero at p < .05 (see Field, 2008 for a discussion regarding CI’s as a more direct measure 
of statistical significance over the sobel test).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.10. Model of state anxiety as a predictor of learned predictiveness, mediated by unusual experiences and 
trait anxiety. The CI for the indirect effect is a BCa bootstrapped CI based on 1000 samples. Arrow headers and 
beta coefficients indicate the predictive relationship between variables.  
 
(2) Model 2: Unusual experiences and state anxiety as mediators of the relationship 
between trait anxiety and learning about the previously predictive cue  
 
A mediation analysis was performed using bootstrapping analyses to test the mediation 
model of unusual experiences and state anxiety as mediators of the relationship between state 
anxiety and learning about the previously predictive cue. Comparable to model 1; mediation is 
significant if the 95% BCa CI’s do not include 0 (Preacher & Kelley, 2011). Refer to Figure 
4.11 for the path diagram that corresponds to this mediation analysis. 
 
Direct effect, b = -.010, p = .346 
Indirect effects: 
 M1, b = -.007, 95% CI [-.014, -.001] 
 M2, b = -.001, 95% CI [-.017, -.013] 
 
State Anxiety 
M1: 
Unusual 
Experiences 
Δα Cue 
Predictiveness 
M2:  
Trait Anxiety 
 
b = .703, p <.001 
b = .260, p <.001 b = -.027, p =.032 
b = -.001, p =.913 
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Results based on 1000 bootstrapped samples indicated that whilst the total effect of trait 
anxiety on learning towards the previously predictive cues was significant, b = -.016, BCa CI 
[-.031, -.001, p = .035], the direct effect was not b = -.001, BCa CI [-.022, .020, p = .913]. 
There was a significant indirect effect of trait anxiety on learning towards the previously 
predictive cue through unusual experiences, b = -.008, BCa CI [-.016, -.001], and through state 
anxiety, b = -.007, BCa CI [-.021, .008]. Thus, individuals who indicated high levels of trait 
anxiety, through high levels of unusual experiences, and through high levels of state anxiety, 
showed reduced learning towards the previously predictive cue. Similar to model 1, a sobel test 
indicated that only the indirect coefficient for trait anxiety on learning towards the previously 
predictive cue through unusual experiences was significant (z = -1.957, p < .05, two tailed). 
However, because zero is not in the 95% CI for either indirect effects, both are considered 
significantly different from zero at p < .05. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.11. Model of trait anxiety as a predictor of learned predictiveness, mediated by unusual experiences and 
state anxiety. The CI for the indirect effect is a BCa bootstrapped CI based on 1000 samples. Arrow headers and 
beta coefficients indicate the predictive relationship between variables. 
Direct effect, b = -.001, p = .913 
Indirect effects: 
 M1, b = -.008, 95% CI [-.016, -.001] 
 M2, b = -.007, 95% CI [-.021, -.007] 
 
Trait Anxiety 
M1: 
Unusual 
Experiences 
Δα Cue 
Predictiveness 
M2:  
State Anxiety 
 
b = .662, p <.001 
b = .310, p <.001 b = -.027, p =.032 
b = -.010, p =.346 
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4.5 General Discussion 
 
Across two experiments a mood induction procedure was used to examine the influence 
of state anxiety on learned attention, using an established learned irrelevance task (Le Pelley 
et al., 2010b). The mood manipulation procedures were successful in both Experiments 5 and 
6 showing an increase in state anxiety from pre to post test in the speech stressor condition, a 
decrease in state anxiety in the relaxation condition, and little or no change in the neutral 
condition. A similar pattern of results was also observed at a post-task follow-up in Experiment 
6. On the basis that stress elicits anxiety (e.g., Houston, 1987) it can then be assumed that 
anxiety levels per se, in the speech stressor group, were elevated as compared to the relaxation 
and neutral control groups.  
 
Experiment 6 successfully demonstrated learned irrelevance: the significant effect of 
cue (assessed across all experiments) indicates that, overall, participants showed faster learning 
in stage 2 about cues that were previously relevant, than cues that were previously irrelevant. 
This finding replicates the effect of learned irrelevance observed by Le Pelley et al (2010b). 
This result is also anticipated by attentional theories of associative learning (Mackintosh, 1975; 
Kruschke, 2001) which suggest that the attention allocated to a cue is directly determined by 
the previously experience relevance of that cue.  
 
Crucially however, the non-significant interaction between cue relevance and the 3 
mood conditions indicates that there was no effect of the different mood induction conditions 
on learning about either the previously relevant cue, or the previously irrelevant cue. Thus, 
irrespective of whether participants are in either, a low, neutral or high state of anxiety, 
individuals overall devote more attention to stimuli that are good predictors of subsequent 
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events than stimuli that are followed by uncertain events. This finding is in contrast to 
Experiments 3 and 4 but interestingly, when the mood conditions were collapsed across into 
high and low anxiety groups, the results were comparable to Experiments 3 and 4. Low state 
anxious individuals showed increased learning towards the previously predictive cue with high 
anxiety individuals demonstrating a reduced attentional bias towards this cue. The main 
interaction between cue relevance and state anxiety (high and low groups) did however fail to 
reach the conventional criterion for statistical significance for Experiment 6. The weaker 
relationship between state anxiety and learned irrelevance observed here suggests variations in 
anxiety that have been generated in the current experiment do not have the same relationship 
with learning as naturally occurring variations in anxiety, as observed in Experiments 3 and 4. 
In Experiment 6, anxiety is manipulated in an acute manner, but it is unclear whether it is a 
chronic build-up of stressful life events that results in participant’s level of state anxiety which 
consequently results in disrupted attentional processes. The latter effect of chronic stress might 
be what we are observing in Experiments 3 and 4. Support for this proposition comes from a 
study by Chajut and Algom (2003) that used an acute stressor task in healthy participants before 
presenting them with the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) of selective attention. Here, the induction 
of acute stress using noise and impossible psychometric tests, served to improve attentional 
abilities on the Stroop task. The task irrelevant dimension of threat related words were not 
processed, and the resources available under stress were devoted in full to the task-relevant 
dimension of colour. Other studies have also reported a decrease in the Stroop effect (i.e., 
improved selectivity) under acute stress (e.g. Agnew & Agnew, 1963; Callaway, 1959; Folkard 
& Greeman, 1974; Glass & Singer, 1972; Houston, 1969; Houston & Jones, 1967; Huguet et 
al., 1999; O’Malley & Poplawsky, 1971; Tecce & Happ, 1964). On the basis of such results it 
has been suggested that once a stressor has been identified and appropriately managed, 
automatic attentional engagement related to threat may be overridden by more controlled, 
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higher level processes, resulting in attentional disengagement away from threat. Whereas, 
reduced attentional control due to chronic stress exposure may not be sufficiently overridden 
by higher level attentional processes, resulting in an enhancement of automatic attentional 
capture towards threat related stimuli (Chajut & Algom). 
 
The current results present an extension of the above findings (Chajut & Algom, 2003) 
suggesting that acute levels of induced stress improve attentional selectivity towards the 
previously relevant cue compared to the previously irrelevant cue. On the other hand, it might 
be said that chronic stress precipitates the broadening of attention, rendering an individual 
vulnerable to intrusions from task irrelevant information; as can be seen in Experiments 3 and 
4 and existing studies (e.g., Braunstein-Bercovitz, 2001). Regarding these latter findings, it is 
entirely plausible that participant’s reported level of state anxiety is due to a chronic build-up 
of situational anxiety of which the consequence is disrupted learned attention; a disruption 
which is not observed with individuals experiencing an acute one off feeling of state 
anxiousness due to stress induction. The dissociation between acute and chronic anxiety and 
the subsequent effects of learned variations in attention is for future research to determine (see 
General Discussion section, Chapter 5 for a further discussion).  
 
 Interestingly however, the mediation analysis, which combined Experiments 3, 4 and 
6, revealed that whilst there is a total effect of anxiety on learning about the previously 
predictive cue, indicating an overall relationship between these two variables, there is not a 
direct, effect of increased anxiety reducing learning towards the predictive cue. It is unusual 
experiences or trait anxiety that mediates this relationship between state anxiety and reduced 
learning about the previously predictive cue. Thus, the inability of high anxious individuals to 
direct attention towards cues with a history of predictiveness or irrelevance is governed by both 
-208- 
 
their high levels of positive schizotypy and their high levels of trait anxiety.  Similarly, state 
anxiety or unusual experiences also mediate the relationship between trait anxiety and learned 
irrelevance. This finding is in accord with previous studies that have argued diminished latent 
inhibition in high schizotypal individuals to be the result of the high levels of anxiety which 
accompany schizotypy states (Braunstein-Bercovitz, 2000, 2001). The present results extend 
these findings using a less ambiguous measure of attention and suggest that diminished learned 
irrelevance in high state anxious individuals’ is the result of high levels of schizotypy which 
accompany anxiety; suggesting a bi-directional relationship between anxiety and schizotypy 
characteristics. In further support of this finding; both state and trait anxiety sub-scales were 
correlated with unusual experiences, when collapsing across experiments 3, 4 and 6, which 
suggests a schizophrenia-like component in the anxiety scales, and vice versa. This is 
comparable with previous studies that have also found a relationship between schizotypy and 
anxiety scores (Braunstein-Bercovitz, 2000; Gibbons & Rammsayer, 1999). 
 
As mentioned in the general introduction, the relationship between disrupted latent 
inhibition, anxiety/stress and schizotypy/schizophrenia has a well-established pharmacological 
basis (e.g. Gray et al., 1991; Gray, 1998). Studies have shown augmented dopaminergic activity 
in both schizophrenic (Caplan & Guthrie, 1994; Silver, 1994; Silver, 1995) and anxious 
(McIvor et al., 1996; Nutt et al., 1998; Peroutka et al., 1998) individuals and furthermore that 
latent inhibition is modulated by schizophrenia and stress. This evidence, together with the fact 
that existing latent inhibition paradigms encompass components of learned irrelevance, 
provides additional support for the present findings that learned irrelevance can be impaired in 
anxious (state or trait) individuals who are also characterised by high levels of positive 
schizotypy, and by extension vulnerability to schizophrenia. Although, in order to examine 
cognitive functioning in the form of learned irrelevance specifically in patient populations; it 
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is desirable that the neuropsychological, neuroanatomical and psychopharmacological basis of 
learned irrelevance and its disruption is examined in more detail. Here we can only speculate 
on the body of pharmacological research that exists for latent inhibition; of which the 
limitations have been extensively discussed in previous sections.   
  
  In summary, whilst the current experiments do not provide evidence that changes in 
acute induced anxiety have a causal effect on learned variations in attention, they do however 
provide evidence to suggest that under low anxiety conditions, individuals are able to learn 
about stimuli with a history of predictiveness and irrelevance. Whereas, individuals 
encountering high levels of anxiety accompanied by a vulnerability to schizophrenia are unable 
to direct attention and there is a breakdown in attentional-inhibitory processing. The outcome 
of such events may result in a relapse too or worsening of a pathological state. Future research 
suggestions that could explore these findings and propositions are discussed in the following, 
concluding chapter. 
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Chapter 5: 
General Discussion 
5.1 Discussion 
 
5.1.1 Overview 
Establishing how cognitive abnormalities result in the signs and symptoms that define 
schizophrenia and anxiety disorders has become a prominent question in clinically, and sub-
clinically, applied research. Moreover, the prevalence of co-morbid anxiety disorders in 
individuals with schizophrenia has encouraged research to address how schizophrenia and 
anxiety might interact in relation to the cognitive deficits involved in both disorders. One 
attempt to understand the origins of these disorders is the study of cognitive endophenotypes, 
defined as quantifiable traits that can provide an illustrative link between neurological 
abnormalities and the expressed symptoms of a disorder. The identification of reliable 
endophenotypes will hopefully lead to improvements for treatments and could possibly be 
applied as prevention techniques for related disorders. Abnormal performance in schizotypy, 
schizophrenia and anxiety has been observed in comparison to healthy individuals on a range 
of cognitive and behavioural tasks. 
 
Latent inhibition has been considered as one promising endophenotype, particularly in 
the study of schizophrenia. Abnormal attention to irrelevant information has long been 
recognised by clinicians, which has since encouraged researchers to elucidate the nature of the 
relationship between schizophrenia, and anxiety more recently, with allocation of attention to 
stimuli in laboratory studies providing empirical evidence for an attentional view of these 
disorders. However, there are a number of limitations encompassed within existing research, 
specifically regarding the nature of the latent inhibition paradigms that have been designed, 
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and whether they instead reflect the operation of learned irrelevance (see Le Pelley et al., 
2010a). The present work has aimed to address some of the limitations with existing research 
and advance the literature to improve our current understanding of schizotypy and anxiety, and 
the cognitive abnormalities involved: 
 
1) By designing a paradigm that examines a purer effect of latent inhibition, by 
minimising the contribution of learned irrelevance, and assessing how this latent 
inhibition task co-varies with both schizotypy and anxiety (Experiments 1 and 2). 
 
2) By employing an alternative, less equivocal, learned attentional paradigm (learned 
irrelevance) and assessing the relationship between this task with both schizotypy 
and anxiety (Experiments 3 and 4).  
 
3) By assessing the causal relationship between induced variations in anxiety (stress, 
relaxation or neutral mood) and learned variations in attention (Experiments 5 and 
6); assessing whether schizotypy level mediates this relationship.    
 
The aim across these experiments and analyses was to separate out the effects of latent 
inhibition and learned irrelevance, to enable an assessment of the difference/similarities in 
performance across these tasks in relation to schizotypy (and by extension schizophrenia), and 
anxiety. Taking converging evidence, from latent inhibition and learned irrelevance tasks, 
allowed the assessment of learned variations in attention in relation to schizotypy and anxiety. 
The mood induction study permitted insight into the causal nature of the relationship between 
anxiety, schizotypy and a less ambiguous measure of attention (compared to latent inhibition): 
learned irrelevance.  
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The following conclusions will highlight how this thesis has furthered existing research, 
by permitting advancement in the current understanding of the mechanisms disrupted in both 
schizotypy (by extension schizophrenia) and anxiety. How the use of these potentially more 
viable tools can be used to further investigate how schizotypy/schizophrenia and anxiety 
interact to produce cognitive abnormalities, is discussed in terms of future research. 
 
5.1.2 Summary of findings 
  5.1.2.1 Experiments 1 and 2  
a) Nature of the relationship between schizotypy and latent inhibition 
The first aim was to design a within-participant’s latent inhibition task which did not 
encompass the limitations found in many of the other within-participant latent inhibition tasks 
that have been reported in the literature (De la Casa & Lubow, 2001; Lubow & De le Casa, 
2002; Swerdlow et al., 2003; Evans et al., 2007; Granger et al., 2012). Specifically, it is 
ambiguous whether they measure latent inhibition or other related learning phenomena. This 
makes the interpretation of existing findings difficult as we might instead be observing an effect 
of schizotypy on learned irrelevance or conditioned inhibition; both of which have been 
reported to vary with schizotypy (Migo et al., 2006; Le Pelley et al., 2010a). It was therefore 
important to develop a refined latent inhibition task so that future experiments can make clear 
predictions about the effect of experimental manipulations, based on the large human and 
animal literature that is available on latent inhibition (for a review see: Lubow & Weiner, 
2010). This aim was successfully achieved, particularly with respect to Experiment 2, which 
minimised the possibility of either conditioned inhibition or learned irrelevance being observed 
in a within-participant latent inhibition design. Performance was nevertheless similar across 
Experiments 1 and 2, suggesting an effect that is specific to stimulus preexposure (latent 
inhibition). 
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 The second aim was to determine whether any schizotypy dimensions co-varied with 
performance on these ‘purer’ latent inhibition tasks, where the contribution of conditioned 
inhibition and learned irrelevance are minimised. Both Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated that 
individuals scoring higher on the unusual experiences dimension of the schizotypy sub-
dimension of the O-LIFE showed slower learning of the stimulus-target association for 
preexposed stimuli throughout the trials, compared to lower scorers on this dimension. This in 
conjunction with the fact that there was no significant association between unusual experiences 
and learning about the non-preexposed stimulus suggests an enhancement of latent inhibition 
in individuals scoring higher on the positive dimension of schizotypy. 
 
The current findings build upon existing research to suggest that the distribution of 
latent inhibition is not only heterogeneous in patients with schizophrenia; rather, a comparable 
distribution can also be observed in high schizotypy individuals. Whether the current result 
was a specific effect of the latent inhibition tasks developed here, or an effect of some other 
sub-clinical characteristic associated with schizotypy such as anxiety (i.e., Braunstein-
Bercovitz, 2000, 2001), formed the basis of the additional analyses. These findings are 
discussed in the following section. 
 
b) Additional analyses: Nature of the relationship between schizotypy, anxiety 
and latent inhibition 
          Existing research draws similarities in cognitive performance between schizotypy and 
anxiety (see Braunstein-Bercovitz, 2000, 2001, 2002) and demonstrates that co-morbidity rates 
of anxiety in schizophrenia are relatively high. Consequently, the purpose of the additional 
analyses was to address the research question posed by Braunstein-Bercovitz (2000); ‘Is the 
attentional dysfunction in schizotypy related to anxiety?’ In contrast to the results observed by 
Braunstein-Bercovitz, the current results however showed that neither component of anxiety, 
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state nor trait, influenced latent inhibition alone, or modulated the ability of schizotypy to 
modify learning about a preexposed stimulus. Thus the variations observed in latent inhibition 
are specific effects of schizotypy, as opposed to non-specific effects related to anxiety. The 
limitations associated with existing latent inhibition paradigms (i.e., the inclusion of a masking 
task) question the validity of the findings reported by Braunstein-Bercovitz (2000, 2001) which 
may explain these contradictory findings. Thus, the outcome of enhanced latent inhibition with 
positive schizotypy (unusual experiences) and an attenuation of latent inhibition with cognitive 
disorganisation (akin to the negative symptoms of schizophrenia), are the first demonstrations 
of these phenomena in a sub-clinical population: 1) using a refined latent inhibition task and 2) 
that can account for variations in latent inhibition as specific effects of schizotypy, and by 
extension schizophrenia, which are not underpinned by anxiety. Future research would benefit 
from the use of factor-analysis to assess the details of this relationship, which currently remains 
open to debate.   
  
Overall, two within-participant experiments (Experiments 1 and 2) are reported that 
measure the effect of familiarity on learning without confounds of alternative effects that also 
retard learning and co-vary with schizotypy (e.g., learned irrelevance and conditioned 
inhibition). Consistent with some of the clinical literature (i.e., Rascle et al., 2001; Cohen et 
al., 2004; Gal et al., 2009), a positive association was found between the rate of learning to the 
familiar, but not the novel, stimulus and the unusual experiences dimension of schizotypy – 
implying abnormally persistent latent inhibition in high schizotypy individuals. The use of the 
task described in Experiment 2 is particularly encouraged, as this task successfully minimised 
the contribution of both conditioned inhibition and learned irrelevance on the preexposure 
effect. This implies a new procedure that is an efficient tool (taking only 7 minutes to complete) 
to investigate the anomalous expression of latent inhibition and presents a potentially useful 
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tool for assessing attentional dysfunction in schizophrenia, as well as other clinical and sub-
clinical populations. The aim of Experiments 3 and 4 were to provide complimentary evidence 
of these findings using an alternative task that also measures an effect of attention on learning; 
learned irrelevance. If learned irrelevance is underpinned by the same unitary mechanism (e.g. 
Mackintosh, 1975) as latent inhibition, it would be expected that the effect of schizotypy, and 
anxiety, observed in a refined latent inhibition paradigm (Experiments 1 and 2) to be 
comparable in a learned irrelevance paradigm (Experiments 3 and 4).  
 
5.1.2.2 Experiments 3 and 4 
 
c) Nature of the relationship between schizotypy, anxiety and learned 
irrelevance 
 
In contrast to latent inhibition, the learned irrelevance paradigm provides a less 
ambiguous measure of the impact of attention on learning (see Le Pelley et al., 2010a). The 
aim here was to employ a learned irrelevance procedure that could measure the associability of 
relevant versus irrelevant cues in subsequent learning, and subsequently assess the relationship 
between this task with measures of schizotypal traits and of anxiety. If differential performance 
on this task is related to high schizotypy (and by extension schizophrenia) in a similar way to 
that observed in Experiments 1 and 2, this would provide support for the attentional deficit 
view of schizophrenia.  
 
Interestingly however, both Experiments 3 and 4 provide findings contrary to 
predictions. Based on the results from Experiments 1 and 2 (enhanced latent inhibition in high 
schizotypy individuals), a superior effect of learned irrelevance in high schizotypy individuals 
was expected. Instead, there were no significant correlations between schizotypy and overall 
discrimination score, and neither relevant nor irrelevant cues. The results of Experiments 3 and 
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4 are however comparable, as both sets of results indicate that the associability of the cue that 
was previously relevant, was higher than the cue that was previously irrelevant, but only in 
participants who were low in anxiety. Participants who were high in anxiety showed, 
numerically, the opposite pattern of results (increased learning to irrelevant cues), although the 
difference in the associability of these cues was not significant. These results indicate that we 
are observing an insensitivity to the difference between relevant and irrelevant information in 
high state anxiety individuals. This finding is also in contradiction to our prediction; based on 
the findings from Experiments 1 and 2, we expected to find no effect of anxiety on learned 
irrelevance. What these opposing findings mean, from Experiments 1 and 2; and Experiments 
3 and 4, in terms of applications of attentional associative models to these sub-clinical traits 
and by extension, their related pathologies, is discussed in section 5.1.3.  
 
Interestingly, and to the best of knowledge, the present data constitute the first 
observation of disrupted learned irrelevance in high state anxious individuals. Existing research 
findings suggest anxiety results in decreased attentional control, characterised by an increase 
in distractibility by irrelevant information (see Braunstein-Bercovitz et al., 2002; Eysenck et 
al., 2007, 2009). The current results corroborate this and extend it to circumstances in which 
attentional biases are acquired during learning. Here, people with high levels of state anxiety 
failed to show the normal attentional bias towards information that was relevant to the solution 
of a learning task. This suggests an association between everyday anxiety and a disruption of 
people’s appropriate allocation of attention to stimuli based on their previous experiences. This 
discovery is important because the natural variation in attention that stems from people’s 
interaction with the environment permits them to tune out irrelevance. If this is disrupted, then 
the repercussions are substantial, as a diminished ability to tune out irrelevance may slow the 
solution of complex tasks and perpetuate a focus on unimportant information (see Hullinger et 
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al., 2014). At this juncture however, the causal status of the relationship between disrupted 
learned attention and anxiety was unclear. It remained to be determined whether high anxiety 
caused an inability to direct attention, or alternatively whether the inability to distinguish 
previously relevant from irrelevant cues induced a state of anxiousness. Experiments 5 and 6, 
discussed in the following section, aimed to address this research proposition.  
 
5.1.2.3 Experiments 5 and 6 
 
a) Nature of the relationship between induced anxiety and learned irrelevance 
(PART 1) 
 
The aim here was to introduce a mood induction procedure to examine the relative 
influence of induced state anxiety on learned attention, using the established learned 
irrelevance task previously employed in Experiment 4 (see also Le Pelley et al., 2010b). The 
effectiveness of stress, relaxation and neutral mood conditions to induce variations in levels of 
state anxiety were explored first before assessing their ability to influence learned variations in 
attention. Based on the findings from Experiments 3 and 4, a reduced attentional bias towards 
previously established predictive cues was expected in individuals induced with an acute state 
of anxiousness, relative to individuals induced with either a relaxed or neutral mood state.  
 
Across both Experiments 5 and 6 mood induction procedures successfully manipulated 
participants’ reported level of state anxiety. From pre-test to post-test state anxiety scores 
significantly increased for individuals in the speech stressor condition; decreased in the 
relaxation condition; with no significant difference in the neutral condition. A similar pattern 
of results across mood conditions was observed at follow-up in Experiment 6; suggesting 
participants’ manipulated level of state anxiety sustained throughout the duration of the study. 
On the basis that stress elicits anxiety (e.g., Houston, 1987) it was assumed that state anxiety 
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levels per se, were elevated in the speech stressor condition as compared to the relaxation and 
neutral control conditions. We first assessed how the results compared to Experiments 3 and 4 
by calculating a total state anxiety score and dichotomising participants into high and low 
anxiety groups, before moving on to investigate the 3 separate mood induced conditions and 
their relationship with learned irrelevance. 
 
When the data were collapsed across the stress, relaxation and neutral mood conditions 
and participants scores dichotomised into high and low anxiety groups the pattern of results are 
comparable to Experiments 3 and 4. Only low state anxious individuals showed increased 
learning towards the cue that was previously relevant than the cue that was previously 
irrelevant; whereas high anxious individuals show a reduction of this effect. It is important to 
note the interaction between cue relevance and state anxiety (high vs low) in Experiment 6 was 
not significant but follow up analyses revealed a comparable pattern of results. This weaker 
relationship between state anxiety and learned irrelevance observed by the non-significant 
interaction suggests that induced variations in anxiety do not have the same relationship with 
learning as naturally occurring variations in anxiety, as observed in Experiments 3 and 4. This 
proposition is further supported by the non-significant interaction between cue relevance and 
the 3 individual mood conditions (stress, relaxation and neutral conditions), indicating no effect 
of induced variations in anxiety on learning about either the previously relevant or irrelevant 
cue. Interestingly, the pattern of results denoted by the speech, relaxation and neutral mood 
induction conditions indicate, if anything, an increase in learning towards the previously 
predictive cue in high state anxiety individuals (in the speech condition) compared to low state 
anxiety individuals (in the relaxation and neutral condition), albeit a non-significant result. This 
observation is in the opposite direction to the pattern of results reported in Experiments 3 and 
4, and when these mood conditions are collapsed across and dichotomised into high/low 
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anxiety groups in Experiment 6. Suggesting that induced levels of acute anxiety have a 
fundamentally different effect on attentional processes and learning.  
 
One attempt to explain the differing findings across Experiments 3, 4, and 6, is that the 
mood induction procedures utilised in Experiment 6 were designed to invoke an acute state of 
anxiety. At this juncture it is unclear whether it is a chronic build-up of stressful life events that 
push an individual’s level of state anxiety to a certain threshold, and it is only when this chronic 
threshold is reached that the consequence is a disruption of attentional processes, resulting in 
an inability to tune out irrelevance. Previous research dissociates between acute and chronic 
stress, suggesting that induced acute stress leads to a narrowing of attention to task-relevant 
attributes, and thus improves attentional selectivity. Whereas chronic stress, lead to the 
broadening of attention, rendering the person vulnerable to intrusions from task irrelevant 
information (for a review see: Chajut & Algom, 2003). The results from Experiment 6 possibly 
lend support this dissociation as there was a trend for individual in the stress induced condition 
to demonstrate better learning about the previously relevant cue than individuals in the 
relaxation condition. Here it would be ideal to make a comparison with individuals who are 
experiencing a chronic state of anxiety; however, for Experiments 3 and 4 it is only possible to 
gauge participant’s level of current experienced anxiety, not the duration of their 
symptomatology. Thus it would be of interest for future research to include an additional 
psychometric measure of symptom duration to assess whether it is symptom chronicity in high 
anxious individuals that correlates with their impaired attentional inhibition; disrupted learned 
irrelevance.  
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a) Nature of the relationship between anxiety, schizotypy and learned 
irrelevance (PART 2): Mediation analysis 
 
The high correlations of schizotypal scale scores with anxiety scale scores suggest that 
schizotypal scales may contain an anxiety factor; and that anxiety scale scores may contain a 
schizotypy factor. This, together with data which indicate dopaminergic involvement in 
schizotypality (Caplan & Guthrie, 1994; Silver, 1995) and anxiety (McIvor et al., 1996; Nutt 
et al., 1998; Peroutka et al., 1998), and that anxious individuals are distracted by irrelevant 
stimuli as previously measured by ‘latent inhibition’ (Braunstein-Bercovitz, 2002; see Chapter 
1, section, 1.6.1.2), reinforces the possibility that the co-existence of these states may account 
for the observed selective attention deficits in these individuals.  Using a direct measure of 
learned irrelevance, the aim here was to assess whether schizotypy mediates the relationship 
between state anxiety and disrupted learned irrelevance, in a similar way to that previously 
investigated by Braunstein-Bercovitz (2000) with reference to latent inhibition. This aim was 
addressed using two mediation models. The first assessed whether unusual experiences and 
trait anxiety mediated the relationship between state anxiety and learning about the previously 
predictive cue (Model 1), and the second assessed whether unusual experiences and state 
anxiety mediated the relationship between trait anxiety and learning about the previously 
predictive cue (Model 2). In line with our predictions, the results from Model 1 suggest that it 
is only when unusual experiences and trait anxiety co-vary with state anxiety that individual’s 
experience an inability to demonstrate the normal attentional bias towards information that had 
previously been relevant the solution of a learning task (disrupted learned irrelevance). 
Similarly, Model 2 revealed state anxiety and unusual experiences also mediate the relationship 
between trait anxiety and learned irrelevance.  
 
Overall, these findings provide an important advancement in the current literature that 
learned irrelevance is impaired in anxious (state or trait) individuals who are also characterised 
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by high levels of schizotypy, and by extension vulnerability to schizophrenia. The predictive 
validity of psychometrically assessed positive and negative schizotypy to predict the 
development of schizophrenia-spectrum disorders has been supported by a 10-year longitudinal 
study carried out by Kwapil et al. (2013) in a non-clinical sample of University students (mean 
age = 19.3 years), thus representing a similar sample of participants to those reported in this 
thesis.  
 
The current findings also support the suggestion that the co-variation between 
schizotypy, anxiety and latent inhibition observed by Braunstein-Bercovitz (2000, 2001) were 
actually observing an effect of learned irrelevance. How learned irrelevance co-varies with 
individuals experiencing clinically co-morbid anxiety with psychosis is a key area of focus for 
future research. 
 
5.1.3 Implications of findings  
Based on single-process models of attentional learning, such as Mackintosh (1975) and 
Pearce and Hall (1980), the mechanism underlying an effect of latent inhibition should be the 
same mechanism underling an effect of learned irrelevance. Both of these models assume that 
latent inhibition is generated by an attention-like mechanism, resulting from a reduction in the 
processing of the stimulus during non-reinforced preexposure. And, learned irrelevance is 
viewed as reflecting a change in the processing (in terms of a change in attention or 
associability) as a result of irrelevance pre-training. Thus Mackintosh (1975) explains latent 
inhibition and learned irrelevance as the result of a failure to encode the relationship between 
the preexposed stimulus and the US (see also Le Pelley, 2004; McLaren & Mackintosh, 2000). 
However, in contradiction to the assumptions of these models that assume there is only one 
mechanism of associability (α), the results of the current studies demonstrate a double 
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dissociation. Experiments 1 and 2 showed an enhanced effect of latent inhibition with 
schizotypy but not with anxiety, whereas Experiments 3 and 4 showed a reduced effect of 
learned irrelevance with anxiety, but not with schizotypy. The fact that schizotypy and anxiety 
did not have comparable effects on both latent inhibition and learned irrelevance suggests that 
these sub-clinical personality characteristics (and by extension their clinical counterparts) may 
influence attention differently and furthermore, that attention is not a unitary system. Thus 
neither the Mackintosh nor the Pearce-Hall model can provide a full account of the current 
results as such single-process models would assume that if schizotypy (or anxiety) modulates 
latent inhibition, it should also modulate learned irrelevance in the same way. The following 
sections discuss the limitations of single-process models before moving on to describe how the 
current results provide novel support for dual-process models of attention and learning. 
 
One problem with assuming a single theory of associability is that the single-process 
models conflict with each other in the view of associability that they support. For example, the 
approach developed in the Mackintosh (1975) model was that good predictors of an outcome 
maintain high associability, while the associability of poor predictors falls. The results of 
various extant studies (e.g., Le Pelley and McLaren, 2003; Le Pelley et al., 2010a; Haselgrove 
et al., 2015) provide support for this view. Contrastingly, the Pearce-Hall model instead 
suggests that learning proceeds faster with stimuli that are inaccurate predictors of an outcome, 
and slows with stimuli that are accurate predictors of an outcome (e.g., Kaye & Pearce, 1984). 
As a consequence of the evidence supporting these two opposing views of associability, dual 
process models of attention on learning have been proposed (e.g., Le Pelley, 2004; Esber & 
Haselgrove, 2011). Such models combine the ideas encapsulated in both the Mackintosh and 
Pearce-Hall models in an attempt to capture the strengths of each and provide a full account of 
the way in which processing afforded to a stimulus changes as the result of past experience.  
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Le Pelley (2004) proposed that the simplest way to reconcile the Mackintosh (1975) 
and Pearce-Hall (1975) models would be to describe them as each measuring different 
properties of a cue, rather than being rival descriptions of the same property (associability). In 
this way Le Pelley describes the Mackintosh α as ‘attentional associability’, determining which 
stimuli should be selected for learning on the basis of their predictive history; and describes 
the Pearce-Hall α as ‘salience associability’, determining how much should be learnt about 
those stimuli, given that they have been selected. Given these proposed differences, Le Pelley 
labelled ‘attentional associability’ of the Mackintosh model as α and the ‘salience associability’ 
of the Pearce-Hall mode as σ and incorporated the two properties as multiplicative factors for 
associability change, thus creating a dual-process model of associability. Applied to learned 
irrelevance, this model suggests that during uncorrelated CS/US exposure, the CS is a poorer 
predictor of the US than is the experimental context, and thus the attentional associability (αCS 
determined by the Mackintosh, 1975 equations) of the CS will fall. As the CS and the context 
is a relatively poor predictor of the US, the salience associability of the CS (σCS determined by 
the Pearce-Hall, 1980 equations) will be relatively high. However, the low α of the CS 
following uncorrelated CS/US exposure will ensure that learning between the CS and US 
during subsequent conditioning will be slower compared to a novel CS. Applied to latent 
inhibition, this dual process model assumes that preexposure to a CS with no consequence (in 
the absence of reinforcement) will thus not affect αCS but because the absence of reinforcement 
following the CS are not surprising, there will be a decline in σCS. Consequently, non reinforced 
exposure to the CS will reduce its ability to enter into an association with the US on subsequent 
conditioning trials, compared to a novel CS that has not been exposed to this decrease in 
salience associability. As such, this model can account for the independent effects of learned 
irrelevance by including a variable of attentional associability (following the Mackintosh 
approach) and of latent inhibition by including a variable of salience associability (following 
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the Peace-Hall approach). This model therefore demonstrates that latent inhibition and learned 
irrelevance can be separated into dissociable components and the current findings provide a 
novel confirmation of this by demonstrating the modulation of these separable effects and their 
double dissociation with schizotypy and anxiety. How the current results also provide support 
for an alternative dual process model of attention on learning (Esber & Haselgrove, 2011) is 
discussed next.  
 
 The preceding discussion has focused on a dual process (hybrid) model which specifies 
how the components of the Mackintosh model (1975) and the Pearce-Hall model (1980) 
interact such that the appropriate mechanism dominates under a given set of circumstances (Le 
Pelley, 2004). Ultimately, suggesting that two different kinds of attentional mechanism are 
required to account for the effects of predictiveness and uncertainty. A second approach taken 
by Esber and Haselgrove (2011) however emphasises a single attentional process based on 
predictiveness (Mackintosh model), but in such a way so that the model can also account for 
uncertainty effects (Pearce-Hall model). In the spirit of the Mackintosh model, Esber and 
Haselgrove suggested that a cue acquires salience as a consequence of becoming a good 
predictor of outcomes, and loses salience as a consequence of being predicted by other events 
(e.g. the context).  
 
Applied to the results of the current experiments to the Esber-Haselgrove (2011) model 
then; the finding that attention is increased to good predictors of subsequent events (learned 
irrelevance; Experiments 3 and 4) and that attention can be reduced as a consequence of an 
outcome being predicted (latent inhibition; Experiments 1 and 2) can be fully accounted for 
with the Esber-Haselgrove model. Comparable to the application of the current findings to Le 
Pelley’s (2004) dual process model, the current findings thus present a novel confirmation of 
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the extant literature by demonstrating the modulation of these separable effects and their double 
dissociation with schizotypy and anxiety. Aside from associative learning theory, there are 
other reasons why the current double dissociation between learned irrelevance with schizotypy 
and anxiety may have been observed; these possibilities are discussed below. 
 
Other possibilities to consider for the observed double dissociation across the current 
experiments are simply that non-attentional accounts of latent inhibition (e.g. Hall, 1991; 
Bouton, 1993; 1997) may instead have some role in determining latent inhibition disruptions 
in schizophrenia. This would suggest the learned irrelevance paradigm to be a more reliable 
potential endophenotype. Another reason however could be that the current latent inhibition 
experiments are generating a purer effect of preexposure than has previously been 
demonstrated in the literature. As discussed in detail previously; many existing latent inhibition 
paradigms have been confounded by learned irrelevance and thus it is problematic to know 
whether existing schizotypy-latent inhibition findings (e.g. Evans et al., 2007; Schmidt-Hansen 
et al., 2009; Granger et al., 2012) are actually showing a relationship between schizotypy and 
learned irrelevance (Le Pelley et al., 2010a). Thus, by disentanging the effects of latent 
inhibition and learned irrelevance in the current experiments instead allowed an assessment of 
their independent effects on schizotypy and anxiety. Whilst schizotypy did not have a direct 
effect on learned irrelevance in the current experiments, it was found to mediate the relationship 
between anxiety and learned irrelevance which provides a novel extension of existing research 
findings in this area (Braunstein-Bercovitz, 2000, 2001; Le Pelley et al., 2010a). The fact that 
schizotypy did not have a direct effect on learned irrelevance could also have something to do 
with the inherent difference between single and compound learned irrelevance tasks. The 
learned irrelevance study by Le Pelley et al. (2010a) used a compound cue task (as opposed to 
the single cue task used in the current experiments) and reported a reduced learned irrelevance 
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effect in high positive schizotypy individuals. Within such compound cue paradigms, two cues 
(one relevant and one irrelevant cue) are presented on each trial. Thus if it is an inability of 
high schizotypal individuals and by extension schizophrenia, to block out irrelevant 
information then we can imagine the sensitivity to detect this effect to be higher in a task where 
participants have to choose between which two cues on the screen to pay attention too, as 
opposed to one single cue. This idea is explored further in section 5.1.4 for future research 
considerations. 
 
Nevertheless, the results from Experiments 3 and 4, contribute to existing knowledge 
regarding an attention deficit in individuals in a transient state of anxiety, when only using 
single cue training. This finding supports the proposal that anxious individuals not only exhibit 
a ‘specific’ hyper-vigilance towards threat related stimuli, but also a ‘general’ hyper-vigilance 
towards any task-irrelevant stimuli, in the absence of threat. In an extension of this finding, the 
key result from Experiment 6, suggests it is only when an individual experiences either state 
or trait anxiety accompanied by a vulnerability to psychotic tendencies that the end result is a 
disrupted learned attentional bias. Given the potential common underlying cognitive processes 
to both anxiety and schizophrenia, it seems likely that therapies which target the symptoms of 
anxiety (e.g., ABMT) would also be beneficial to individuals who have also been diagnosed 
with a psychotic disorder. Primary benefits may not only involve anxiety reduction but also 
reduced levels of schizophrenic symptomology; something which to the best of current 
knowledge has not been empirically reported in the literature. The clinical application of 
harnessing cognitive bias modification therapy developments for co-morbid anxiety and 
schizophrenia, are discussed in the following section. 
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5.1.4 Clinical applications and future directions for research 
 
Although clinical application and avenues for future research have been discussed in 
previous chapters, when the current research is viewed as a whole, a number of particularly 
promising avenues emerge.  
 
As previously discussed; the mediation analysis suggests that unusual experiences and 
trait anxiety together mediate the relationship between state anxiety and learned variations in 
attention; and similarly that unusual experiences together with state anxiety mediates the 
relationship between trait anxiety and learned variations in attention. The fact that all three 
variables predict disrupted learned irrelevance provides an extension of the findings reported 
by Braunstein-Bercovtiz (2001, 2002) which also suggest schizotypy, trait anxiety and 
induced-stress account for the disrupted ability to tune out irrelevance. Braunstein-Bercovitz 
(2000, 2001) demonstrated these findings using a latent inhibition task but as previously 
discussed this paradigm encompasses components of learned irrelevance; which provides a 
parsimonious comparison for the present results.  
 
Additionally, as briefly mentioned in the preceding sections, the identified mediators 
possibly account for the non-significant interaction observed between mood condition and cue 
predictiveness in Experiment 6 (see Chapter 4; section 4.3.2.3), as there were unknown co-
variates associated with induced state anxiety that were not experimentally manipulated. Thus 
it would be of interest for future research to not only experimentally manipulate anxiety but to 
also manipulate levels of schizotypy to fully examine the proposed mediation model. This 
proposition follows from the evidence that dopamine signalling is associated with normal 
variation in schizotypal traits. Following dopamine challenge, Woodward et al (2011) 
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demonstrated that total scores on the schizotypal personality questionnaire (SPQ; Raine, 1991) 
were correlated with dopamine release in the striatum. This, together with evidence of 
augmented dopamine release in patients with schizophrenia experiencing an acute phase of the 
illness; and a transient increase in positive psychotic symptoms in individuals with schizotypal 
personality disorder (Laruelle et al., 1999), suggests the link between d-amphetamine induced 
dopamine release and schizophrenia extends to normal variation in schizotypal personality 
traits. In addition to this, a relationship between increased dopaminergic activity and anxiety 
has also been established (McIvor et al., 1996; Nutt et al., 1998; Peroutka et al., 1998). Thus, 
D-amphetamine induced dopamine release may be a useful endophenotype for investigating 
the pharmacologic effects on cognition in relation to both schizophrenia and anxiety disorders. 
Further understanding of the genetic basis of schizophrenia and anxiety and importantly, how 
they interact, will allow further insight into how cognition might be pharmacologically 
improved which represents a major target for novel therapeutics in both clinical conditions.  
 
The implication is that people with diagnosed anxiety and schizophrenia will show 
reduced learned irrelevance in this task, and this remains for future research with a clinical 
population to determine. More generally though, this approach has the potential to 
disambiguate the psychological mechanisms underlying both psychiatric disorders and hence 
to advance our understanding of the cognitive changes associated with vulnerability to co-
morbid anxiety with psychosis. Thus, it would seem that current emerging technologies aimed 
at changing the cognitive biases underlying anxiety (i.e., Mathews and Macleod, 2000; Hertel, 
2002; Mackintosh et al., 2006; Mathews et al., 2007; Koster et al., 2009) require continued 
development for the high proportion of individuals with schizophrenia who are distressed by 
co-morbid anxiety. In support of this suggestion, existing findings suggest anxiety processes 
such as scanning for threat and confirmation bias are also common within psychosis, and it is 
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these underlying psychological processes which are associated with the onset and maintenance 
of phenomena associated with both conditions (Garety et al., 2001). Thus, it seems likely that 
therapies which target these symptoms would also be beneficial to individuals who have also 
been diagnosed with schizophrenia.  
 
However, there are a number of key questions that remain for future research to 
determine in order to understand in more detail, the complexity of the interaction between 
learned attention, anxiety and schizotypy. One question for future research would be to 
examine whether there are differences between the current results utilising a single cue learned 
irrelevance task and the development of a compound cue design (as previously used by Le 
Pelley et al., 2010a). As discussed in the previous section, it is possible that the intrinsic 
differences between these designs are accountable for why Le Pelley et al (2010a) noted a 
direct effect of schizotypy on learned irrelevance whereas the current experiences did not. 
Moreover, it would be of interest to explore the effects of state versus trait anxiety on a 
compound cue learned irrelevance task as existing studies (e.g. Pacheo-Unguetti, Acosta, 
Callejas & Lupiáñez, 2010) have demonstrated that different types of anxiety (state or trait) 
influence attentional processes differently. Trait anxiety for example has been associated with 
an impoverished attentional control for inhibiting distractor information (i.e., when two stimuli 
are presented and thus compete for processing resources) (Pacheo-Unguetti et al.). Such 
findings suggest a reason why we did not observe a direct effect of trait anxiety on learned 
irrelevance using a single cue task (as only one cue is present and thus there is no competition 
for processing resources). Such comparisons remain for future research to explore. It is also 
important to highlight that there is a large literature evaluating gender differences in learned 
attention tasks, particularly in the latent inhibition and schizotypy literature (see Baruch et al., 
1988a; Lubow et al., 2002 for a review). Thus future research may wish to consider exploring 
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the effects of gender to better understand the relationship between learned attention, schizotypy 
and anxiety. 
 
Predominantly, future research should endeavour to refine the current understanding of 
how anxiety and schizotypy disrupt learned attention in the real world environment. Through 
the use of online data collection, diary studies could be deployed where participants provide 
measurements of the types and levels of their anxieties, unusual experiences and variations in 
their attention. Coupled with this, participants could complete the learned irrelevance task 
outlined in Experiment 4 (and subtly different variations of this task i.e., a compound cue) over 
a period of 6-7 days to provide an insight into how cognition co-varies with the wax and wane 
of everyday chronic anxiety and variations in psychotic experiences. The use of focus groups 
with the general public and relevant stakeholders would provide qualitative data on the 
influence of anxiety, schizotypy and learned attention and provide an evidence base for the 
continued development of the relevant interventions discussed (i.e., attentional bias 
modification treatment). An extension of this idea would be to run a study using wireless 
activity trackers to collect real time psychophysiological data such as heart rate and galvanic 
skin response that could be used to corroborate the self-report, psychometric measure of 
anxiety (STICSA; Ree et al., 2008), and also schizotypy (O-LIFE; Mason et al., 1995) used in 
the current studies. The learned irrelevance task could be programmed on an App so that 
completion of the task could take place whilst psychophysiological data is recorded. This type 
of study could, in real time, assess the co-variation between cognition and symptoms of anxiety 
and psychotic experiences, which is key research that can appropriately inform future ‘attention 
based’ interventions for both sub-clinical/at risk populations for anxiety and schizophrenia. 
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5.1.5 Conclusions 
 
This thesis has aimed to address some of the key questions and limitations with existing 
research that evaluate latent inhibition and learned irrelevance as potentially useful cognitive 
endophenotypes for schizophrenia and anxiety disorders. Across 6 experiments, the findings 
suggest dissociation between schizotypy, anxiety and attention on learning using latent 
inhibition and learned irrelevance paradigms and urge continued use of the less ambiguous 
paradigm; learned irrelevance (as described in Experiment 4), as a potential cognitive 
endophenotype for both clinical disorders. 
 
The evidence presented in Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that a refined measure of latent 
inhibition generates an enhanced expression of latent inhibition, underpinned by the positive 
symptom dimension of schizotypy, unusual experiences, and an attenuation of latent inhibition, 
underpinned by the cognitive disorganisation dimension of schizotypy. These effects are 
independent of anxiety related symptoms. To the best of knowledge, the current data constitute 
the first demonstration of an enhanced latent inhibition effect in a non-clinical population, 
suggesting a heterogeneous latent inhibition distribution exists in both patients with 
schizophrenia and in high schizotypy individuals.  
 
 Across Experiments 3 and 4, learned irrelevance did not provide complementary 
evidence of the latent inhibition work. Instead, a reduced learned irrelevance effect was 
observed in high, state anxious individuals, with no direct effect on schizotypy. If anything 
there was a trend for reduced learned irrelevance on schizotypy – the opposite of that observed 
in the latent inhibition experiments. This observed double dissociation suggests latent 
inhibition and learned irrelevance are not governed by the same underlying, attentional 
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mechanism, which provides a way in which to challenge the single-process model of learning 
and attention (e.g., Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce & Hall, 1980).  Instead, the current results 
advocate a dual process model of attention on learning that can separate the effects of latent 
inhibition and learned irrelevance into dissociable components (e.g., Le Pelley, 2004; Esber & 
Haselgrove, 2011) and furthermore, that these can be modulated independently by schizotypy 
and anxiety; providing a novel confirmation of the existing literature. At this juncture though, 
it appears that there is an association between schizotypy and learned irrelevance, and it is this 
relationship that underlies deficits in selective attention (as previously demonstrated in existing 
research; Braunstein-Bercovitz et al., 2002) and in extension, learned variations in attention. 
This effect is only demonstrated however using the learned irrelevance paradigm (which also 
confounds Braunstein-Bercovitz’ findings); as opposed to the latent inhibition paradigm. A 
developed understanding of the pharmacological basis of learned irrelevance will shed more 
light on whether the two learning paradigms are similar or different. 
 
This work represents the first attempt to investigate the independent effects of latent 
inhibition and learned irrelevance on schizotypy and anxiety, using refined tasks that 
minimised the contribution of either learning phenomenon on each other. How these learning 
tasks co-vary in patients with schizophrenia and clinically diagnosed anxiety remains for future 
research to determine. The experiments reported in this thesis are considered the first step in 
attempting to truly disentangle the attention deficit in schizophrenia and anxiety disorders by 
considering their degree of overlap and thus their co-morbidity in sub-clinical populations. 
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Appendix 2: DSM-V Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD) Diagnostic Criteria 
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Appendix 3: The O-LIFE (Mason et al., 1995) 
  
  
     [1]   Do you prefer reading to meeting people?   YES NO 
     [2]  Do you often hesitate when you are going to say something in a group of people whom  
  you more or less know?   YES NO 
      [3]   Are you always willing to admit it when you have made a mistake?   YES NO 
      [4]   Do you sometimes put off until tomorrow what you ought to do today?   YES NO 
      [5]   Do you often overindulge in alcohol or food?   YES NO 
      [6]   Do you often feel that people have it in for you?   YES NO 
      [7]Are the sounds you hear in your day-dreams really clear and distinct?   YES NO 
      [8] Do you enjoy many different kinds of play and recreation?   YES NO 
      [9] Do your thoughts sometimes seem as real as actual events in your life?   YES NO 
  [10]   Do you have many different hobbies?  YES NO 
  [11]   Does it often happen that nearly every thought immediately and automatically suggests an  
  enormous number of ideas?  YES NO 
  [12]   When in a group of people do you usually prefer to let someone else be the centre of 
   attention?  YES NO 
  [13]   If you say you will do something do you always keep your promise no matter how  
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  inconvenient it might be?  YES  NO 
  [14]   Do you frequently have difficulty in starting to do things?  YES NO 
  [15]   Has dancing or the idea of it always seemed dull to you?  YES NO 
  [16]   When you catch a train do you often arrive at the last minute?  YES NO 
  [17]   Is trying new foods something you have always enjoyed?  YES NO 
  [18]   Do you always wash before a meal?  YES NO 
  [19]   Do you believe in telepathy?  YES NO 
  [20]   Do you often change between intense liking and disliking of the same person?  YES NO 
  [21]   Have you ever cheated at a game?  YES NO 
  [22]   Are there very few things that you have ever really enjoyed doing?  YES NO 
  [23]   Would you call yourself happy-go-lucky?  YES NO 
  [24]   Do you at times have an urge to do something harmful or shocking?  YES NO 
  [25]   Do you often worry about things you should not have done or said?  YES NO 
  [26]   Are your thoughts sometimes so strong that you can almost hear them?  YES NO 
  [27]   Do you usually take the initiative in making new friends?  YES NO 
  [28]   Do your thoughts ever stop suddenly causing you to interrupt what you are saying?  YES NO 
  [29]   Are you usually in an average sort of mood, not too high and not too low?  YES NO 
  [30]   Do you often take on more activities than you have time for?  YES NO 
  [31]   Would you take drugs which may have strange or dangerous effects?  YES NO 
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  [32]   Do you think you could learn to read other s minds if you wanted to?  YES NO 
  [33]   When in a crowded room, do you often have difficulty in following a conversation?  YES NO 
  [34]   No matter how hard you try to concentrate do unrelated thoughts always creep into  
  your mind?                 YES    NO 
  [35]   Are you easily hurt when people find fault with you or the work you do?  YES NO 
  [36]   Do you stop to think things over before doing anything?  YES NO 
  [37]   Have you ever felt that you have special, almost magical powers?  YES NO 
  [38]   Are you much too independent to really get involved with other people? YES NO 
  [39]   Do you ever get nervous when someone is walking behind you?  YES NO 
  [40]   Do ideas and insights sometimes come to you so fast that you cannot express them all?  YES NO 
  [41]   Do you easily lose your courage when criticized or failing in something?  YES NO 
  [42]   Can some people make you aware of them just by thinking about you?  YES NO 
  [43]   Does a passing thought ever seem so real it frightens you?  YES NO 
  [44]   Do you always practice what you preach?  YES NO 
  [45]   Would you dodge paying taxes if you were sure you could never be found out?  YES NO 
  [46]   Have you ever blamed someone for doing something you know was really your fault?  YES NO 
  [47]   Are you a person whose mood goes up and down easily?  YES NO 
  [48]   Does your voice ever seem distant or faraway?  YES NO 
  [49]   Do you think having close friends is not as important as some people say?  YES NO 
  [50]   Do you like doing things in which you have to act quickly?  YES NO 
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  [51]   Are you rather lively?  YES NO 
  [52]   Do you feel at times that people are talking about you?  YES NO 
  [53]   Are you sometimes so nervous that you are blocked ?  YES NO 
  [54]   Do you find it difficult to keep interested in the same thing for a long time?  YES NO 
  [55]   Have you ever insisted on having your own way?  YES NO 
  [56]   Do you dread going into a room by yourself where other people have already gathered  
  and are talking?  YES NO 
  [57]   Have you ever felt that you were communicating with someone telepathically?  YES NO 
  [58]   Does it often feel good to massage your muscles when they are tired or sore?  YES NO 
  [59]   Do you sometimes feel that your accidents are caused by mysterious forces?  YES NO 
  [60]   Do you like mixing with people?  YES NO 
  [61]   On seeing a soft thick carpet have you sometimes had the impulse to take off your  
  shoes and walk barefoot on it?  YES NO 
  [62]   Can you get a party going?  YES NO 
  [63]   Do you often have difficulties in controlling your thoughts?  YES NO 
  [64]   Do you feel that you cannot get close to other people?  YES NO 
  [65]   Do the people in your daydreams seem so true to life that you sometimes think they are real? YES NO 
  [66]   Do other people think of you as being very lively?  YES NO 
  [67]   Are people usually better off if they stay aloof from emotional involvements with people?  YES NO 
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  [68]   Have you ever broken or lost something belonging to someone else?  YES NO 
  [69]   Are you mostly quiet when you are with other people?  YES NO 
  [70]   Can just being with friends make you feel really good?  YES NO 
  [71]   Do you enjoy meeting new people?  YES NO 
  [72]   Is your hearing sometimes so sensitive that ordinary sounds become uncomfortable?  YES NO 
  [73]   Have you often felt uncomfortable when your friends touch you?  YES NO 
  [74]   When things are bothering you do you like to talk to other people about it?  YES NO 
  [75]   Do you ever have the sensation that your body or a part of it is changing shape?  YES NO 
  [76]   Do you have many friends?  YES NO 
  [77]   Are all your habits good and desirable ones?  YES NO 
  [78]   Do you tend to keep in the background on social occasions?  YES NO 
  [79]   Have you ever taken anything (even a pin or a button) that belonged to someone else?  YES NO 
  [80]   As a child were you ever cheeky to your parents?  YES NO 
  [81]   Would being in debt worry you?  YES NO 
  [82]   Have you ever felt when you looked in a mirror that your face seemed different?  YES NO 
  [83]   Do you think people spend too much time safeguarding their future with savings  
  and insurance?  YES    NO 
  [84]   Do you believe that dreams can come true?  YES NO 
  [85]   Do you ever have the urge to break or smash things?  YES NO 
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  [86]   Do you often feel that there is no purpose to life?  YES NO 
  [87]   Do things sometimes feel as though they were not real?  YES NO 
  [88]   Do you worry about awful things that might happen?  YES NO 
  [89]   Have you ever felt the urge to injure yourself?  YES NO 
  [90]   Would it make you nervous to play the clown in front of other people?  YES NO 
  [91]   Do you prefer watching television to going out with other people?  YES NO 
  [92]   Have you felt that you might cause something to happen just by thinking too much about it?  YES NO 
  [93]  Have you had very little fun from physical activities like walking, swimming, or sports?  YES NO 
  [94]   Have you ever been late for an appointment or work?  YES NO 
  [95]   Have you ever said anything bad or nasty about anyone?  YES NO 
  [96]   Do you feel so good at controlling others that it sometimes scares you?  YES NO 
  [97]   Are you easily distracted from work by daydreams?  YES NO 
  [98]   Are you easily confused if too much happens at the same time?  YES NO 
  [99]   Do you ever have a sense of vague danger or sudden dread for reasons that you do  
  not understand?  YES NO 
  [100]   Is it true that your relationships with other people never get very intense?  YES NO 
  [101]   Do you feel that you have to be on your guard even with your friends?  YES NO 
  [102]   Have you sometimes had the feeling of gaining or losing energy when certain people  
  look at you or touch you?  YES NO 
-264- 
 
  [103]   When coming into a new situation have you ever felt strongly that it was a repeat  
  of something that had happened before?  YES NO 
  [104]   Do you worry too long after an embarrassing experience?  YES NO 
  [105]   Do you love having your back massaged?  YES NO 
  [106]   Do you consider yourself to be pretty much an average kind of person?  YES NO 
  [107]   Have you ever taken advantage of someone?  YES NO 
  [108]   Would you like other people to be afraid of you?  YES NO 
  [109]   Have you ever thought you heard people talking only to discover that it was in fact  
  some nondescript noise?  YES NO 
  [110]   Have you occasionally felt as though your body did not exist?  YES NO 
  [111]   Do you often feel lonely?  YES NO 
  [112]   Do you often have an urge to hit someone?  YES NO 
  [113]   Do you often experience an overwhelming sense of emptiness?  YES NO 
  [114]   On occasions, have you seen a person s face in front of you when no one was in fact there?  YES NO 
  [115]   Do you feel it is safer to trust nobody?  YES NO 
  [116]   Is it fun to sing with other people?  YES NO 
  [117]   Do you often have days when indoor lights seem so bright that they bother your eyes?  YES NO 
  [118]   Have you wondered whether the spirits of the dead can influence the living?  YES NO 
  [119]   Do people who try to get to know you better usually give up after a while?  YES NO 
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  [120]   Do you often feel fed up ?  YES NO 
  [121]   Have you felt as though your head or limbs were somehow not your own?  YES NO 
  [122]   Do you ever become oversensitive to light or noise?  YES NO 
  [123]   When you look in the mirror does your face sometimes seem quite different from usual?  YES NO 
  [124]   Do you nearly always have a ready answer when people talk to you?  YES NO 
  [125]   Do people who drive carefully annoy you?  YES NO 
  [126]   Do you like telling jokes and funny stories to your friends?  YES NO 
  [127]   Do you sometimes boast a little?  YES NO 
  [128]   Are you very hurt by criticism?  YES NO 
  [129]   Do you feel lonely most of the time, even when you are with people?  YES NO 
  [130]   Would you call yourself a nervous person?  YES NO 
  [131]   Can you usually let yourself go and enjoy yourself at a lively party?  YES NO 
  [132]   Do you ever feel that your thoughts don t belong to you?  YES NO 
  [133]   Do you ever suddenly feel distracted by distant sounds that you are not normally aware of?  YES NO 
  [134]   As a child, did you do as you were told immediately and without grumbling?  YES NO 
  [135]   Do you sometimes talk about things you know nothing about?  YES NO 
  [136]   When you are worried or anxious do you have trouble with your bowels?  YES NO 
  [137]   When in the dark do you often see shapes and forms even though there’s nothing there?  YES NO 
  [138]   Can you easily get some life into a rather dull party?  YES NO 
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  [139]   Do you often have vivid dreams that disturb your sleep?  YES NO 
  [140]   Do you like plenty of bustle and excitement around you?  YES NO 
  [141]   Have you sometimes sensed an evil presence around you, even though you could not see it?  YES NO 
  [142]   Is it hard for you to make decisions?  YES NO 
  [143]   Do you find the bright lights of a city exciting to look at?  YES NO 
  [144]   Does your sense of smell sometimes become unusually strong?  YES NO 
  [145]   Do you usually have very little desire to buy new kinds of food?  YES NO 
  [146]   Are you often bothered by the feeling that people are watching you?  YES NO 
  [147]   Do you ever feel that your speech is difficult to understand because the words are all 
   mixed up and don’t make sense?  YES NO 
  [148]   Do you often feel like doing the opposite of what other people suggest, even though you  
  know they are right?  YES NO 
  [149]   Do you like going out a lot?  YES NO 
  [150]   Do you feel very close to your friends?  YES NO 
  [151]   Are you sometimes sure that other people can tell what you’re thinking?  YES NO 
  [152]   Do you ever feel sure that something is about to happen, even though there does not seem  
  to be any reason for you thinking that?  YES NO 
  [153]   Do you often feel the impulse to spend money which you know you can’t afford?  YES NO 
  [154]   Are you easily distracted when you read or talk to someone?  YES NO 
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  [155]   Are you a talkative person?  YES NO 
  [156]   Were you ever greedy by helping yourself to more than your share of anything?  YES NO 
  [157]   Do everyday things sometimes seem unusually large or small?  YES NO 
  [158]   Do you feel that making new friends isn’t worth the energy it takes?  YES NO 
  [159]   Have you ever taken the praise for something you knew someone else had really done?  YES NO 
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Appendix 4: STICSA State Subscale (Ree et al., 2008) 
Instructions 
Below is a list of statements which can be used to describe how people feel. 
Beside each statement are four numbers which indicate the degree with 
which each statement is self-descriptive of mood at this moment (e.g., 
1 = not at all, 4 = very much so). Please read each statement carefully and 
circle the number which best indicates how you feel right now, at this 
very moment, even if this is not how you usually feel. 
                                                                                                                                                           Not at                                                                                           Very 
                                                                                                                                                              All                        A Little                 Moderately                   Much So 
1. My heart beats fast. 1 2 3 4 
2. My muscles are tense. 1 2 3 4 
3. I feel agonized over my problems. 1 2 3 4 
4. I think that others won’t approve of me. 1 2 3 4 
5. I feel like I’m missing out on things because I can’t make up my mind soon enough. 1 2 3 4 
6. I feel dizzy. 1 2 3 4 
7. My muscles feel weak.   1 2 3 4 
8. I feel trembly and shaky 1 2 3 4 
9. I picture some future misfortune. 1 2 3 4 
10. I can’t get some thought out of my mind.   1 2 3 4 
11. I have trouble remembering things. 1 2 3 4 
12. My face feels hot. 1 2 3 4 
13. I think that the worst will happen. 1 2 3 4 
14. My arms and legs feel stiff. 1 2 3 4 
15. My throat feels dry.   1 2 3 4 
16. I keep busy to avoid uncomfortable thoughts.   1 2 3 4 
17. I cannot concentrate without irrelevant thoughts intruding.   1 2 3 4 
18. My breathing is fast and shallow. 1 2 3 4 
19. I worry that I cannot control my thoughts as well as I would like to.  1 2 3 4 
20. I have butterflies in the stomach.   1 2 3 4 
21. My palms feel clammy. 1 2 3 4 
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Appendix 5: STICSA Trait Subscale (Ree et al., 2008) 
 
Instructions 
Below is a list of statements which can be used to describe how people feel. 
Beside each statement are four numbers which indicate how often each 
statement is true of you (e.g., 1 = not at all, 4 = very much so). Please read 
 each statement carefully and circle the number which best indicates 
 how you often, in general, the statement is true of you. 
                                                                                                                                                           Not at                                                                                           Very 
                                                                                                                                                              All                        A Little                 Moderately                   Much So 
1. My heart beats fast. 1 2 3 4 
2. My muscles are tense. 1 2 3 4 
3. I feel agonized over my problems. 1 2 3 4 
4. I think that others won’t approve of me. 1 2 3 4 
5. I feel like I’m missing out on things because I can’t make up my mind soon enough. 1 2 3 4 
6. I feel dizzy. 1 2 3 4 
7. My muscles feel weak.   1 2 3 4 
8. I feel trembly and shaky 1 2 3 4 
9. I picture some future misfortune. 1 2 3 4 
10. I can’t get some thought out of my mind.   1 2 3 4 
11. I have trouble remembering things. 1 2 3 4 
12. My face feels hot. 1 2 3 4 
13. I think that the worst will happen. 1 2 3 4 
14. My arms and legs feel stiff. 1 2 3 4 
15. My throat feels dry.   1 2 3 4 
16. I keep busy to avoid uncomfortable thoughts.   1 2 3 4 
17. I cannot concentrate without irrelevant thoughts intruding.   1 2 3 4 
18. My breathing is fast and shallow. 1 2 3 4 
19. I worry that I cannot control my thoughts as well as I would like to.  1 2 3 4 
20. I have butterflies in the stomach.   1 2 3 4 
21. My palms feel clammy. 1 2 3 4 
 
 
